22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 376a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2203SILVInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Where husband and wife claimants purchased vehicle intended for their sole use and possession and paid for insurance on vehicle, and named insured on vehicle policy had no involvement with vehicle other than co-signing for purchase, claimants could be entitled to statutory coverage under policy as beneficial owners of vehicle even though they were not named insureds on policy — Statutory coverage may extend to son as resident relative of beneficial owners — Where policy exclusion improperly limits coverage to named insured, court is obligated to construe policy as if it fully complies with statutory coverage requirements — Insurer is not entitled to summary judgment on coverage issue

SILVERLAND MEDICAL CENTER, a/a/o ELADIO MARTINEZ, a/a/o JULIO MARTINEZ, a/a/o MARIELA DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case Nos. 12-2483 CC 24, 12-2593 CC 24, 12-2544 CC 24. August 28, 2014. Rodolfo Ruiz, Judge. Counsel: Ryan Peterson, for Plaintiff. Sherria Williams and Daniel Buigas, for Defendant.ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FORFINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING NOCOVERAGE AND REQUEST FOR § 57.105 SANCTIONS

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on April 1, 2014, on Defendant’s, UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (“United”), Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding No Coverage and Request for § 57.105 Sanctions, and the Court having considered the Motion, Court file, applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, it is,

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED for the reasons set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

The three cases at issue involve competing interpretations of a personal injury protection (“PIP”) automobile insurance policy issued by United. The three claimants involved — Eladio Martinez, his wife Mariela Diaz, and their son Julio Martinez — maintain that they are entitled to PIP benefits despite the fact that they (1) are not “named insureds” under the United policy at issue; (2) did not live with the named insured; and (3) were not related to the named insured. The key facts in this matter are undisputed. Eladio Martinez (“Martinez”), and his wife, Mariela Diaz (“Diaz”), purchased a Chrysler 300 automobile (“Chrysler”) at a dealership. Ramon Bodano (“Bodano”), the named insured in United’s policy, accompanied the claimants to the dealership in order to guarantee a loan for the Chrysler because Martinez and Diaz did not qualify for the loan. Shortly after purchasing the vehicle, Martinez, Diaz, and Bodano purchased the PIP policy of insurance at issue. Bodano was listed as the “named insured” on the policy, while Martinez and Diaz were listed as additional drivers.

It is undisputed that Bodano had no involvement with the Chrysler apart from co-signing for its purchase. He did not drive in otherwise operate the vehicle, and resided in a separate household. The Chrysler was intended for the use and possession of Martinez, Diaz, and their family. Martinez and Diaz paid for the insurance, made payments on the Chrysler, and kept possession of the vehicle. They also had an agreement with Bodano that the Chrysler would be exclusively titled in their names once the automobile loan was paid off and the obligation of the security agreement was discharged.

On February 3, 2012, Martinez, Diaz, and their son Julio Martinez were involved in an automobile accident. They were treated by the Plaintiff, Silverland Medical Center (“Silverland”), which ultimately filed suit against United for unpaid medical bills. United maintains that it properly denied the claims at issue because there is no coverage for the subject loss under its policy. Specifically, United argues that because Martinez owns a 1989 Ford E350 van insured with Progressive, his policy with Progressive is the proper source for coverage regarding the claims at issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party is entitled to summary judgment in their favor if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S390a]; Calarese v. Weissfisch, 87 So. 3d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D1238c]. However, once the moving party has met its burden, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine and material disputed issue of fact. Tropical Glass & Const. Co. v. Gitlin, 13 So. 3d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D1163a].

ANALYSIS

United posits that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no coverage for the subject loss under its policy. Pursuant to Part E, Section 1 of the PIP policy at issue, coverage is afforded as follows:

We will pay benefits as a result of bodily injury caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and sustained by:

(a) the named insured or any resident relative while occupying a motor vehicle or while a pedestrian through being struck by a vehicle; or

(b) any other person, who does not own a motor vehicle or have coverage elsewhere, while occupying the insured motor vehicle, or while a pedestrian, through being struck by the insured motor vehicle.

Provision (f) in the “Exclusions” section of Part E goes on to state as follows: “This insurance does not apply: . . . (f) to any person, other than the named insured, if such person is the owner of a motor vehicle . . . ” (emphasis added). Consequently, United maintains that because Martinez is not the named insured in this case and owns another vehicle — a 1989 Ford E350 van — the aforementioned exclusion prohibits coverage for Martinez, Diaz, and Julio Martinez.

However, the exclusion relied upon by United is more restrictive than the limitations set forth under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. First and foremost, section 627.736(1) requires an insurance company to provide PIP benefits to the “named insured . . . resulting from bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle . . . subject to subsection (2) and paragraph (4)(e) . . .” Fla. Stat. § 627.736(1) (2012). Subsection (2) provides that policy exclusions are limited to the following:

(2) AUTHORIZED EXCLUSIONS. — Any insurer may exclude benefits:

(a) For injury sustained by the named insured and relatives residing in the same household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and not insured under the policy or for injury sustained by any person operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured.

(b) To any injured person, if such person’s conduct contributed to his or her injury under any of the following circumstances:

1. Causing injury to himself or herself intentionally; or

2. Being injured while committing a felony.

Fla. Stat. § 627.736(2) (2012). Therefore, the only exclusions authorized by Florida law are for individuals who are in a vehicle they own but is not insured under the policy, or for those who hurt themselves intentionally or feloniously. Moreover, section 627.736(4)(e), in pertinent part, provides as follows:

The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury protection benefits for:

1. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by the ownerwhile occupying a motor vehicle, or while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle if the injury is caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.

. . .

3. Accidental bodily injury sustained by a relative of the owner residing in the same household, under the circumstances described in subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., if the relative at the time of the accident is domiciled in the owner’s household and is not the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required under ss. 627.730-627.7405.

Fla. Stat. § 627.736(4)(e) (2012) (emphasis added).

Thus, where the injured person is either the owner of the vehicle or their resident relative, and is not the named insured, section 627.736 requires coverage. Here, Martinez and Diaz could be deemed beneficial owners of the insured vehicle (the Chrysler) even though they were not named insureds under the policy, and therefore coverage would be afforded under section 627.736(4)(e)(1).¹ In turn, Julio Martinez would be covered under section 627.736(4)(e)(3) as a resident relative of the beneficial owners.

Under the United policy, however, statutory coverage is effectively eliminated through the exclusion of “any person, other than the named insured, if such person is the owner of a motor vehicle.” Given that Bodano was the named insured and Martinez owned a Ford automobile insured by Progressive, coverage for Martinez, Diaz, and Julio Martinez would be prohibited in contravention of Florida law. See Custer Medical Center v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1089 n.1 (Fla. 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly S640a] (holding that “[t]he prohibition of policy exclusions, limitations, and non-statutory conditions on coverage controlled by statute is clear.”); Vasques v. Mercury Cas. Co., 947 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D363a] (stating that restrictions on statutorily mandated coverage must be carefully examined because exclusions that are inconsistent with the purpose of the statute are invalid) (citing Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 740, 745 (Fla. 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly S499a]); see also Nunez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 117 So. 3d 388, 398 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S440a].

Ultimately, this Court is obligated to construe the policy at issue as though the policy language is in “full compliance” with section 627.736 of the Florida Statutes. See Fla. Stat. § 627.418(1) (2012). Application of the operative policy exclusion to the facts at hand improperly limits coverage to the named insured only, and therefore summary judgment regarding coverage cannot be entered.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding No Coverage and Request for § 57.105 Sanctions is DENIED.

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¹The record reflects that genuine material issues of fact exist as to whether Martinez and Diaz qualify as “beneficial owners,” thereby entitling them to coverage under section 627.736(4)(e)(1). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartzog, 917 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D129a] (“[T]he law is clear that the name on the title is not the litmus test for determining who owns a vehicle for insurance purposes.”) “ ‘Owner’ means a person who holds the legal title to a motor vehicle; or, in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or leasewith an option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of ss. 627.730-627.7405.” Fla. Stat. § 627.732(5) (2012) (emphasis added). Here, Bodano accompanied the claimants to the dealership to serve as a guarantor. Martinez and Diaz were listed as additional drivers on the policy, paid for the PIP insurance in question, made vehicle payments, and kept possession of the vehicle. In addition, Martinez and Diaz had an agreement with Bodano that the vehicle would be titled in their names once the loan was paid off and the obligations of the security agreement were discharged. Consequently, summary judgment cannot be entered in favor of the Defendant based on Martinez and Diaz failing to qualify as owners of the Chrysler under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. See McQueen v. Roye, 785 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D1415a] (“A trial court is required to deny summary judgment where even the slightest doubt exists regarding the existence of material issues.”).

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