21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 881a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2109BENJInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Cancelled policy — Collateral estoppel — Trial court correctly barred insurer from pursuing affirmative defense that insured did not have coverage at time of accident due to cancellation of policy where issue had previously been litigated in action against insurer brought by different assignee of insured
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. MICHAEL L. DOUGLAS, D.C., P.A., d/b/a RAPID REHABILITATION, INC., a/k/a RAPID REHAB, INC., a/a/o CYNTHIA BENJAMIN, Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case No. 11-3298 CACE. L.T. Case No. 08-19729COCE (52). April 7, 2014. Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Leonard Feiner, Judge. Counsel: Lara J. Edelstein, of United Automobile Insurance Company Office of General Counsel, for Appellant. Marlene S. Reiss, Marlene S. Reiss, P.A.; Nicole Malick, Nicole Malick, P.A., Fort Lauderdale; and Douglas A. Harrison, Law Office of Douglas A. Harrison, P.A., for Appellee.
OPINION
(PER CURIAM.)
(RODRIGUEZ POWELL, J.) Appellant, United Automobile Insurance Company (“United”), appeals from the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of Appellee, Michael L. Douglas, D.C., P.A., d/b/a Rapid Rehabilitation, Inc., a/k/a Rapid Rehab, Inc., a/a/o Cynthia Benjamin (“Rapid Rehab”). This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A) and section 26.012(1), Florida-Statutes. Having carefully considered the briefs filed by the parties, the record on appeal and applicable law, we dispense with oral argument and affirm the decision of the trial court.Facts
On December 31, 2008, Rapid Rehab, as the assignee of Cynthia Benjamin (“Benjamin”) filed a one-count complaint for breach of contract against United seeking to recover personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits pursuant to an insurance policy issued by United to Benjamin. According to the record, Benjamin was injured in an automobile accident on October 1, 2006. On January 28, 2009, United filed its answer and affirmative defense. Specifically, United asserted a single affirmative defense that Benjamin did not have a policy of insurance at the time of the alleged loss because the policy had previously been cancelled for non-payment of the premium. Rapid Rehab filed a reply asserting that United’s “no coverage” affirmative defense was barred by, inter alia, collateral estoppel. Specifically, Rapid Rehab argued that the issue of coverage had previously been litigated in a Miami-Dade County lawsuit (“Miami-Dade Action”) arising out of the same automobile accident, and involving the same insured and United, but a different assignee.
On May 29, 2009, United filed a motion for summary judgment, specifically arguing that Benjamin was not covered under the insurance policy on the date of the alleged loss. In opposition to United’s motion for summary judgment, Rapid Rehab filed a motion requesting that the trial court take judicial notice of: (1) United’s motion for summary judgment that was filed in the Miami-Dade Action; and (2) the order entered by the Miami-Dade court determining coverage under the subject insurance policy. Additionally, Rapid Rehab filed a motion for adjudication of coverage for collateral estoppel. The record reflects that the trial court granted Rapid Rehab’s motion and denied United’s motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the parties stipulated that the medical bills were related, reasonable, and medically necessary. As a result, on January 31, 2011, the trial-court entered final judgment in favor of Rapid Rehab.
On February 8, 2011, United timely filed the instant appeal. United argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied its motion for summary judgment and determined that United was collaterally estopped from pursuing its coverage defense.
Under Florida law, “[a] trial court’s ruling that relief is barred on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel is reviewed de novo.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Michael I. Libman, 46 So. 3d 1101, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D2390a] (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Likewise, a court reviews an order granting or denying summary judgment de novo. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly S465a]. Under Florida law,
[c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a judicial doctrine which, in general terms, prevents identical parties from relitigating issues which have already been decided. The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues are identical, and the particular matter is fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Courts have emphasized that collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding. Collateral estoppel does not require prior litigation of an entire claim, only a particular issue.
Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 853 So. 2d 1125, 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) [27 Fla. L. Weekly D1152a] (internal citations omitted).
First, United argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because the Miami-Dade Action and the instant case involved different assignees, and therefore, different parties. Although each case involved a different assignee, each assignee received an assignment from the same insured, Ms. Benjamin. Under Florida law, “an assignee of an insurance claim stands to all intents and purposes in the shoes of the insured.” Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 125 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D562a]. Therefore, United’s first claim of error lacks merit.
Second, United argues that the same issues were not litigated in the Miami-Dade Action as in the instant case. Specifically, United claims that the Miami-Dade Action and the instant action were adjudicated on the basis of different statutory provisions. After a careful review, the record reflects that, although different statutory provisions were utilized in each case, the issue litigated in both cases was coverage. “Once a party has had an opportunity to litigate a matter in an action in a court of competent jurisdiction, he should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent.” Lorf v. Indiana Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Since the issue of coverage was determined in the Miami-Dade Action, the trial court was correct in finding that United was not entitled to summary judgment, and was otherwise collaterally estopped from pursuing its coverage affirmative defense.
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the court court’s final judgment is AFFIRMED. (BOWMAN and HAURY, JJ., concur.)
* * *
