23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 820a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2308TATAInsurance — Personal injury protection — Reimbursement by insurer of commercial vehicle — Sedan is private passenger vehicle within meaning of PIP statute, notwithstanding that it was used as taxicab
TATA LIMO SERVICES INC., Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Broward County. Case No. CACE 13-018831(AP). L.T. Case No. COSO 12-00508. November 19, 2015. Appeal from the County Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Ian Richards, Judge. Counsel: Aaron M. White, Wadsworth & Huott, LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant. David B. Kampf, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
OPINION
(PER CURIAM.) Tata Limo Services Inc. appeals a final judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Having carefully reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, this Court dispenses with oral argument and finds that the final judgment in favor of Appellee should be REVERSED as set forth below.
Appellant contends that a vehicle used primarily for occupational or professional services regardless of classification, must be considered a commercial motor vehicle. Section 627.732(3), Florida Statutes, defines the terms “commercial motor vehicle” and “private passenger motor vehicle” as follows:
(3)(a) A “private passenger motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes, a motor vehicle of the pickup, panel, van, camper, or motor home type.
(b) A “commercial motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.
§ 627.732, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 627.7405 describes an Insurer’s right of reimbursement as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such a private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle.
§ 627.7405, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). It is an elementary principle of construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible. Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly S119a]. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that words are not to be considered as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words in the statute. State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680, 686 (Fla. 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S153a]. Statutory construction requires that courts avoid reading the law in a way that renders part of a statute meaningless. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198-99 (Fla. 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly S455a]. When the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, a court gives the statute its plain meaning. Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774, 777 (Fla. 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly S227a] (internal citations omitted).
In the instant case, the subsection of the statute that defines a “private passenger motor vehicle” is composed of three segments. The first segment declares outright that “a private passenger motor vehicle” is any “sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type” motor vehicle. See § 627.732, Fla. Stat. The last two segments expand the “private passenger motor vehicle” category to include vehicles of the “panel, van, camper, and motor-home” type if they are “not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes.” Id. The only way to give effect to all words in the statute is to recognize that the statute subdivides “private passenger motor vehicles” into two categories. See Bodden, 877 So. 2d 686. There are vehicles which are always classified as private passenger vehicles “and” other vehicles, which depending on their primary use, may be classified that way as well. See § 627.732, Fla. Stat. If the middle segment of the statute, which refers to a vehicle’s “use,” were applied to the first segment, the third segment would be transformed into “mere surplusage” which a court cannot do. See Hechtman, 840 So. 2d 996. In fact, the last segment would be rendered completely meaningless. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc., 963 So. 2d 198-99. The statutory definition controls the meaning of statutory words thus a “private passenger motor vehicle” is a sedan. See Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949). The statute does not apply any “use” test for sedans as argued by Appellee.
The language of section 627.7405 is clear and unambiguous in that it gives insurers “a right of reimbursement” only against owners of “commercial motor vehicles.” See § 627.7405, Fla. Stat. “Private passenger motor vehicles” are excluded from the right of reimbursement. Id. Appellee argues that this reading creates an “absurd result” that undermines the reimbursement statute, particularly when a vehicle is used for business purposes. However, the statute is unambiguous in its statutory definitions and to read the statutes any other way results in a court’s impermissible rewriting of the statute. See Lawson, 336 U.S. at 201; see also Anderson, 87 So. 3d at 777. Additionally, the result is not absurd when the legislature still allows insurers to recover a reimbursement from an entirely distinct category of vehicles specifically classified as “commercial motor vehicles.” A sedan, regardless of its use, is statutorily a “private passenger motor vehicle” and therefore does not activate the insurer’s right of reimbursement. The two different statutory subsections make it clear that the Florida Legislature intends to exclude the owner or registrant of any “private passenger motor vehicle” from the insurer’s right of reimbursement even if that vehicle is used as a taxicab. While the Florida Legislature may want to reexamine the definition of a sedan in the pertinent statutes in light of the rise of new “car for hire” business models such as those employed by Lyft® and Uber®, this Court cannot legislate that reexamination through our Opinion. Accordingly, the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Appellee’s Motion for Attorney Fees is hereby DENIED. (ENGLANDER HENNING, TUTER and MURPHY, JJ., concur.)
