25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 822a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2509YALVInsurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — Assignment — Where medical provider assigned rights to PIP claim to collection agency, and there is no evidence that assignment was ever rescinded or modified despite fact that provider then brought action against insurer that resulted in settlement, collection agency has standing to pursue claim against insurer — Accord and satisfaction — Where insurer was provided notice that claim was assigned to collection agency, settlement of suit brought by provider was voluntary on part of insurer and did not constitute bar to agency’s claim — Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bar collection agency’s action where agency was not party to provider’s action against insurer
GABLES INSURANCE RECOVERY, INC. a/a/o Yuliesky Marquez Alvarez, Plaintiff, vs. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Small Claims Division. Case No. 13-3246 SP 26. December 5, 2017. Lawrence King, Judge. Counsel: G. Bart Billbrough, Coral Gables, and Adriana de Armas, Gables Insurance Recovery, In-House Counsel, for Plaintiff. Christopher Kirwan, Kirwan Spellacy & Danner, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTIONSFOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard on Wednesday, November 8, 2017, at 10:05 a.m., on Plaintiff Gables Insurance Recovery, Inc. a/a/o Yuliesky Marquez Alvarez’s (“Gables”) Motion for Final Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition, filed July 11, 2014, and on Defendant Allstate Indemnity Company’s (“Allstate”) Motion for Final Summary Judgment Regarding Res Judicata, filed January 21, 2016, and having heard argument of counsel, reviewed the file, and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:Factual Background
The facts regarding the motions before the Court are not in material dispute. On or about April 24, 2008, Yuliesky Marquez Alvarez (“Alvarez”), an Allstate insured, was provided medical treatment by All X-Ray, a healthcare provider, allegedly arising out of an automobile accident. At the time of the treatment, Alvarez gave All X-Ray an assignment of the PIP insurance benefits in the Allstate policy.
On or about July 18, 2008, approximately three months later, All X-Ray assigned the rights to payment for the Alvarez treatment to Gables. A few weeks afterward, by July 30, 2008, Gables provided Allstate with notice of that the right to payment had been assigned to Gables. On or about August 19, 2008, Gables then sent a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation, or statutory pre-suit demand letter, to Allstate. Allstate did not respond to the demand for payment.
On July 8, 2011, despite having assigned its rights in the Alvarez claim to Gables, All X Ray initiated a lawsuit against Allstate for the Alvarez treatment. All X Ray Diagnostic Services Corp. v. Allstate, Case No. 2011-010362 SP 25. This 2011 All X Ray lawsuit resulted in a settlement being accomplished between it and Allstate, and this 2011 lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed on October 20, 2011.
On May 16, 2013, Gables then initiated this lawsuit against Allstate seeking payment for the Alvarez treatment pursuant to the assignment All X Ray provided it in 2008.
In response to the Gables’ complaint, Allstate denied the material allegations and asserted certain affirmative defenses. In its third affirmative defense, Allstate asserts that Gables does not hold a valid assignment and lacks standing to sue; in its fifth affirmative defense, Allstate asserts Gables cannot recover due to an accord and satisfaction; in its sixth affirmative defense, Allstate asserts that Gables cannot recover due to the doctrine of res judicata; and in its seventh affirmative defense, Allstate asserts that Gables was not entitled to recover because its claim is barred by collateral estoppel.
Thereafter, both sides moved for summary judgment on the issues raised by this series of events. Gables moves for summary judgment and asserts it received a valid assignment; that the assignment was never revoked; and that regardless of what went on between All X Ray and Allstate in the 2011 lawsuit, both of those parties knew the claim had been assigned to Gables so defenses of accord and satisfaction, res judicata, and collateral estoppel do not lie.
Allstate moved for summary judgment as to res judicata and collateral estoppel. Allstate asserts that All X Ray’s lawsuit against Allstate in 2011, and the settlement of it, operates to bar Gables’ claim for payment for the same services.Discussion
The Court first addresses the issue of lack of standing. Gables has filed with the Court a copy of the assignment of benefits in its favor received from All X Ray for the Alvarez treatment. Florida law recognizes the right to assign post loss PIP insurance claim rights of collection. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Seminole Cas. Ins. Co., 10 So.3d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D672b]. Once there is an assignment, the assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor and it is the assignee who may enforce payment or performance of an obligation due. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ray, 556 So.2d 811, 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “Because an unqualified assignment transfers to the assignee all the interest of the assignor under the assigned contract, the assignor has no right to make any claim on the contract once the assignment is complete, unless authorized to do so by the assignee.” Ray, 556 So.2d at 813 (citations omitted); see also Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 391, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D687a].
In the instant case, the record shows that All X Ray assigned its rights to Gables in 2008. There is no evidence before the Court that the assignment was ever rescinded or modified in any way. No evidence has been presented to indicate the assignment given by All X Ray to Gables was modified in any way. The evidence before the Court shows that both the assignor, All X Ray, and the assignee, Gables, acknowledge the 2008 assignment and both state it was never vitiated in any way, shape, or form. As such, the Court finds the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Gables holds an assignment of the Alvarez claim from All X Ray and therefore has standing to pursue its claim against Allstate.
Next, the Court addresses the issue of the defense of accord and satisfaction. Allstate argues that it settled the Alvarez treatment claim with All X Ray and, therefore, Gables can have no claim against Allstate for that same treatment. Allstate asserts that Gables needs to address the issue with All X Ray, and that Allstate may not be made to pay twice for the same treatment. The answer to this question is found in the Florida common law governing assignments.
All X-Ray, once it assigned the rights to Gables, had no claim to enforce against Allstate in its 2011 lawsuit. It is well established under Florida law that a debtor — like Allstate here — who has received actual notice of an assignment of a payment obligation, may still be held liable to the assignee — even if the debtor pays the assigned debt to the assignor, rather than the assignee. Building Materials Corp. of America v. Presidential Financial Corp., 972 So.2d 1090, 1092-93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D351a]; Capital City Second Nat’l Bank v. Peavy & Son Constr. Co., 585 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); City of N. Miami v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 505 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Fla. First Nat’l Bank at Key West v. Fryd Constr. Corp., 245 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). A defendant cannot claim satisfaction of an invalid claim as a defense to the claim brought by the rightful holder of the payment obligation.
And that is precisely the situation we have here. It is undisputed that Allstate was provided notice that the Alvarez treatment claim was assigned by All X ray to Gables in 2008. When Allstate was sued by All X Ray on that claim in 2011, All X-Ray had the right and opportunity to determine the legitimacy of All X Ray’s right to sue it, but did not do so. Instead, even though on notice of the to proceed when it had filed, Allstate chose to accept All X-Ray’s allegations as to its right of recovery and paid a settlement. And the lawsuit was dismissed. Allstate paid what was a legally unenforceable claim by All X Ray and wants to visit its action in that regard upon Gables, who the record reflects was at all relevant times the lawful owner of the claim.
On such facts, any settlement of the All X-Ray lawsuit by Allstate was voluntary on Allstate’s part and does not constitute any kind of bar to Gables’ claim for recovery in this lawsuit. There was no agreement between the rightful owner of the claim and the party against whom the claim had been made. Without Gables, the actual holder of the claim rights, participating in any settlement, there can be no accord and satisfaction and the Court grants summary judgment on this defense in favor of the Plaintiff.
The next issue to be addressed is res judicata. Res judicata operates as an adjudication on the merits, barring a subsequent action on the same claim. In order for res judicata to bar a subsequent action, four identities must be present: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Signo v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 454 So.2d 4, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
The 2011 lawsuit between All X Ray and Allstate did not have an identity of parties with this current lawsuit. Gables was not a party to the 2011 lawsuit. Under the previously discussed case law, All X Ray’s rights and Gables’ rights were not coextensive, but distinct; once All X Ray assigned its rights to Gables, and Allstate was on notice of it, All X Ray had no interest and it was Gables who held the right of recovery. All X Ray’s interest in the subject matter was extinguished by the assignment. As between All X-Ray and GIR, there is no unity of parties. They are not privies. Their relationship as assignor and assignee. So all of the elements of a res judicata are not present and the Court grants summary judgment to Plaintiff on this defense.
Finally, Allstate has raised the related defense of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1977). Again, the problem with this affirmative defense is that the parties must be identical. As discussed above, there is no identity of parties in the two lawsuits at issue. So the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this case either, and this Court grants summary judgment for Plaintiff on this issue as well.
Plaintiff Gables’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition is GRANTED as to Defendant Allstate’s affirmative defenses of lack of standing, accord and satisfaction, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Defendant Allstate’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment Regarding Res Judicata is DENIED.
