23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 219b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2303WARNInsurance — Personal injury protection — Small claims — Doctrine of de minimis non curat lex does not preclude small claims action seeking less than $100 in PIP benefits — Error to base dismissal in part on affirmative defense that medical provider did not bring action in good faith because it did not attempt to mitigate damages by reaching out to insurer before initiating litigation — PIP statute only requires that claimant submit presuit demand letter, which provider did
DR. CRAIG POGUE, a/a/o JOYCE WARNER, Appellant, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 20th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Lee County. Case No. 13-28 AP. L.C. Case No. 12-50592 SC. February 19, 2015. Appeal from the County Court for Lee County; Archie B. Hayward, Jr., Judge. Counsel: Michael C. McQuagge, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Kenneth P. Hazouri, Orlando, for Appellee.
(PER CURIAM.) The Appellant, (“Dr. Pogue/Plaintiff”) appeals an order by the County Court in and for Lee County, in its small claims capacity, granting Appellee’s (“State Farm/Defendant”) motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1). The underlying issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of de minimis no curat lex (the “de minimis doctrine/doctrine”) applies to the amount in controversy so as to create a jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy in small claims court. For the reasons stated below, the Court answers this question in the negative.
Appellant filed an action in the County Court in its small claims capacity for recovery of overdue Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. The complaint listed the amount in controversy as more than $0.00 but less than $100. Appellee filed a “Motion to Dismiss as De Minimis Non Curat Lex,” in which it argued that the amount in controversy of $198.36 was trivial in nature, particularly in relation to the attorney and court costs that would incur. The amount in controversy was derived from a demand letter sent by Appellant to Appellee and was not included in the original complaint. A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss, at which Appellee contended that the amount in controversy was less than four percent of the amount that was actually paid to Appellant; therefore, Appellee contended the amount in controversy was de minimis.
Appellant countered that State Farm breached its contract by not fulfilling its contractual obligation to pay certain PIP payments, and the Florida Constitution, statutes, and rules authorize him to bring small claims actions; therefore, dismissing the claim as de minimis would result in the deprivation of his right to access the court. After the hearing, the County Court reserved ruling.
On July 16, 2013, the County Court entered a “Final Order Granting Motion to Dismiss.” In that order, the County Court noted that parties have a duty to engage in good faith litigation and to mitigate damages. It further noted that there is a split in the Circuit Courts as to whether or not the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex applies in PIP cases. Relying on Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla. 161 (Fla. 1858); Sanchez v. State Farm Ins. Co., 997 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D10a]; and a number of circuit and county court cases, the County Court ruled that Appellant had not acted in good faith to minimize or mitigate damages, the de minimis doctrine applies in PIP cases, and the suit was brought solely for the purpose of obtaining attorney fees. The motion to dismiss was granted, which resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of Appellant’s complaint.
Appellant filed a Motion for Rehearing on July 18, 2013. n the motion, Appellant argued that the Trial Court’s decision violated the separation of powers doctrine, because it overrode the statutorily regulated fee schedules set forth by the legislature that insurers are required to pay as PIP insurers. He further argued that the Trial Court’s order denied him access to the courts, particularly when the Florida Small Claims Rules allow a party to bring claims for minimal amounts of damages. Also, Appellant contended that by singling out small insurance claim disputes, the Trial Court was treating plaintiffs unequally. As it relates to the Trial Court’s “good faith” determination, Appellant countered that it followed every condition precedent to litigation under § 627.736. Furthermore, Appellant argued that the decision was contrary to the No Fault Statute, because the purpose of the statute is to ensure that the insured receive medical coverage and payments, which Plaintiff is now incapable of recovering under the reasoning of the Trial Court’s order. Lastly, he contended that he had a statutory right to collect attorney’s fees and that counsel for Appellant could only be awarded fees if they prevailed; therefore, it was wrong for the Trial Court to insinuate that he was bringing this claim solely to receive attorney’s fees. The Trial Court denied the motion for rehearing, and Appellant then initiated the instant appeal.
On appeal, Appellant argues that County Court decision to grant the motion to dismiss is wrong for the following two reasons: (1) the Trial Court committed fundamental error, because the standard for a motion to dismiss was not met, and (2) the Trial Court committed fundamental error by encroaching on the legislative branch by overriding § 627.736, Fla. Stat. which created both the fee schedule for defendants to pay and the procedure that plaintiffs were required to follow to seek redress from the courts.
As it relates to the first issue, Appellant argues that the standard for determination of the merits of a motion to dismiss a complaint is whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. According to Appellant, his complaint clearly stated a cause of action, breach of contract; therefore, the Trial Court erred in dismissing it. Furthermore, Appellant contends the Trial Court’s reliance on the doctrine of de minimis to dismiss his claim violates Art. V. Sec. 20 and Art. I Sec. 21 of the Florida Constitution by denying him access to court, because the Florida Constitution does not provide for a minimum amount in controversy only a ceiling for the amount that can be brought in a county court. Moreover, the creation of small claims procedures by the Florida Supreme Court demonstrates that any amount, regardless of how little, can be brought before a court provided there is a legally sufficient cause of action. Likewise, both § 34.041, Fla. Stat., which grants the Clerk the ability to establish a schedule for filing fees, and the Lee County Clerk filing fees for claims under a $100.00 demonstrate that such claims are cognizable pursuant to legislative mandate. Appellant notes that no constitutional provision, statute, or ordinance mandates a minimum amount in controversy; therefore, he contends the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss.
As it relates to the second issue, Appellant further argues that the Trial Court committed fundamental error by violating the doctrine of separation of powers when it overrode § 627.736 by ignoring the fee schedule and the requirements a plaintiff must meet in order to seek redress from the courts. Noting that the PIP statute requires providers to provide coverage for reasonable expenses for necessary medical services, he claims that the Trial Court improperly encroached on the legislature by allowing Appellee to underpay on the amount prescribed by the No Fault Law and allowing Appellee to breach its contract and underpay the insured. Furthermore, he asserts that the Trial Court added additional duties that a plaintiff must meet in order to bring an action in small claims court. To the extent the Trial Court found that Appellant did not engage in good faith and failed to mitigate damages, Appellant notes that Appellee did not raise this issue in its motion to dismiss. Moreover, the only condition precedents to litigation provided in the PIP statutes were followed here by Appellant. Namely, submitting a PIP Application to Appellee, obtaining a written Assignment of Benefits, timely submitting a benefit claim, and filing a demand letter. Lastly, Appellant argues that the Trial Court’s finding that Appellant brought this claim solely to collect attorney’s fees is speculative and unfounded, as counsel can only obtain attorney’s fees if Appellant is the prevailing party.
“To rule on a motion to dismiss, a court’s gaze is limited to the four corners of the complaint, including the attachments incorporated in it, and all well pleaded allegations are taken as true.” U.S. Project Mgmt., Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc., 861 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D2481b]. Likewise, on appeal, “[i]n reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss . . . [an appellate] court may not go beyond the four corners of the complaint and must accept the facts alleged therein and exhibits attached as true.” Edwards v. Landsman, 51 So.3d 1208, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D97a].
At the core of this appeal is the applicability of the doctrine of de minimis to the amount in controversy in small claims court. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex literally translates to “the law does not concern itself with trifles.” See also Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So. 2d 331, 338 (Fla. 1953) (stating that “[t]he legal maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex,’ simply means that the law does not care for small things.”). Furthermore, “[a]s to the application of the doctrine of ‘de minimis non curat lex,’ it appears that the determination of such is within the discretion of the chancellor.” McLaughlin v. Block, 159 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
One of the more important cases relied on by Appellee and the County Court for the doctrine of de minimis was the Florida Supreme Court’s 1885 decision in Milton, in which the Florida Supreme Court held, in part, that it would not remand a cause simply due to a “slight excess in the amount of the verdict.” The underlying claim in Milton originated when Blackshear sued Milton to recover $163.22 he claimed was owed to him for the sale of lumber sold and delivered on different dates in 1855. The trial court instructed the jury that if they find for Blackshear, then they will allow for interest on the amount owed. After trial, the jury found for Blackshear in the amount of $181.35. Milton argued on appeal that the trial court erred for, among other reasons, instructing the jury that it could apply interest to the amount owed if it found in favor of Blackshear. The Florida Supreme Court, noting that there was a conflict among the States as to whether interest should be applied, concluded the following principle will apply in Florida:
[I]n all cases where the demand sued for is a debt eo nomine, in contra-distinction to unliquidated damages, interest is allowable thereon from the time when the same becomes legally due and payable; and when no such time is ascertainable, then interest is allowable only from the date of an actual demand of payment, or of the commencement of the suit.
The Florida Supreme Court found that jury verdict was not in conformity with this principle, but found the following:
It is true that the verdict is not in strict conformity to the instruction, and had a motion been made for a new trial on that ground and refused, and were the error of such an amount as to demand consideration, we might be inclined to give the defendant a new trial, for the purpose of having it corrected. But the amount of the excess is so trifling, that acting upon the maxim of “de minimis non curat lex,” we are indisposed, by remanding the cause, to subject the parties to additional costs, which would probably amount to more than the actual excess of the verdict.
The excess interest payment amounted to $9.00 and $11.00 respectively, an amount, in sum, that the Florida Supreme Court found too small, in light of the principal demand, to subject the parties to further litigation. Accordingly, the Court denied Milton relief on this ground, and affirmed the jury verdict.
Notably, the decision in Milton was written approximately 82 years before the adoption of the rules of procedure for small claims. In re Summary Claims Procedure Rules, 203 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1967). In adopting the small claims rules, the Florida Supreme Court stated that these rules “shall govern all proceedings within the scope of these rules after midnight December 31, 1967,” and “shall supersede all conflicting rules and statutes.” Id, at 616 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the promulgation of these rules created a new framework for county courts to handle small and trivial claims. These small claims procedures were designed “to provide an open forum for the speedy resolution of disputes over minor claims.” Metro Ford, Inc. v. Green, 724 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D279a] (emphasis added). The Rules of Small Claims “do not create a ‘small claims court’ ” per se, rather “[t]hey simply create rules of procedure for use in county court when the amount in controversy is small.” LaSalla v. Pools by George of Pinellas County, Inc., 125 So. 3d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D1426a] (emphasis added). Notably, the scope of these rules apply to all civil actions in county courts that contain a demand for money or property that does not exceed $5,000; however, there is no minimum threshold dollar amount for these cases. See Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.010(b). Accordingly, the small claims rules do not expressly prohibit claims under a certain amount, such as the $50 threshold Appellee requested the County Court to use in order to dismiss several similar cases being brought at the time. The doctrine of de minimis cannot be used to create a minimum amount in controversy, because the very nature of small claims procedures contradicts the notion that “the law does not care for small things,” as the Florida Supreme Court stated in Loeffler when summarizing the doctrine of de minimis. Loeffler, 69 So. 2d at 338 (Fla. 1953). To apply such a threshold would, in essence, result in the amendment of the small claims rules by a county court decision, an authority that belongs solely with the Supreme Court of Florida. Based on the above, the Court finds that the use of the de minimis doctrine to dismiss a claim in small claims court based on the amount in controversy is inconsistent with the underlying policies and rationale of the small claims rules.
The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, which authorizes causes of action for overdue benefits, likewise does not contain any provision requiring a minimum amount in controversy in order to sue under the Statute. See §§ 627.730-627.7405, Fla. Stats. Similarly, the Florida Constitution and statutes do not limit access to court due to a small or minor amount in controversy. See Fla. Const. of 1968, Art. I. § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”) (Emphasis added); and § 34.041, Fla. Stat. (establishing a filing fee of $50 for all claims less than $100).
A review of case law does not show that the issue of the applicability of the de minimis doctrine to PIP claims in small claims cases has been addressed at the district court level; however, the issue with regard to PIP has been addressed, with varying determinations, at the circuit and county court levels. Appellant points to following cases in support of its contention that the doctrine of de minimis is inapplicable here: Radiology Regional Center, P.A. a/a/o Junior Jacques v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 505a (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2013); Karow Chiropractic Center, P.A. a/a/o Ronny Alguera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 518a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2013); and Doral Health Center, P.A. a/a/o Gema Salinas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1088b (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2013). The court in Radiology Regional did not give a reason for its denial of State Farm’s motion to dismiss. The court in Karow found that Florida Law does not support the use of the doctrine of de minimis in small claims PIP cases for breach of contract and unpaid benefit. It further noted that there was no binding case law on the applicability of the doctrine to PIP matters, and that the Florida Constitution and Florida Laws (the No-Fault Law and § 34.041) demonstrate that the doctrine is inapplicable. Finally, the County Court in Doral specifically cited to Milton, Loeffler, and McLaughin, but found them distinguishable, while also finding that the Florida Constitution guaranteed access to the courts no matter the amount in controversy and that other Florida Laws demonstrated that amounts in controversy less than $100 are cognizable claims. The Doral court also found that dismissal of the case would “contravene the very purpose of small claims court.”
On the other hand, Appellee points to the following cases in support of its contention that the doctrine of de minimis is applicable here: Florida MRI Inc. a/a/o Monica Maley v. AllState Indemnity Co., 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 417b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2011); Jeffrey Katzell, M.D., P.A. a/a/o Kelly Heatherly v. Mercury Insurance Co. of Florida, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 314a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2010); and United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Marta S. Alfonso, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 887a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2010). In Alfonso, the court found Milton to be controlling, and precluded litigation in the matter. The court in Florida MRI found that damages sought for $4.37 were trifling in amount and pursuant to the doctrine of de minimis the action should be dismissed. Notably, the court cited to the Alfonso case in support of its decision. Lastly, the court in Katzell relied on Milton to find that $75.91 was de minimis in nature, but, more importantly, the court admonished the plaintiff’s action in bringing this suit, because the defendant had actually paid the $75.91 but instead of making the check payable to the provider, the defendant made it payable to the attorney’s office and Plaintiff refused to recognize this payment. Based on these specific facts and the amount in controversy, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The district court case law on the doctrine of de minimis provided by Appellee in its brief is distinguishable in that the cases either pre-date the promulgation of the small claims rules or do not deal with matters heard in a small claims court. See Milton (predating small claims rules); Loeffler (predating small claims rules); Molter v. State, 892 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D2590b] (a criminal case); Durham v. State, 235 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (a criminal case); and Sanchez v. State Farm Ins. Co., 997 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D10a] (denying an appellate attorney’s fee request as de minimis). Moreover, from a public policy perspective, finding the doctrine of de minimis inapplicable in small claims cases would discourage insurance companies or other institutions from intentionally underpaying contractual payments based on a belief that they can get a case dismissed in small claims court as de minimis. The Court having had an opportunity to review the case law and the small claims rules finds Appellant’s position well founded and reasoned, because the applicability of the doctrine of de minimis in small claims cases would contravene the very purpose of having small claims rules.
Lastly, as it relates to Appellee’s contention that Appellant did not act in good faith by bringing this litigation, because it did not attempt to mitigate its damages by reaching out to State Farm, “[d]ismissal should not be granted on the basis of an affirmative defense, except when the face of the complaint is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of that defense.” Wilson v. County of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D1800a]. Notably, the duty to mitigate damages in a breach of contract case is an affirmative defense. Iannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1249a]. Pursuant to § 627.736(10)(a), Fla. Stat., the only condition precedent to filing an action for benefits is the filing of a demand letter, which both parties conceded occurred here. Accordingly, Appellant only needed to provide a demand letter prior to instituting litigation under the No Fault Law and as the complaint does not, on its face, demonstrate a failure to mitigate damages or failure to comply with the No Fault Law, the County Court erred in basing, in part, it decision to grant Appellee’s motion to dismiss on Appellee’s affirmative defense of failure to mitigate. Furthermore, to the extent the order finds that Appellant brought this case solely for an award of attorney’s fees; such fees are only awarded to a prevailing party, so if plaintiffs bring meritless suits then their attorneys receive no award of fees. See § 627.428, Fla. Stat. Also, nothing within the four corners of the complaint itself indicates any bad faith dealing or attempt to bring this action solely for attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, based upon the Florida Supreme Court’s promulgation of the Rules of Small Claims, the doctrine of de minimis cannot be used to dismiss a claim based on the amount in controversy in PIP claims brought in small claims proceedings. The Trial Court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss is reversed, and the cause is remanded to proceed in accordance with this opinion. (KRIER, K. KYLE, and MASON, JJ., concur.)
