22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 532c
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2205CARBInsurance — Attorney’s fees — Attorney who withdrew as counsel prior to resolution of case was not entitled to award of attorney’s fees notwithstanding fee agreement stating that attorney is entitled to fee upon judgment or settlement after withdrawal
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. DR. MICHAEL SURDIS d/b/a BROWARD CHIROPRACTIC & PAIN REHABILITATION CENTER, (a/a/o RAFAEL CARBONELL), Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case Nos. CACE11008527 and CACE12003274. L.T. Case Nos. COCE06008239 and COCE06008235. September 15, 2014. Appeal from County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Gary Cowart. Counsel: Michael J. Neimand, Office of the General Counsel, United Automobile Insurance Company, Trial Division, Miami, for Appellant. Marlene S. Reiss, Marlene S. Reiss, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
CORRECTED OPINION[Original Opinion at 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 80a]
(HAURY, Judge.) We withdraw our opinion dated June 6, 2014 and substitute this corrected opinion in its place. United Automobile Insurance Company (“United”) appeals a portion of the attorney fee award in favor of Dr. Michael Surdis d/b/a All Broward Chiropratic & Pain Rehab Centers, a/a/o Rafael Carbonell (“Surdis”).1 Specifically, United contests that portion which awarded attorney fees to Todd Link for services performed prior to the stipulation for substitution of counsel whereby Link voluntarily withdrew as counsel of record.2 Since the issue is entitlement to fees our standard of review is de novo.
We reverse the award of attorney fees to Mr. Link pursuant to United Automobile Insurance Company v. Miramar Injury Center, Inc. a/a/o Sandra Giraldo 10-017018 CACE 04 (Fla. 17th Cir. App. Ct. March 7, 2013) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 80b].3
The fee agreements provide “[c]lient agrees that the law firm is entitled to a fee upon judgment or settlement of the claim after withdrawal”. We believe such a provision is an ineffective attempt to draft around Faro v. Romani, 641 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1994) and a violation of the comment to R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16 which states that lawyers should not accept representation unless it can be performed to completion. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the attorney fee award in favor of Mr. Link and remand for modification of the Judgment and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Reasonable Attorney’s Fee and Costs consistent with this opinion.
Surdis’ Motion for Rehearing and Clarification is otherwise denied. Mr. Link is not entitled to an attorney’s fee pursuant to either § 627.428 (1), Fla. Stat. (1992) or § 627.736 (8), Fla. Stat. (2006) for the reasons set forth above. (BOWMAN and POWELL, JJ., concur.)
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1Since the facts here are virtually identical with those of United Automobile Insurance Company v. Dr. Michael Surdis d/b/a Broward Chiropractic & Pain Rehab Centers (a/a/o Vivian Garcia), case no.: CACE12003274 the cases are consolidated for the purposes of this opinion.
2United does not contest the fees awarded to successor counsel.
3A copy of the opinion is attached. Although the fee agreement was not part of the record in Miramar it is here.
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