22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 124a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2201STATInsurance — Personal injury protection — Reimbursement — Schools — Sovereign immunity — Final judgment is rendered in favor of school board in action by PIP carrier against board for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid for injuries incurred while insured was occupant of school bus — Section 627.7405 does not waive school board’s sovereign immunity
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant. County Court, 10th Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County. Case No. 53-2011CC-004830-0000-00. July 22, 2014. Kevin Abdoney, Judge. Counsel: David B. Kampf and Sarah M. Sorgie, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., Tampa, for Plaintiff. W.A. “Drew” Crawford, Boswell & Dunlap LLP, Bartow, for Defendant.
FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This cause is before the Court for entry of Final Judgment on the Pleadings. In a previous order dated June 30, 2014, the Court granted a Motion for Rehearing filed by the Polk County School Board (“School Board”) and vacated and set aside its October 31, 2013 Final Judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Polk County Sch. Bd., Case No. 2011CC-4830 (Fla. Polk Cnty. Ct. Jun. 30, 2014). In the same June 30, 2014 order, the Court granted the School Board’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Id. The Court writes today for three reasons: First, to outline its rationale for granting the Board’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Second, to formally enter Final Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of the School Board; and Third, to dispose of all pending motions.I.
“The purpose of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is to test the legal sufficiency of a cause of action or defense where there is no dispute as to the facts.” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc., 134 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D1990a](quoting Barentine v. Clements, 328 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). “A party can only obtain judgment on the pleadings if it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings and attachments thereto.” Id. (citing Hammond v. Decorator’s Serv., Inc., 522 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)). “The trial court must take all well-pleaded facts as true and the court’s sole inquiry is whether the complaint states a cause of action.” Id. (quoting Hammond at 522)(internal citations and quotations removed). “If a party refers to a document within the complaint, a trial court may rely on that document to determine the nature of the claim being alleged.” Id. (citing Veal v. Voyager Prop. & Cas. Ins., 51 So. 3d 1246, 1249-50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D164a]).II.
Based on the foregoing authority, the Court defers to the well-pled facts found in Plaintiff’s Complaint and the documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
On April 16, 2010, Eddie David Rodriguez-Rivera was operating a rental vehicle on Hemlock Avenue in Haines City, Florida. Mr. Rodriguez-Rivera ran a stop sign at the intersection of Hemlock and Poinciana Parkway and struck a school bus operated by the School Board. Brianna Chapman, one of the students riding in the school bus at the time of the crash, injured her neck as a result of the collision. After she was injured, Ms. Chapman sought medical treatment from a variety of providers and State Farm paid for her care with “Personal Injury Protection” (“PIP”) benefits due under a no-fault automobile insurance policy issued to Karen Faith Stanford, a private driver.
Between the date of the accident and September 9, 2010, Ms. Chapman’s physicians received $10,000 in PIP payments from State Farm. On January 14, 2011, State Farm sent a written demand to the School Board for “reimbursement” of its PIP payment losses pursuant to Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2010). The School Board did not tender any reimbursement to State Farm.
On October 14, 2011, State Farm filed a single-count Complaint against the School Board with the Clerk of the Polk County Court alleging that the Board’s school bus qualified as a “commercial motor vehicle” under the PIP law and that the Board had a statutory duty, as both operator and insurer of the bus, to reimburse State Farm, due to its status as a private passenger automobile insurer. The School Board answered State Farm’s Complaint and denied all material allegations. Fourteen months later, on January 23, 2013, the School Board moved for judgment on the pleadings, as a matter of law. In its Motion, the Board invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity and argued that as “an agency of the State of Florida” it should “not subject to the provisions of the indemnity and/or contribution statute” in the PIP law.III.
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that a sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission, has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries and is based on the principle that ‘the King can do no wrong.’ ” Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly S980a],(quoting Glassman v. Glassman. 309 N.Y. 436, 131 N.E. 2d 721 (1956)). “The doctrine was a part of the English common law when the State of Florida was founded and has been adopted and codified by the Florida Legislature.” Id. at 1094 (citing §2.02, Fla. Stat.). It “rests on two public policy considerations: the protection of the public against profligate encroachments on the public treasury, Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958), and the need for the orderly administration of government, which, in the absence of immunity, would be disrupted if the state could be sued at the instance of every citizen, State Road Department v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1941).” Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 396 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The School Board is a government agency entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Circuit Ct. of Twelfth Jud. Cir. v. Department of Nat. Res., 339 So. 2d 1113, 1114-15 (Fla. 1978)(citing, inter alia, Hampton v. State Bd. of Ed., 90 Fla. 88, 104 So. 323 (1925)). State Farm argues that Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2011), waives the School Board’s sovereign immunity and that the facts of this cause entitle it to reimbursement. Section 627.7405 says that:
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of [Florida’s PIP law], any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.”
A waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal, and statutes purporting to waive sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. Fessenden v. State, 52 So. 3d 1, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D2419b](quoting McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So. 2d 74, 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), and citing American Home Assur. Co. v. National R.R. Pass. Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 472 (Fla. 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly S516a]). Waiver will not be reached as a product of inference or implication. Spangler, supra at 424.
The Florida Legislature knows how to waive the sovereign immunity of a government agency. See, e.g., §768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2010)(“In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”). Upon examination of Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2011), and its related statutes, the Court finds that the PIP law does not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity. Because the PIP law does not expressly waive the sovereign immunity of the School Board, final judgment for the School Board is appropriate.
The Court’s decision is supported by the legislative history underlying Chapter 97-74, Laws of Florida. In Chapter Law 97-74, the Legislature amended the PIP law to delete a reference to “public school transportation” in Section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (the definition of “motor vehicle”). See §1, ch. 97-74, Laws of Fla. The Legislature however added a provision to Section 627.733(1), Florida Statutes, exempting “school bus[es]” from maintaining required PIP security. See §2, ch. 97-74, Laws of Fla. The apparent intended effect of Chapter 97-74 was twofold: 1) to provide parents whose children were injured while riding a school bus a means to obtain PIP benefits from their own no-fault insurers; and, more importantly, 2) to reduce the overall liability costs for school districts. See Fla. H.R. Comm. On Ed. Serv., H.B. 9 (1997), Staff Analysis (final May 23, 1997). The indication in the legislative history of intended cost savings for school districts weighs heavily against finding a waiver of sovereign immunity because waiver would actually increase costs for school districts, instead of reducing them, since districts would theoretically be subject to the Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes, reimbursement mandate.
For the reasons articulated in this opinion, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Per the Court’s order of June 30, 2014, the School Board’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.
2. Final Judgment on the Pleadings is ENTERED in this matter in favor of the School Board. State Farm shall take nothing by its Complaint and the School Board shall go henceforth without day.
3. All pending Motions before the Court, including State Farm’s Motion for Entitlement to Attorneys Fees and Costs and Motion for Final Summary Judgment are DENIED.
4. The Court reserves jurisdiction to consider such collateral matters to this Final Judgment on the Pleadings as may be appropriate, to include the issues of attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.
