21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 375a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2104QUINCriminal law — Driving while license suspended or revoked — Evidence — Statements of defendant — Corpus delicti — Defendant’s admission to his identity to deputy at scene of traffic stop is not admissible where other evidence admitted is not sufficient to establish prima facie case of driving while license suspended or revoked with knowledge
STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, vs. VINCENT GEORGE QUINN, Defendant. County Court, 20th Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Criminal Division.. Case No. 13-1109-T. January 3, 2014. Peter A. Bell, Judge. Counsel: Caitlin Sorenson, Assistant State Attorney, for Plaintiff. Kerry E. Mack, Mack Law Firm, Chartered, for Defendant.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE having come before this Honorable Court on November 14, 2013, the Court having heard argument of counsel and being fully and otherwise advised in the premises does hereby find as follows:
Corpus Delicti was raised by the defense as an objection to the admissibility to any admissions made by the Defendant. The Defendant never waivered from making this objection. Additionally, the defense objected to all inadmissible hearsay the State was attempting to offer for the truth of the matter asserted.
In light of those objections, the Court would be limited in admitting in evidence any admissions of the Defendant until the State has presented enough independent evidence to establish a prima facia case that the Defendant (the man in the courtroom on the day of trial with the black shirt with gold flowers) was driving a vehicle while his license was suspended and he knew his license was suspended. If the Court could, at some point, make that finding then the admissions would be admissible but would not be able to be used by the finder of fact to render a guilty verdict unless the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and the Defendant was the person who committed the crime and any admissions of the Defendant would need to be corroborated by independent evidence.
In light of the above parameters the Court must look to what evidence was admitted separate from the Defendant’s admissions or hearsay which the Defendant has asked not be considered and which therefore should not be considered, which would therefore be the following:
1. Deputy Martinez stopped a vehicle.
2. The driver, the person who was at the trial wearing a black shirt with yellow flowers, was taken, after the stop, by the Deputy to an address, to-wit: 11141 Oceanspray Blvd., Englewood, FL 34224.
3. The driver was a white male approximately 48 years of age.
4. The State was in possession of a driving record for an individual named Vincent Quinn whose date of birth is 12/25/1964, who’s residence address was 11141 Oceanspray Blvd., Englewood, FL 34224 and whose driver’s license was suspended for a period of one (1) year as of November, 2012, for a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.
The above evidence would be insufficient to serve as a basis for finding there was a prima facia case of driving whle license suspended or revoked with knowledge. (See State v. Snowden, 345 So,.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)) That being the case, Defendant’s admission that he was Vincent Quinn made to the deputy at the scene of the stop would be inadmissible.
It is therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the charge in the above-styled and referenced case must be dismissed.
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