25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1028a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2512CHAVInsurance — Personal injury protection — Affirmative defenses — Accord and satisfaction — Common law accord and satisfaction was not effectuated where insurer believed it was paying full amount of its obligation when it tendered checks, and there was no mutual intent to effect settlement of preexisting dispute — Statutory accord and satisfaction was not effectuated where tender of amount calculated pursuant to statutory fee schedule that was not elected in PIP policy demonstrates absence of good faith tender; claim reimbursed under fee schedule is liquidated claim; there was no bona fide dispute at time of payment of claim; and “full and final” text in payee section of checks in same or lesser size as surrounding text and not in contrasting type, font or color is not conspicuous
MIAMI BEACH NATURAL SPORTS MEDICINE, INC. D/B/A MIAMI BEACH FAMILY & SPORTS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER, A FLORIDA CORP. (a/a/o Chavez, Francisco), Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 14-3194 SP 23 (02). February 7, 2018. Caryn Schwartz, Judge. Counsel: Robert Goldman, Florida Advocates, Dania Beach, for Plaintiff. Nicholas Babinski, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT’SDEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on December 22, 2017, upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Defendant’s Defense of Accord and Satisfaction, and the court having considered the motion and the court file, having considered the summary judgment evidence, including the documents attached to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Request for Admissions and Plaintiff’s Second Request for Admissions, having considered the Affidavit of Defendant’s records custodian, Jhonny Navarro, having heard argument of counsel and being otherwise fully advised, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the defense of Accord and Satisfaction is GRANTED, for the reasons set forth below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a PIP case brought by the Plaintiff, Miami Beach Natural Sports Medicine, Inc. d/b/a Miami Beach Family & Sports Chiropractic Center (a/a/o Chavez, Franciso), in which the Plaintiff alleges entitlement to be reimbursed for medical services provided to Francisco Chavez, after Mr. Chavez was involved in a motor vehicle accident on May 15, 2011. At the time of the accident, Mr. Chavez was insured under an automobile insurance policy with United Automobile Insurance Company (“United Auto”). Mr. Chavez executed an Assignment of Benefits, assigning his rights, title and interest in and to his policy with United Auto, in favor of Miami Beach Family & Sports Chiropractic Center. Plaintiff provided chiropractic services to Francisco Chavez from May 16, 2011 to August 19, 2011, sending three (3) sets of bills to United Auto.
Mr. Chavez’ automobile insurance policy with United Auto provided that United Auto will pay, in accordance with the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, to or for the benefit of the injured person, eighty percent of all “medically necessary expenses”.1 The United Auto policy did not provide that United Auto will calculate reimbursement amounts based upon the State Fee Schedule Guidelines, based on the Medicare Part B Fee Schedule or based on 200% of the Medicare Part B Fee Schedule.May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011 Dates of Service
For dates of service from May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011, United Auto responded to Plaintiff’s pre-suit demand letter with checks for PIP benefits that United Auto had calculated based upon its application of the permissive fee schedule methodology contained in Sec. 627.736(5)(a)(2)(b), Fla. Stat., together with an August 25, 2011 letter of transmittal to the Law Office of Russel Lazega PA (“Demand Response”), and Explanations of Review.
United Auto’s Demand Response that accompanied the checks for the May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011 dates of service provided as follows:
Dear Sir/Madam:
United Auto Insurance Company has received the bills submitted for PIP benefits on the referenced matter. Enclosed please find our drafts and itemized Explanations of Review (“EOR”) for the amount charged. Please be advised that our claims investigation, including our review for medical necessity and relatedness of services billed to the referenced loss, is ongoing. As such, we reiterate our request for your cooperation in providing any and all medical records and information relating to your patient that you may possess or can access.
Having notified you of our ongoing claims investigation, the enclosed drafts are hereby tendered as advanced consideration for unverified treatments. Any payment for medical treatment that is excessive, unrelated, unreasonable, unnecessary or unlawful is an unintended overpayment and expressly disputed. Any such disputed overpayment is not intended to be gratuitous in nature and subject to reimbursement.
UAIC hereby advises that it does not, either by sending this letter or processing this payment advance at this time, waive any exiting rights or defenses, including rights or defenses discovered during future review, investigation or discovery. Any and all such rights and defenses are specifically reserved; including, but not limited to claims for reimbursement and any defenses listed below, including our enclosures.
Sincerely,
Robert Columbie
Claims Adjuster
The Explanations of Review that accompanied United Auto’s checks for the May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011 dates of service contained the following language:
REIMBURSEMENT HAS BEEN CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE STATE FEE SCHEDULE GUIDELINES.
Unless otherwise noted, all reductions are due to guidelines indicated in Senate Bill SB 1092
Kindly notify us in writing within 5 days of any dispute or we will assume that our response is satisfactory. Nothing in this letter waives any rights or defenses under the policy or law. All such rights and defenses are specifically reserved.
Neither the August 25, 2011 Demand Response that accompanied United Auto’s checks for the May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011 dates of service, nor United Auto’s Explanations of Review contained unequivocal language to the effect that United Auto found Plaintiff’s charges to be unreasonable or that United Auto otherwise disputed those charges.July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011 Dates of Service
Plaintiff subsequently billed United Auto for dates of service from July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011. In response to the bills for those dates of service, United Auto issued checks for PIP benefits that United Auto had also calculated based upon its application of the permissive fee schedule methodology, together with August 30, 2011 and October 31, 2011 letters of transmittal and Explanations of Review. United Auto’s checks for the July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011 dates of service contained the following information in the PAYEE section of each check:
PAYEE: MIAMI BEACH NATURAL SPORTS MEDICINE
F/A/O FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
for Full and Final PIP Benefits
The Explanations of Review that accompanied United Auto’s checks for the July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011 dates of service contained the following language:
REIMBURSEMENT HAS BEEN CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE STATE FEE SCHEDULE GUIDELINES.
Unless otherwise noted, all reductions are due to guidelines indicated in Senate Bill SB 1092
Kindly notify us in writing within 5 days of any dispute or we will assume that our response is satisfactory. Nothing in this letter waives any rights or defenses under the policy or law. All such rights and defenses are specifically reserved.
United Auto’s letters of transmittal that accompanied the checks and Explanations of Review for the July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011 dates of service were substantially identical to United Auto’s August 25, 2011 Demand Response that accompanied the checks for the May 16, 2011 to June 22, 2011 dates of service. United Auto’s August 30, 2011 letter of transmittal for July 1, 2011 to August 1, 2011 dates of service provided as follows:
Dear Sir/Madam:
United Auto Insurance Company has received the bills submitted for PIP benefits on the referenced matter. Enclosed please find our drafts and itemized Explanations of Review (“EOR”) for the amount charged. Please be advised that our claims investigation, including our review for medical necessity and relatedness of services billed to the referenced loss, is ongoing. As such, we reiterate our request for your cooperation in providing any and all medical records and information relating to your patient that you may possess or can access.
Having notified you of our ongoing claims investigation, the enclosed drafts are hereby tendered as advanced consideration for unverified treatments. Any payment for medical treatment that is excessive, unrelated, unreasonable, unnecessary or unlawful is an unintended overpayment and expressly disputed. Any such disputed overpayment is not intended to be gratuitous in nature and subject to reimbursement.
UAIC hereby advises that it does not, either by sending this letter or processing this payment advance at this time, waive any exiting rights or defenses, including rights or defenses discovered during future review, investigation or discovery. Any and all such rights and defenses are specifically reserved; including, but not limited to claims for reimbursement and any defenses listed below, including our enclosures.
The charges are dictated by statute. The charges billed exceed the amount allowable pursuant to the Medicare Part B fee schedule.
Sincerely,
Robert Columbie
Claims Adjuster
Neither United Auto’s letters of transmittal that accompanied United Auto’s checks for the July 1, 2011 to August 19, 2011 dates of service nor United Auto’s Explanations of Review with respect to those dates of service contained unequivocal language to the effect that United Auto found Plaintiff’s charges to be unreasonable or that United Auto otherwise disputed those charges.United Auto’s Affirmative Defense of Accord and Satisfaction
United Auto has asserted the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, pursuant to Sec. 673.3111, Fla. Stat. and/or common law. More particularly, United Auto asserts that under Sec. 627.736(5)(a), a medical provider may only charge a reasonable amount, and that by reducing Plaintiff’s charges and issuing checks in lesser amounts, United Auto further asserts that “a dispute arose as to whether the additional amounts are covered by the statute.” United Auto further asserts Plaintiff’s actions in cashing the checks that indicated “for Full and Final PIP Benefits” constituted an agreement to accept the lesser amount offered by United Auto in full and final satisfaction of its claim.
In its motion for summary judgment on the defense of accord and satisfaction, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, as the summary judgment evidence establishes that Defendant has failed to meet the required elements of common law accord and satisfaction or statutory accord and satisfaction, that there was no pre-existing dispute, no intent to accept a reduced amount by a superseding agreement and no conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
In opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant has filed the Affidavit of its records custodian, Jhonny Navarro. According to the Navarro Affidavit, a dispute as to the reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s charges submitted was demonstrated in Defendant’s August 25, 2011 Demand Response and associated Explanations of Review reflecting that Defendant had reduced the amounts billed and that Defendant had issued payment based upon a reduced amount. According to the Navarro Affidavit, by virtue of the fact that Defendant had reduced Plaintiff’s charges, Plaintiff was purportedly on notice of Defendant’s position that Defendant found Plaintiff’s charges to be unreasonable and disputed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A moving party is entitled to Final Summary Judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, conclusively show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S390a]. The burden is upon the moving party to show conclusively the complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966). Summary judgment should only be granted if the moving party demonstrates conclusively that no genuine issues exist as to any material fact, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the opposing party. Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1985).
Although the issue of whether an accord and satisfaction occurred ordinarily involves a question of fact, Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corp., 380 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980), where the facts are undisputed and reveal no genuine issue as to any material fact, the Court may grant summary judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., this Court’s decisions in Millenium Radiology, LLC (Ronnica Nix) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 605a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, August 3, 2015) and Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Obdulia Romaguera) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 270c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, October 17, 2013), as well as other Miami-Dade and Broward County decisions involving the identical issues presented here.2
A party may not create ‘paper issues’ to avoid summary judgment where the pleadings and evidentiary matters before the court show that defenses are without substance in fact or law. Hialeah Medical Assoc., Inc. a/a/o Ana Lexcano v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 487b (11th Cir. App., March 7, 2014); Miami Dade County MRI, Corp. (a/a/o Aleshia Keith) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 644a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Spencer Multack, January 5, 2017); Millenium Radiology, LLC d/b/a Millennium Open MRI (a/a/o Rosendo Fernandez) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 368b (Broward County, Judge Martin R. Dishowitz, June 22, 2015).
ANALYSIS OF COMMONLAW ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
An affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction requires (1) proof of a preexisting dispute as to the nature and extent of an obligation between the parties, (2) their mutual intent to effect settlement of that dispute by a superseding agreement, and (3) the obligor’s subsequent tender and the obligee’s acceptance of performance of the new agreement in full satisfaction and discharge of the prior disputed obligation. St. Marys’s Hospital v. Schocoff, 725 So.2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D405a]. An accord and satisfaction results when (1) the parties mutually intend to effect a settlement of an existing dispute by entering into a superseding agreement; and (2) there is actual performance in accordance with the new agreement. Martinez v. South Bayshore Tower LLLP, 979 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D655a].
There must be unequivocal evidence that a dispute existed prior to the issuance of the payment by the Defendant. San Hueza v. National Foundation Life Insurance Company, 545 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) [14 Fla. L. Weekly 1142] (the defense of accord and satisfaction was not established where the insurer issued checks for payment of medical services in amounts for which there had been no showing of the existence of a real dispute).
The Affidavit of Defendant’s records custodian, Jhonny Navarro, attempts to demonstrate a preexisting dispute by asserting that Defendant’s August 25, 2011 Demand Response and associated Explanations of Review had reduced the amounts billed and therefore evidenced a dispute as to the reasonableness of the charges submitted. However, neither the Demand Response nor the Explanations of Review communicated the existence of a dispute or that Defendant had determined Plaintiff’s charges to be unreasonable. To the contrary, Defendant’s Explanations of Review advised only that the reimbursement had been calculated according to the state fee schedule guidelines and that unless otherwise noted, all reductions were due to the guidelines indicated in Senate Bill SB 1092. In the Explanations of Review, Defendant also requested, “Kindly notify us in writing within 5 days of any dispute or we will assume that our response is satisfactory,” demonstrating that Defendant had communicated no dispute to create an accord and satisfaction, and clearly evidencing the absence of any dispute.
The Court finds that the indisputable evidence presented demonstrates that Defendant communicated no dispute prior to sending the checks for the July 1, 2011-August 19, 2011 dates of service. Further, the Court finds that prior to the issuance of the checks for the July 1, 2011-August 19, 2011 dates of service, there is no summary judgment evidence as to any conversations or correspondence by the Defendant advising the Plaintiff that the payments were intended as a compromise or settlement of the Plaintiff’s claim. Defendant argued at the hearing that its payment of a lesser amount then the billed amount is sufficient to communicate a dispute. An insurer, however, cannot create a dispute by making a payment in an amount it contends will fully satisfy its obligation. Pino v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 627 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1993).
Here, the facts indicate and the Court finds that Defendant did not believe that the amount paid was a compromise of what Defendant owed or to what Plaintiff was otherwise entitled. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to the absence of a mutual intent to effect a settlement of a preexisting dispute.
ANALYSIS OF STATUTORYACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Sec. 673.3111, Fla. Stat. provides, in pertinent part:
(1) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, that the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and that the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply.
(2) Unless subsection (3) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
Thus, in order to invoke this defense, Defendant must prove (1) it made a good faith tender; (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a dispute; and (3) that Plaintiff obtained payment of the instrument.
There was no Good Faith Tender
“Good faith” is defined in the notes of Sec. 673.3111(1) as “not only honesty in fact, but the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The applicable United Auto policy in this case provided that United Auto will pay, in accordance with the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, to or for the benefit of the injured person, eighty percent of all medically necessary expenses. Despite the fact that the United Auto policy did not provide that United Auto will calculate reimbursement amounts based upon the State Fee Schedule Guidelines, and that the policy did not reference the Medicare Part B fee schedule, United Auto issued the reduced payments using the Permissive Payment Methodology, demonstrating an absence of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.3
The Amount of the Claim was Liquidated
The Defendant reimbursed the Plaintiff pursuant to the Permissive Payment Methodology. An amount of an obligation that is determined by mathematical calculation is a liquidated claim. Watson v. Internet Billing, 888 So.2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly D2141a]. See also Bowman v. Kingsland Dev. Inc., 432 So.2d 660 (Fla. 5th DCA, 1983); DYC Fishing, Ltd. v. Martinez, 994 So.2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA, 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D2604a]. This court has previously held that where United Auto uses the Permissive Payment Methodology, despite that methodology not being a part of the insurance contract, the claim is for liquidated damages. Millenium Radiology, LLC (Ronnica Nix) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 605a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, August 3, 2015); Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Obdulia Romaguera) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 270c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, October 17, 2013).4
There was no Bona Fide Dispute
As noted above, the summary judgment evidence establishes that prior to the Defendant’s issuance of the checks for the July 1, 2011-August 19, 2011 dates of service, there were no communications as to the existence of a dispute or that Defendant had determined Plaintiff’s charges to be unreasonable. Defendant’s Explanations of Review advised only that the reimbursement had been calculated according to the state fee schedule guidelines and the guidelines indicated in Senate Bill SB 1092, and that Defendant would assume its response to be satisfactory unless notified by the Plaintiff in writing of the existence of any dispute. Based upon these facts, this Court and others have found no bona fide dispute.5
There was No Conspicuous Statement as to the Checks having
been Tendered as Full Satisfaction of the Claim.
Sec. 671.201(10), Fla. Stat. defines the term “conspicuous” as follows:
“Conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following:
(a) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and
(b) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.
Whether the face of a check contains a “conspicuous statement” that the check is presented as full satisfaction of Plaintiff’s entire claim is a question of law. Conspicuousness is judged by the relationship of the text to the color, size, and type of the print surrounding it. Millenium Radiology LLC (Ronnica Nix) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 605a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, 2015); Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (a/a/o Obdulia Romaguera) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 270c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, 2013).
Where the “For Full and Final PIP Benefits” language in the Payee section of the United Auto checks is the same or lesser size as the surrounding text and is not in a type, font or color in contrast to the surrounding text of the same size, the language is not conspicuous, does not comply with the statute and does not effect an accord and satisfaction of the Plaintiff’s claim. See Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1972) (Statute requiring conspicuous language excluding or modifying implied warranties of merchantability not satisfied where language on disclaimer in the same color, size and type used for other provisions); Gonzalez v. Associates Life Insurance Company, 641 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA, 1994) [19 Fla. L. Weekly D1291] (terms of medical insurance policy which were required to be conspicuous were unenforceable as text was printed in same color, style, and size of type as the remainder of the page).6
Therefore, based upon the undisputed facts, and there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment regarding Defendant’s defense of Accord and Satisfaction as a matter of law. Accordingly it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Defense of Accord and Satisfaction is GRANTED.
__________________
1The United Auto Policy defines “Medically Necessary Expenses” as a medical service or supply that a prudent physician would provide for the purposed of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease or symptom that is: (a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site and duration; and (c) not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician or health care provider.
2 Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Tomas Nunez) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 841c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Diana Vizcaino, January 15, 2017); Millenium Radiology, LLC d/b/a Millennium Open MRI a/a/o Daniela Alfonzo v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 701b (Miami-Dade County, Judge Jason Emilios Dimitris, September 20, 2016); Rivero Diagnostic Center, Inc. a/a/o Reinaldo Maestre v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 446a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Carlos Guzman, May 9, 2016); Care Plus Medical Center of Westchester, Inc. (a/a/o Maria Del R. Ladines) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 156b (Miami-Dade County, Judge Gloria Gonzalez-Meyer, December 5, 2014); Sunshine Health Group (a/a/o Rosa Castro) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 603a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Michaelle Gonzalez-Paulson, January 9, 2013); Ann K. Medical Office, Inc. (a/a/o Delgado, Rosa) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 116a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Myriam Lehr, November 10, 2010); Millenium Radiology, LLC (a/a/o Yesenia Heredia) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 384a (Broward County, Judge Robert W. Lee, March 22, 2017); Oakland Park MRI, Inc. d/b/a DPI of Fort Lauderdale (a/a/o Niurka Fuentes) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 82a (Broward County, Judge Giuseppina Miranda, July 28, 2015); North Broward Health & Rehab, Inc. (a/a/o Philomene Menelas) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 646a (Broward County, Judge John D. Fry, September 15, 2015); Hallandale Open MRI, LLC (a/a/o Jonathan Bailey) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 162a (Broward County, Judge Peter B. Skolnik, August 14, 2014); Dr. Alan R. Freedman (a/a/o Janette Westley) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 397a (Broward County, Judge Sharon L. Zeller, August 6, 2014).
3See Rivero Diagnostic Center, Inc. a/a/o Reinaldo Maestre v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 446a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Carlos Guzman, May 9, 2016); Sunshine Health Group (a/a/o Rosa Castro) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 603a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Michaelle Gonzalez-Paulson, January 9, 2013) (United Auto’s unilateral application of fee schedule reductions demonstrated lack of good faith); North Broward Health & Rehab, Inc. (a/a/o Philomene Menelas) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 646a (Broward County, Judge John D. Fry, September 15, 2015) (United Auto failed to tender the check in good faith where its check was the product of an intentional economic breach of clear contractual language).
4See also, Sunshine Health Group (a/a/o Rosa Castro) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 603a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Michaelle Gonzalez-Paulson, 2013); North Broward Health & Rehab, Inc. (a/a/o Philomene Menelas) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 646a (Broward County, Judge John D. Fry, 2015); Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (a/a/o Lenia Pineiro) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 447a (Broward County, Judge Robert W. Lee, 2013), aff’d, United Automobile Ins. Co. v. Best American Diagnostic Center, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 210c (17th Judicial Circuit (Appellate), 2014).
5 Millenium Radiology, LLC (Ronnica Nix) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 605a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, August 3, 2015); Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Obdulia Romaguera) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 270c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Caryn Schwartz, October 17, 2013); Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Tomas Nunez) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 841c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Diana Vizcaino, January 15, 2017); Rivero Diagnostic Center, Inc. a/a/o Reinaldo Maestre v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 446a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Carlos Guzman, May 9, 2016); Hallandale Open MRI, LLC (a/a/o Jonathan Bailey) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 162a (Broward County, Judge Peter B. Skolnik, August 14, 2014).
6See also, Best American Diagnostic Center, Inc. (Tomas Nunez) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 841c (Miami-Dade County, Judge Diana Vizcaino, January 15, 2017); Millenium Radiology, LLC d/b/a Millennium Open MRI a/a/o Daniela Alfonzo v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 701b (Miami-Dade County, Judge Jason Emilios Dimitris, September 20, 2016); Rivero Diagnostic Center, Inc. a/a/o Reinaldo Maestre v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 446a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Carlos Guzman, May 9, 2016); Care Plus Medical Center of Westchester, Inc. (a/a/o Maria Del R. Ladines) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 156b (Miami-Dade County, Judge Gloria Gonzalez-Meyer, December 5, 2014); Sunshine Health Group (a/a/o Rosa Castro) v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 603a (Miami-Dade County, Judge Michaelle Gonzalez-Paulson, January 9, 2013).
