23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 169a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2302JOHNInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Medical expenses — Reasonableness of charges — Summary judgment — Opposing affidavits filed by insurer do not preclude summary judgment in favor of medical provider on issue of reasonableness of charges where one affiant omitted and ignored damaging information to render “expert” opinion, and second affiant premised her opinion on incorrect assumptions and insufficient data — Where it is undisputed that insurer applied permissive statutory fee schedule that was not unambiguously elected in policy, PIP reductions made by insurer are unlawful — Insurer also erred in denying reimbursement for compensable supply that was properly billed as separate code

FLORIDA INJURY & REHABILITATION CENTERS, INC. ala/o Digiggi Johnson, Plaintiff, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 11-19779 SP 25 (3). April 17, 2014. Patricia Marino Pedraza, Judge. Counsel: Matthew C. Barber, Landau & Associates, P.A., Hallandale Beach, for Plaintiff.

FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFAND AGAINST DEFENDANT

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on April 7, 2014 on Plaintiff’s Motion(s) for Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the Motions, the entire Court file, and the relevant legal authorities, having heard argument, having made a thorough review of the matters filed of record, and having been sufficiently advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:I. Background and Findings

1. This case arises out of a claim for Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) benefits as a result of an automobile accident occurring on or about February 8, 2010. Defendant issued a policy of insurance which included $10,000.00 in PIP benefits which did inure to the benefit of Digiggi Johnson (“Claimant”) and was in full force and effect at all times relevant to the accident occurring. Claimant sustained pain and injuries from the accident.

2. Following the accident, the Claimant presented to Florida Injury & Rehabilitation Centers for date of service February 8, 2010 for treatment to the injuries sustained in the accident on the same, billed in the amount of $1,250.00

3. There is no dispute that Plaintiff timely submitted proper Health Insurance Claim Forms (“HCFAs”). There is no dispute that notice of accident was timely given and that written notice of a covered loss was provided. There is no dispute with the assignment of benefits.

4. In response to the HCFAs received, Defendant elected to pay benefits pursuant to Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)2f. State Farm’s explanation of review dated March 9, 2010 show reason codes 305 (“The allowed amount for this procedure is based upon the Participating Level of Medicare Part B fee schedule for the region in which services were rendered” (Reference: CMS Physician Fee Schedule File)), 433 (“Pursuant to Florida Statute 627.736(5), The allowable amount has been calculated pursuant to Florida Statute 627.736(5), the maximum reimbursement for this procedure may not exceed the applicable fee schedule or other payment methodology established pursuant to the Workers Compensation Fee Schedule (s. 440.13)”), and 432 (“The allowed amount for this procedure is based upon 200% of the 2007 Participating Level of Medicare physician fee schedule for the region in which the services were rendered, which is higher than the current fee established for the date of service, pursuant to Florida Statute 627.736(5).”) as the only bases for State Farm’s automatic reductions of Plaintiff’s bills.

5. State Farm also refused to allow HCPCS code A4556 (electrodes supply) based upon reason code 53 (“Supplies are subject to local carrier discretion and are not separately payable if incidental to physician’s services, otherwise refer to DMERC policy.”).

6. Plaintiff also submitted a pre-suit demand letter to the Defendant, which requested payment for dates of service February 8, 2012. Defendant did not pay additional amounts in response to the demand letter as State Farm responded that “A review of this claim indicates payment for DOS 2/8/10 was issued correctly and timely.” Therefore, Plaintiff filed and served this lawsuit seeking full remuneration for the charges incurred.

7. Defendant thereafter filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses, raising as its First Defense that “Defendant paid an appropriate and an allowable amount to the Plaintiff pursuant to the terms, conditions, limitations, and exclusions of the subject policy of insurance under which the instant claim is made, as well as Fla. Stat. §627.736(5)(a)1[.]” Notably, the First Affirmative Defense is in direct contradiction to the explanation of review which states “if an insurer limits payment as authorized by subparagraph 2., the person providing such services, supplies, or care may not bill or attempt to collect from the insured any amount in excess of such limits, except for amounts that are not covered by the insured’s personal injury protection coverage due to the coinsure amount or maximum policy limits. F.S. 627.736(5)(a)5.” Subparagraph 2 in this context refers to the so-called permissive fee schedule.

8. Defendant also raised its Third Affirmative Defense which alleges that A4556 is not reimbursable. Defendant later added its Fourth and Fifth Affirmative Defenses.

9. The deposition of adjuster Harold Ly was taken on November 30, 2012. State Farm’s witness confirmed that State Farm did not find anything defective or insufficient about the medical records/bills and received from Plaintiff and that State Farm is not alleging a failure to complete a condition precedent. See deposition transcript at p. 26:10-25.

Harold Ly also testified that “Based upon my review of the explanation of review, the services billed by your client on February 8, 2010 were considered reasonable, and the amounts were calculated based on what is identified in the explanation of review excluding the service for the electrodes which was for A4556, that particular code was not reimbursable.” See deposition transcript at p. 28:16-22. Harold Ly reiterated that “All the services were considered reasonable and covered under the insurance policy, except one as it was an unbundled service from electrical stimulation and not part of a separate identifiable service.” See deposition transcript at p. 39:1-5.

Harold Ly also testified that State Farm is relying on DMERC policy to deny or reduce A4556, although Mr. conveniently did not have the DMERC policy at the deposition. See deposition transcript at p. 31:14-21

Mr. Ly again testified that the medical records substantiate what services were billed. See deposition transcript at p. 38:15-20.

Mr. Ly also testified that payment in this case was based on “200 percent of participating level of Medicare Part B” even though the insurance policy does not indicate as much. See deposition transcript at p. 39:15-23; p. 40:7-13; and, p. 41:21-25. Mr. Ly was consistent on this point when he admitted that was no evidence that usual and customary charges and reimbursement levels were considered by State Farm. See deposition transcript at pp. 43-50.

Notably, Mr. Ly was requested in the duces tecum to bring “7. All reasonable proof that the services are not overdue, including those documents and/or materials which Defendant relies and/or relied on to deny or reduce the claim prior to suit.”

10. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment as to Reasonableness, Relatedness and Medical Necessity. Plaintiff filed the Affidavit of Dr. Robert S. Frankl, D.C. in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and its position that the treatment and services rendered by Plaintiff were reasonable, medically necessary and related to the automobile accident, and that A4556 (electrodes supply) was reimbursable. Plaintiff also filed the affidavit of Anicia Vicente. Dr. Frankl opined that the treatment and services were reasonable, related and necessary based upon his expertise, experience, education and a review of the medical records. Ms. Vicente’s affidavit shows what payments are accepted by the medical provider, the basis for setting the charges, and the reasonableness of the charges.

11. In opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, State Farm filed the affidavit of Frank Lavergne (an adjuster for State Farm) and the affidavit of Nicole Bonaparte (an alleged coding expert).II. Conclusions

12. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), summary judgment is warranted “if the pleadings, and summary judgment evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).

13. This Court finds that Plaintiff met its prima facie burden. Plaintiff satisfied its burden on more than one occasion. State Farm filed no evidence in opposition to relatedness and medical necessity. As it pertains to reasonableness, the affidavit of Dr. Frankl, the affidavit of Ms. Vicente and the deposition of Harold Ly all show that the charges are reasonable.

14. This Court rejects the affidavit of State Farm’s adjuster, Frank Lavergne. First off, State Farm did not comply with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e) which requires that opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters set forth therein.

15. Secondly, Mr. Lavergne does not show any basis for his personal knowledge or his competency to testify that the medical bills are reasonable or not reasonable in this case. Furthermore, neither Mr. Lavergne, nor State Farm, establish that the medical provider even takes or bills Medicare or workers compensation; in fact, the evidence shows that it does not. Therefore, the affidavit of Mr. Lavergne is insufficient, noncompliant with Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(e) and Florida Evidence Code 90.956, lacking foundation, and conclusory.

16. State Farm did not establish that Frankl Lavergne’s opinion is admissible. See Weaver v. Corey, 111 So.3d 947, 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D874d] (merely tabulating totals and doing math, as Darrell Spell has done in this case, is not the province of an “expert”). In addition, Florida’s new admissibility standard closely mimics the Federal Rules of Evidence and the rule set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert requires trial courts to act as a “gatekeeper” regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, focusing “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595; see McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F. 3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) [15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C839a]. As a gatekeeper, the court must determine whether expert testimony “has been subjected to the scientific method; it must rule out subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). In this case, it is apparent that Frank Lavergne, and conversely State Farm, cherry-picked information. For instance, Mr. Lavergne’s entire opinion is based upon Florida’s worker’s compensation fee schedule, Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)2f, Medicare fee schedule and New Jersey state medical fee schedule. See paragraphs 9-11 of the affidavit. Mr. Lavergne’s foundation is conveniently nondescript. Notably, Mr. Lavergne’s affidavit omits consideration of usual and customary charges, payments accepted by the provider, reimbursement levels in the community and other information relevant to reasonableness, as indicated in Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)1. That is, Mr. Lavergne only considered one of the five factors permitted under s.(5)(a)1. The Second DCA has held that evidence of contractual discounts is insufficient to prove a medical provider’s charges are unreasonable. The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, et al. v. Peggy Auld Fernandez, 664 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D2650b] (contractual discount evidence included contracts with health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, Medicare, Medicaid and Workers Compensation).

17. Mr. Lavergne’s affidavit and conclusions are quite incredible when considered in conjunction with the New Jersey fee schedule allowable amounts at paragraph 12 of the affidavit. The unauthenticated data unequivocally shows that the New Jersey state fee schedule allowable amounts exceed the allowed amounts by State Farm in this case for CPT codes 72070, 72110, and 73030.

18. Furthermore, in United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hallandale Open MRI, Inc., Case No. 12-19662 CACE, at 6 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. App. Ct., Dec. 11, 2013) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 399d], the appellate court found a witness to be “unqualified to render an opinion on whether [the] charge for the subject MRI was reasonable” when the witness has never worked for an MRI provider, had no knowledge of what hospitals in the county charge for the MRIs, had no knowledge as to what other MRI providers located in the county charge for the same procedure, and had never provided any billing or accounting services to MRI providers. Mr. Lavergne does not meet anyone of the standards set forth by the appellate court.

19. Without gilding the proverbial lily, in Florida an expert’s testimony is inadmissible if it is grounded on insufficient data, speculation, conjecture or incorrect assumptions. See The Doctors Company v. State of Florida, Department of Insurance, 940 So.2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2341a] (holding that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony which was a mere conduit for hearsay or which does not have a sufficient basis); and, M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A. et al. v. Khosrow Maleki, P.A. et al., 932 So.2d 459, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D1524c] (finding it was error to admit testimony of expert which was not based on a recognized methodology and is ‘unsupported by any discernible, factually-based chain of underlying reasoning’). There is no question that Mr. Lavergne cherry-picked information, omitted other information or ignored damaging information to make his “expert” opinion.

20. Likewise, this Court rejects the affidavit of Nicole Bonaparte as it pertains to A4556. Ms. Bonaparte’s opinion is premised on incorrect assumptions and insufficient data in that State Farm failed to provide her, or she purposefully chose to ignore, the entire medical chart of the patient, which was attached to both Dr. Robert S. Frankl, D.C.’s and Ms. Anicia Vicente’s affidavits. Indeed, the Ms. Bonaparte’s affidavit only attaches 5 pages of supporting records which include 2 pages of HCFAs and 3 pages of an Explanation of Review from State Farm. Furthermore, Ms. Bonaparte’s opinion relies on Medicare and the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). See paragraphs 11, 15 and 17 of the affidavit. An affidavit which does not provide underlying data, relies on insufficient data and incorrect assumptions cannot create an issue of fact to avoid summary judgment. Furthermore, State Farm cannot use Ms. Bonaparte’s affidavit which relies on unauthorized Medicare limitations. State Farms’s explanation of review shows that A4556 is reimbursable under Medicare Part B, but subject to local carrier discretion. Finally, although not necessary and it is not the basis for rejecting the affidavit, this Court also finds that Ms. Bonaparte’s opinion is arguably not admissible as required by R. 1.510 in that State Farm has already admitted that Nicole Bonaparte was not retained as an expert for this case. Admissions are binding and conclusively prove the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g., Rule 1.370(b); Holland v. CSX Transportation, et al., 583 So.2d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)(trial court may not disregard an admission at summary judgment hearing); and, Lutsch v. Smith, 397 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(an admission between parties is a fact without need for supporting evidence). In effect, State Farm’s reliance on Ms. Bonaparte’s affidavit is an ambush tactic which deprived Plaintiff of due process. See by analogy Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981)(which while not exactly on point does state that prejudice is “the surprise in fact of the objecting party” and stated that prejudice does not depend on the testimony’s adverse nature); and, by analogy, Ellison v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1954)(a party cannot create jury question by baldy repudiating prior testimony without explanation). It does seem strange and unfair to admit that someone was not retained as an expert and then spring that very witness’s affidavit on the opposing party 2 business days prior to a dispositive summary judgment hearing. Quite obviously: Plaintiff had no knowledge that this affidavit would be forthcoming; State Farm intentionally admitted the witness would not be used; and the surprise would potentially delay the resolution of the case and disrupt the trial court.III. Opinion

21. Because State Farm has not provided substantial, competent evidence in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no question of fact that the charges are related to the accident, medically necessary and reasonable and usual and customary in price. Plaintiff’s summary judgment must be granted. See Rose v. Dwin, 762 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D1083c] (where the proponent of expert testimony offers such expert testimony, the opponent of such expert testimony, in order to create a factual issue for the trier of fact, must (1) present countervailing expert testimony; (2) severely impeach the proponent’s expert; or (3) present other evidence which creates a direct conflict with the proffered expert opinion). See again Ellison (which is directly on point with regard to the deposition transcript of Harold Ly wherein he admits that charges were considered reasonable by State Farm but paid at fee schedule).

22. Furthermore, this Court finds that Plaintiff succeeds on summary judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Geico Gen. Ins. Co. vs. Virtual Imaging Service, Inc., SC-12-905 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S517a] is controlling. In Virtual Imaging III, the Supreme Court concluded “that the insurer was required to give notice to its insured by electing the permissive Medicare fee schedules in its policy before taking advantage of the Medicare fee schedule methodology to limit reimbursements.”

23. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that there are two reimbursement methods permitted under the 2008 amendments to the PIP statute and that the PIP statute “offered insurers a choice in dealing with their insureds as to whether to limit reimbursements based on the Medicare fee schedules or whether to continue to determine the reasonableness of provider charges for necessary medical services rendered to a PIP insurer based on the factors enumerated in section 627.736(5)(a)(1).” Consistent with Kingsway Amigo Ins. Co. v. Ocean Health, Inc., 63 So.3d 63, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D1062a], the PIP insurer must give notice and elect the Medicare fee schedule methodology in its policy. The Supreme Court further held that “a PIP insurer cannot take advantage of the Medicare fee schedules to limit reimbursements without notifying its insured by electing those fee schedules in its policy.”

24. In this case, it is undisputed by virtue of the explanations of review and the deposition of State Farm’s witness Harold Ly that the insurer applied the Medicare fee schedules found at s.(5)(a)2 to limit reimbursement in this claim. State Farm did not, when making reimbursements and reductions for this claim, consider the enumerated factors of s.(5)(a)1 and/or its policy. The insurance policy states under PIP it pays “80% of all reasonable expenses incurred.”

25. Therefore, the PIP reductions by State Farm were unlawful as a matter of law because the PIP policy agrees to pay reasonable medical expenses and does not make an unambiguous election of limiting reimbursement to 80% of “200 percent of the allowable amount under the participating physicians schedule of Medicare Part B.” See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Feel Better Medical Rehab, Inc. a/a/o Norwig De Jesus Silva, Consolidated Case Nos. 12-042 and 12-127 AP (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. App. 10/23/13)(wherein the three-judge appellate panel Per Curiam Affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict for the medical provider when State Farm paid at an unelected fee schedule). See also Partners in Health Chiropractic a/a/o Neocles Lebrun v. United Auto, 21 So.3d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D2177a] (holding that “an insurer may deny a PIP claim in whole or in part either before or after that claim becomes ‘overdue [because not paid within thirty days]’ provided it has ‘reasonable proof’ that it is not responsible for payment”); and, Florida Medical & Injury v. Progressive, 29 So.3d 329, 341 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D215b] (noting that “[n]one of the EOB’s raised the issue of incomplete D&A form” which waived the PIP insurer’s right to object to payment on that basis). State Farm did not have reasonable proof because it did not make an analysis of the reasonableness of the charges, as indicated by the explanations of review.

26. Two more recent appellate case are instructive. In Hialeah Medical Assoc., Inc. a/a/o Ana Lexcano v. United Auto Ins. Co., App. Case No. 12-229 AP (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. App. 3/7/14) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 487b] (holding that affidavits of two of the insurer’s adjusters which merely attempt to create a paper issue to avoid summary judgment are not permissible), the Miami-Dade appellate court remanded to the case to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in FAVOR of the medical provider where the affidavits filed in opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment relied on “Medicare Fee schedule, in addition to other things.” The appellate court found that “[a] party may not create ‘paper issues’ to avoid summary judgment.” The appellate court went on to cite to both Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)2f and Geico v. Virtual Imaging to conclude that “Medicare Fee Schedules are not relevant in PIP cases, and should not be used. In 2008, the legislature allowed such schedules to be used as an alternative reimbursement method that insurers may use if they elect a fee schedule in their policies as their chosen method of calculating reimbursement.”

27. Also, in State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Imaging Center of Pensacola, Inc. a/a/o Anthony Perkins, Mary Perkins, Paula Padilla, Barbara Green., App. Case No. 2012-AP-00052, 00053, 00054, 00003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. App. 3/3/14) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 979a] (in affirming summary judgment for a medical provider), the appellate court found that “State Farm did not elect the option to reimburse medical services pursuant to the Medicare fee schedules. . .but rather chose to pay a reasonable amount for medical services pursuant to Section 627.736(5)(a)1.” The appellate court also stated that “[medicare] schedules cannot be sole basis for the ‘reasonable amount’ determination.” The appellate court then concluded “[t]he manner in which State Farm used the fee schedules in determining the amounts it believed were reasonable for the medical services provided runs contrary to the option State Farm elected when it entered into its insurance contract with the insured” and “[t]o permit an insurer who opted not to pay the medical expenses of its insured pursuant to the medicare fee schedules to use those same fee schedules as the sole basis for the determination of reasonable expenses would circumvent the legislative intent of the statute as defined by the Florida Supreme Court[.]”

28. Therefore, State Farm in this present case made a critical and fatal error when it chose to automatically reduce the charges billed by Plaintiff at a Medicare Fee Schedule which was not elected in its own insurance policy. There is no factual question that State Farm reduced the charges pursuant to an unelected fee schedule and now wishes to do an about-face, switcheroo to use reasonableness factors of s.(5)(a)1 which were not once considered prior to this lawsuit. State Farm’s actions are in derogation of the No-Fault Law, mislead the Court, and contradict the record. State Farm should not be permitted to create a paper issue to avoid this summary in light of the appellate case law which states this is not permissive and this is not a genuine issue of material fact.

29. Notably, this Court must point out that if the provider’s charges fall within the range of reasonableness, then the insurer must pay it. Indeed, the standard jury instruction provides that if a jury finds a provider’s charge to be reasonable, then the jury should award that amount as damages. Fla. Civil Standard Jury Instruction 413.4. Therefore, the issue is not whether the amount of the State Farm’s reimbursement is reasonable, rather the issue is whether the medical provider’s charge is reasonable and if not how much is reasonable. In this case, State Farm has no evidence to show that Plaintiff’s charges are unreasonable; the affidavit of Mr. Lavergne merely concludes that “it is my opinion that State Farm’s payment in the matter was reasonable.” See paragraph 13 of the affidavit. Therefore, the charges in question are reasonable.

30. As a separate and distinct finding, based upon the record, the Court finds that HCPCS code A4556 is reimbursable. In fact, A4556 is reimbursable under Medicare Part B. See Florida Medical & Injury Center, Inc. a/a/o Kyle Ayers v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 465a (Fla. 9th Cir. County Ct. 1/14/10). State Farm’s explanation of review shows that code is reimbursable under Medicare, but subject to local carrier discretion. The affidavit of Nicole Bonaparte confirms that it is separate a Medicare policy which supports “State [Farm’s] denial of HCPCS Level II code A4556 was valid as HCPCS Level II code A4556 is unbundled from G0283.” See paragraph 19 of the affidavit. State Farm cannot avoid payment of A4556 by relying on Medicare coding policies which are not incorporated into the No-Fault Law (2008). See SOCC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 95 So.3d 903, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D1663a] (NCCI edits are not part of No-Fault Law, and “[reading of the statute] prohibits an insurance company from treating PIP claims as if they were Medicare claims.”); and, Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. AFO Imaging, Inc., 71 So.3d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D1463b] (in excluding consideration of Medicare OPPS, holding that “subsection 627.736(5)(a)(2)(f), (5)(a)(3), and (5)(a)(4) did not authorize a PIP insurer to utilize any restrictions or limitations applicable to the Medicare Program when determining amount due for MRI services”). Even if A4556 were not a recognized code under Medicare, the electrodes supply is reimbursable under Section VI: Medical Supplier Services at page 17 promulgated under Rule 69L-7.020, FAC. Therefore, A4556, a compensable supply, was properly billed as a separate code in the amount of $15.00 for date of service February 8, 2010 and should have been reimbursed by State Farm under the No-Fault Law.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant as follows: that Plaintiff, FLORIDA INJURY & REHABILITATION CENTERS, INC., shall recover from Defendant, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 10451 NW 117th Avenue, Suite 300, Medley, Florida 33178, the sum of $529.95 in PIP benefits, plus $130.42 in PIP interest, for a total of $660.37. Defendant shall also pay post-judgment interest at the applicable rate of interest until satisfied. Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to §627.428(1) incurred in obtaining this Final Judgment, and this Court specifically reserves jurisdiction to determine the amount of same and enter judgment for fees and costs. Accordingly, Final Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff for which let execution issue.