24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 501a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2407SANTInsurance — Automobile liability — Third-party bad faith claim — Plaintiff who was involved in motor vehicle accident with insured, resolved dispute with insured confidentially, and agreed to order dismissing case against insured with prejudice cannot bring third-party bad faith claim against insured’s liability insurer where plaintiff holds no judgment against insured — Trial court did not have jurisdiction to vacate order of dismissal and enter final judgment more than two years after entry of order of dismissal — Although insurer was not party to action between plaintiff and insured, it may challenge validity of void judgment since its rights are affected by that judgment
ROBERT A. BENNETT, individually and a/a/o Roberto Santiago, Plaintiff, v. 21ST CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY f/k/a NEW HAMPSHIRE INDEMNITY COMPANY, INC., Defendants. Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County. Case No. 2013-CA-012378-O. August 17, 2016. John Marshall Kest, Judge. Counsel: Stephen A. Marino, Ver Ploeg & Lumpkin, P.A., Miami; Diana Widjaya, Ver Ploeg & Lumpkin, P.A., Orlando, for Plaintiff. John W. Weihmuller and James Michael Shaw, Jr., Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING “DEFENDANT, 21ST CENTURYINSURANCE COMPANY’S, MOTION FORFINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT”
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the “Defendant, 21st Century Insurance Company’s, Motion for Final Summary Judgment,” filed on June 10, 2016 and heard on August 1, 2016. The Court, having considered the Motion, arguments of counsel, record evidence, the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion, and case law cited by parties, finds as follows:
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. Robert Bennett (“the Plaintiff”), who was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Roberto Santiago, has brought a third-party bad faith lawsuit brought against Mr. Santiago’s liability insurance carrier, 21st Century Security Insurance Company (“the Defendant”). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant acted in bad faith failing to settle his claim against Mr. Santiago; as a result, the Plaintiff is seeking to recover an amount in excess of Mr. Santiago’s policy limit.
Prior to the filing of this action, the Plaintiff filed suit against Mr. Santiago in connection with the motor vehicle accident. According to the Complaint filed in this action, the Plaintiff and Mr. Santiago resolved their dispute confidentially in an amount in excess of the policy limits. They then filed a Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, and the trial court ultimately entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice on May 2, 2013. No other orders or motions were filed in the case between Mr. Santiago and the Plaintiff at that time.
More recently, the Defendant, in a deposition, raised the issue that the Plaintiff holds no judgment against Mr. Santiago, and therefore cannot bring a third-party bad faith lawsuit against the Defendant. On December 22, 2015, the Plaintiff moved for final judgment in his case against Mr. Santiago, and final judgment was entered on March 17, 2016. Additionally, an order setting aside the dismissal was rendered on March 29, 2016.
Presently, the Defendant has filed the instant Motion, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order of final judgment on the case between Mr. Santiago and the Plaintiff, resulting in its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because the Plaintiff has no valid cause of action against the Defendant.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Sunshine State Ins. Co. v. Jones, 77 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D164a]; Continental Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III Ltd P’ship, 758 So. 2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D1196a].
In the instant Motion, the Defendant argues that summary judgment is proper because the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction in the underlying case once it was dismissed with prejudice. “[A]n order dismissing an action with prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction to preside over the parties and their dispute.” Buonopane v. Ricci, 603 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); see also Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“As a general rule, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits, barring a subsequent action on the same claim.”); Rabello v. Alonso, 927 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D928a] (“[O]nce a stipulated voluntary dismissal is taken, the court loses jurisdiction.”). If the trial judge loses its ability to adjudicate the cause, then it follows that it “has no jurisdiction to reinstate a dismissed proceeding.” Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1978) (“The right to dismiss one’s own lawsuit during the course of trial is guaranteed by Rule 1.420(a), endowing a plaintiff with unilateral authority to block action favorable to a defendant which the trial judge might be disposed to approve. The effect is to remove completely from the court’s consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of “jurisdiction”. If the trial judge loses the ability to exercise judicial discretion or to adjudicate the cause in any way, it follows that he has no jurisdiction to reinstate a dismissed proceeding. The policy reasons for this consequence support its apparent rigidity.” (emphasis added)).
Furthermore, once the litigation is terminated and the time for appeal has run, then the action is concluded for all time, unless one of the exceptions in Rule 1.540 is present. Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986) (“A trial judge is deprived of jurisdiction, not by the manner in which the proceeding is terminated, but by the sheer finality of the act, whether judgment, decree, order or stipulation, which concludes litigation. Once the litigation is terminated and the time for appeal has run, that action is concluded for all time. There is one exception to this absolute finality, and this is rule 1.540, which gives the court jurisdiction to relieve a party from the act of finality in a narrow range of circumstances.”). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) allows for relief from judgment for the following:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) that the judgment or decree is void; or (5) that the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application.
The Rule also requires that such motion shall be made within a reasonable amount of time, to not exceed one year after the judgment. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
Here, the trial court entered an order of dismissal, dismissing the cause with prejudice on May 2, 2013. On December 22, 2015, the Plaintiff moved for final judgment, and the trial court entered final judgment on March 17, 2016. After that final judgment was entered, the trial court, on March 29, 2016, entered an order vacating the May 2, 2013 dismissal. However, the May 2, 2013 order divested the trial court of jurisdiction to preside over the case. Buonopane v. Ricci, 603 So. 2d at 714. Additionally, even if one of the enumerated reasons for allowing relief from judgment were present, such relief is not available because the motion was not made within the one-year timeframe set forth in the Rule. For these reasons, because the court was without jurisdiction to enter a final judgment between Mr. Santiago and the Plaintiff, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, the Plaintiff counters that the Defendant may not challenge the underlying judgment because the Defendant was not a party to the judgment. However, a nonparty may challenge the validity of a void judgment if its rights are affected by such judgment. Gibson v. Progress Bank of Florida, 54 So. 3d 1058, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D404a] (“A void judgment is a judgment that has no legal force or effect, the invalidity of which may be asserted by any party whose rights are affected at any time and any place, whether directly or collaterally. . . . It is incapable of being confirmed, ratified, or enforced to any degree.”). Therefore, the Defendant is able to successfully attack the judgment, even though it was not a party to the underlying action.CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that necessitate a trial on the merits and that Defendants therefore are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiff shall take nothing by this action, and the Court reserves jurisdiction to determine entitlement and amount of any costs and attorney’s fees.
