23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 829b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2308INTEDeclaratory judgments — Insurance — Commercial vehicle — Duty to defend or indemnify — Wrongful death — Workers’ Compensation — Exclusive remedy — Action seeking declaration that commercial vehicle policy does not provide coverage for damages in wrongful death action arising from accident at construction site and that insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify insured because Workers’ Compensation Act provides insured employer with immunity from wrongful death action — Constitutionality — 2003 amendments to Act that narrowed exception to employer’s workers’ compensation immunity to instances where employer engaged in conduct that is virtually certain to result in injury or death is not unconstitutional denial of access to courts where rational basis exists for enactment, and Act remains reasonable alternative to tort litigation — Enactment of “virtually certain” standard did not create separate class of individuals in violation of equal protection clause or encroach on judicial function in violation of separation of powers doctrine — Insurer’s motion for partial summary judgment on constitutionality of Act is granted
INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a North Carolina corporation, Plaintiff, vs. ALEIDA M. CORRALES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of RICARDO CORRALES, a Florida Citizen; ALLIED TRUCKING OF FLORIDA, INC. (d/b/a ALLIED TRUCKING OF WEST PALM BEACH d/b/a ALLIED TRUCKING), et al., Defendants. ALEIDA M. CORRALES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of RICARDO CORRALES, a Florida Citizen, Defendant/Counter Plaintiff, vs. INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a North Carolina corporation, Plaintiff/Counter Defendant. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 13-017690 CACE (21) consolidated with 14-016218 CACE (04). January 19, 2016. Cynthia Imperato, Judge. Counsel: Dorothy Venable DiFiore, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Tampa, for Plaintiff. Alejandro Larrazabal and Carlos Velasquez, Velasquez Dolan Arias, P.A., Plantation, for Defendant Estate of Aleida Corrales. Suzanne Singer, for Ric-Man Construction. Paula Phillips, for Defendant Allied Trucking of Florida, Inc. Kelly G. Dunberg and Brando Waas, for Emis Martin-Rojas. Shawn Davis, for State National Insurance Company
ORDER GRANTING COUNTER DEFENDANT’SMOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTAS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THEWORKERS COMPENSATION ACT
THIS CAUSE came before the court on Counter Defendant, Integon National Insurance Company’s, motion for partial summary judgment on the constitutionality of the Workers Compensation Act.1 The court, having considered the motion and response, having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, finds and decides as follows:
This is an action for declaratory relief, seeking a determination regarding coverage under a commercial vehicle policy issued by Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”) to Emis Martin Rojas (“Rojas”) for claims arising out of an accident at a construction project, which resulted in the death of Ricardo Corrales.2 On August 20, 2014, Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”) filed the instant action (14-016218 CACE (04)) for declaratory relief against Aleida M. Corrales, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ricardo Corrales (“Corrales”), Allied Trucking of Florida, Inc., Rojas, K.E.M. Trucking, Inc., Ric-Man Construction, Inc., and State National Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that: (1) a commercial vehicle liability insurance policy issued by Integon to Rojas does not provide coverage for damages sought by Corrales in the Wrongful Death Action; and (2) Integon has no duty to defend or indemnify Martin-Rojas (“Declaratory Relief Action”).3 Among other things, Integon alleges that section 440.11, Florida Statutes (“Section 440.11”) provides Rojas with workers’ compensation immunity from Corrales’ Wrongful Death Action.4
On October 14, 2014, Corrales filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and six-count counterclaim against Integon, alleging causes of action for: (1) declaratory judgment that the immunity set forth in section 440.11 is inapplicable to Rojas because he acted with gross negligence (count I); (2) declaratory judgment that Section 440.11 is unconstitutional under U.S. Const. Amend. XIV and Fla. Const. art. I, § 9 (count II); (3) declaratory judgment that Section 440.11 is unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (count III); (4) declaratory judgment that Section 440.11 is unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. I, § 21, (count IV); (5) declaratory judgment that Section 440.11 is unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. I, § 22 (count V); and (6) declaratory judgment that Section 440.11 is unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. II, § 3 (count VI). On May 13, 2015, Integon filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Section 440.11. On October 6, 2015, Corrales filed a response to Integon’s motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held before the court on October 8, 2015.
“Summary judgment is proper only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).” Scalice v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare, 120 So. 3d 215, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D1803a] (citation omitted). “Statutory interpretation is a question of law . . . .” Id. The “[d]etermination of whether a statute is constitutional is a pure question of law . . . .” Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S25a] (reversing summary judgment determination that statute was unconstitutional).
Counts II — VI of Corrales’ counterclaim challenge the constitutionality of workers compensation immunity set forth in Section 440.11, and the 2003 legislative amendments to Section 440.11 (“2003 Amendments”), which provide an exception to an employer’s immunity only if an injured party establishes that his injury was “virtually certain” to occur. See § 440.11(1)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. Integon argues that partial summary judgment should be granted as to the constitutionality of Section 440.11 because: (1) Section 440.11 is Constitutional; (2) the 2003 Amendments do not violate Corrales’ access to courts (Fla. Const. art. I, § 21; counterclaim count IV); (3) the 2003 Amendments do not violate equal protection (Fla. Const. art. I, § 2; counterclaim count III); (4) the 2003 Amendments do not violate the separation of powers (Fla. Const. art. II, § 6; counterclaim count VI); (5) the 2003 Amendments do not violate the right to trial by jury (Fla. Const. art. I, § 22; counterclaim count V); and (6) Corrales’ Fourteenth Amendment argument fails (counterclaim count II). In opposition, Corrales argues that the 2003 Amendments violate various provisions of the Florida and U.S. Constitutions. Corrales argues that the court should follow Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S174a], which was abrogated by the 2003 Amendments.
Under Florida law, “employers in compliance with the Workers’ Compensation Law are immune from their employees’ common law negligence actions for damages arising from work-related injuries.” R.L. Haines Const., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D2227c] (citation omitted). However,
[t]here are exceptions to an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity. In Turner v PCR, Inc, 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S174a], the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed prior holdings that recognized an exception to employers’ immunity where the employer “exhibite[d] a deliberate intent to injure or engage[d] in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death.” Id. at 687 (second emphasis added) (quoting Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 1986)). As a result of Turner, the Legislature amended the exception language by enacting section 440.11(1)(b) in 2003. Among other things, the amendment narrowed the exception standard by changing from the “substantially certain” standard identified in Turner to a “virtually certain” standard.
R.L. Haines Const., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D2227c] review denied, 171 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 2015) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also, List Indus., Inc. v. Dalien, 107 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D186a] review denied, 122 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2013) (stating that “[t]he change from ‘substantial certainty’ to ‘virtually certain’ is an extremely different and a manifestly more difficult standard to meet. It would mean that a plaintiff must show that a given danger will result in an accident every — or almost every — time.”). Further,
[s]tatutes come to the Court “clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome.” Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So.2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly S172c]. “Absent a constitutional limitation, the Legislature’s ‘discretion reasonably exercised is the sole brake on the enactment of legislation.’ ” Id. at 141 (quoting Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 406 (Fla. 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly S1a] (quoting State v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Dade County, 126 Fla. 142, 170 So. 602, 606 (1936))).
Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S25a]. Further, the Florida Supreme Court has “long recognized that ‘[t]he court should not declare a statute to be void or inoperative on the ground that it is opposed to a spirit that is supposed to pervade the Constitution, or because the statute is considered unjust or unwise or impolitic.’ ” Id. at 385 (quoting State ex. rel. Johnson v. Johns, 92 Fla. 187, 109 So. 228, 231 (1926)).
At the outset, the court determines that the rational basis standard of review applies to the instant motion. See Winn Dixie v. Resnikoff, 659 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D2070a] (noting that “the rational basis test is traditionally applied to social legislation such as workers’ compensation”) (internal citation omitted). Under this minimal level of scrutiny, Integon need only establish that Section 440.11 has a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Lucas v. Englewood Cmty. Hosp., 963 So. 2d 894, 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Indeed, even if it appears that the legislature has made an improvident, ill-advised, or unnecessary decision, the law must be upheld if there is any state of facts that may reasonably be conceived to justify it. A determination of whether a rational basis exists is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
Id. at 896 (citations omitted).
First, Integon argues that Section 440.11 is constitutional under article I, sections 21 and 22 of the Florida Constitution (“Access to courts” and “Trial by jury”) (counterclaim counts IV and V). In opposition, Corrales argues that the “virtually certain” standard added by the 2003 Amendments effectively denies Corrales access to the courts and abolishes all causes of action for negligence without providing an alternative. Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides that:
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Fla. Const. art. I, § 21 (“Access to courts”). Additionally, Article I, section 22, provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate.” Fla. Const. art. I, § 22 (“Trial by jury”). Under Florida law,
where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. s 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternativeto protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
Kluger v. White, 28l So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); see also, De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1989) (stating workers’ compensation program is “in harmony” with open courts provision as an alternative to tort litigation and does not violate a claimant’s right to jury trial). Construing Section 440.11 to effect a constitutional outcome, the court determines that a rational basis exists to support the legislature’s decision to enact the 2003 Amendments. Further, the court determines that the Workers’ Compensation Act remains a “reasonable alternative to tort litigation” notwithstanding the “virtually certain” standard. Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983) (concluding that a previous version of the workers’ compensation statute did not violate the right to access courts under Kluger and noting that the statute “continues to afford substantial advantages to injured workers, including full medical care and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability without their having to endure the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.”); see also, Sasso v. Ram Prop Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) approved, 452 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984) (noting that although the Workers Compensation Act abolished the right to sue in tort for a job-related injury, it provided adequate, sufficient, and even preferable safeguards for an injured employee). Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to the constitutionality of Section 440.11 under Article I, sections 21 and 22 of the Florida Constitution.
Second, Integon argues that Section 440.11 is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (counterclaim count II). Specifically, Integon argues that injured employees who cannot establish than an employer’s conduct is “virtually certain” to result in injury or death are not a separate and protected class under the Federal or State Constitution. Rather, they are simply unable to meet their statutory burden. In opposition, Corrales argues that the “virtually certain” standard impermissibly creates a separate class of individuals. The equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that no state laws shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “Under both our federal and state constitutions, as well as our common law heritage, all similarly situated persons are equal before the law.” De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989). The court, after careful consideration, determines that the “virtually certain” standard does not create a separate class of individuals.5 Rather, the “virtually certain” standard heightens any plaintiff’s burden of establish an exception to an employer’s immunity. Thus, Integon’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the constitutionality of Section 440.11 under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. For the same reason, the court grants Integon’s motion for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Section 440.11 under Article I section 2 of the Florida Constitution (counterclaim count III). See Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (providing that “[a]1l natural persons . . . are equal before the law . . . .”).
Third, Integon argues that Section 440.11 is constitutional under article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution (“Branches of government”) (counterclaim count VI). Specifically, Integon argues that section 440.11 does not offend the separation of powers requirement set forth in article II, section 3. In opposition, Corrales argues that the Florida legislature, by enacting the 2003 Amendments, encroached on a judicial function, and improperly delegated judicial powers to the administrators of the workers’ compensation system.
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution divides our state government into three separate and distinct branches and provides that “[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.” Formally known as the “separation of powers” clause, this constitutional principle prohibits the unlawful encroachment by one branch upon the powers of another branch.
Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D2005d] (citing Fla. Const. art. II, § 3). In the instant matter, the court determines that the legislature did not encroach upon the powers of the judiciary by enacting the 2003 Amendments. Further, the court determines that the 2003 Amendments are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, See R L. Haines Const, 161 So. 3d 528 at 530 (noting that the 2003 Amendments were enacted in response to Turner).
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Counter Defendant, Integon National Insurance Company’s, motion for partial summary judgment on the constitutionality of the Workers Compensation Act is GRANTED.
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1See Fla. Stat. 440.01 “Workers’ Compensation Law.”
2Before Integon filed the instant action, on July 24, 2013, Aleida M. Corrales, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ricardo Corrales (“Corrales”), filed a separate action for wrongful death against Allied Trucking of Florida, Inc., Rojas, K.E.M. Trucking, and Ric-Man Construction, Inc, alleging in her complaint causes of action for: (1) gross negligence (count I against Martin-Rojas); (2) vicarious liability for gross negligence (count II against K.E.M. Trucking), (3) vicarious liability for gross negligence (count III against Allied Trucking of Florida, Inc.); and (4) virtual certainty tort (count IV against Ric-Man Construction, Inc.) (the “Wrongful Death Action” case no.: 13-017690 CACE (21)). On July 29, 2015, the court entered an agreed order on Corrales’ motion to transfer and consolidate, which consolidated the Wrongful Death Action and the Declaratory Relief Action “only for the purpose of discovery and dispositive legal issues.” See July 29, 2015 Order at 2, (13-017690).
3On September 28, 2015, Integon filed an amended complaint.
4Section 440.11, Florida Statutes, (“Exclusiveness of Liability”), is a statute within the Workers Compensation Act that Integon contends provides Rojas and others with immunity from Corrales’ Wrongful Death Action.
5The absence of a suspect class or a fundamental right requires the court to apply a rational basis test. See De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989).
