23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 571a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2306CUARInsurance — Summary judgment — Factual issues — Insurer’s motion for summary judgment as to late billing is denied — Opposing affidavit based on personal knowledge and establishment of routine practice of medical provider created genuine issue of material fact regarding submission of bills
DORAL HEALTH CENTER, P.A. (A/A/O SIDNEY JULIAN CUARTAS), Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami Dade County. Case No. 13-0278 SP 24. August 10, 2015. Donald J. Cannava, Judge. Counsel: Charles Hubley, Patiño Law Firm, Hialeah, for Plaintiff. Sherria Williams, Office of the General Counsel, Miami, for Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTIONFOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTREGARDING LATE BILLING
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court for hearing on July 8th, 2015, for Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Late Billing, and the Court, having reviewed the pleadings and motions, heard the argument of Counsel, and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, the Court Finds and Orders as follows:
The Court finds there to be a genuine issue of material fact as it relates to whether the Plaintiff, Doral Health Center, P.A., timely submitted the bills at issue in this claim to the Defendant.
The affidavit filed by the Plaintiff in response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment creates a genuine issue of material fact relating to the submission of bills in that the affidavit testimony is based on both personal knowledge and the establishment of the routine practice of the Plaintiff organization in submitting medical bills to insurers. See Fla. Stat. 90.406; Tabb v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n, 880 So.2d 1253, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D1982b](The existence of a routine practice creates an inference that an agent or employee of the organization acted according to the practice) quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Alvarez, 443 So.2d 279, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)(“The impact of Section 90.406 on the case at hand is that [the defendant’s] testimony as to the routine practice of the insurance agency is not to be disregarded, as it was below, merely because it is uncorroborated and indeed is contradicted by [the plaintiff’s] ‘eyewitness’ denial; instead, [the defendant’s] testimony is to be weighed and considered by the trier of fact as any other type of evidence.”)(Emphasis Added); see also Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics v. Dunn, 977 So.2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D2755a].
Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Late Billing is hereby DENIED.
