25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 306b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2504LYONInsurance — Automobile — Error to enter summary judgment in favor of insurer in action by auto repair shop for additional repairs to insured’s vehicle that were performed pursuant to shop’s supplemental estimate after insurer paid benefits pursuant to its own estimate where repair shop was not bound by provision requiring pre-approval of all estimates, which was included in insurer’s estimate but was not included in policy — Further, summary judgment was precluded by outstanding issues of material fact with respect to whether insurer’s estimate would fully pay for loss
STEWART AGENCY, INC. d/b/a EARL STEWART TOYOTA OF NORTH PALM BEACH, a/a/o Victoria Lyons, Appellant, v. THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 15th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Palm Beach County, Civil Division AY. Case No. 502016AP900115CAXXMB. L.T. Case No. 502015SC000953XXXXNB. June 13, 2017. Appeal from the County Court in and for Palm Beach County, Judge Sandra Bosso-Pardo. Counsel: Scott Edwards, Boca Raton, for Appellant. Benjamin L. Bedard and Laura E. Bedard, West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
(PER CURIAM.) Appellant, Stewart Agency, Inc. (“Earl Stewart Toyota”), appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s, The Standard Fire Insurance Company’s, Motion for Summary Judgment. We find that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company fully paid for the loss to the vehicle covered by its automobile insurance policy.
On September 24, 2014, Victoria Lyons (“the insured”) took her vehicle to Earl Stewart Toyota for repair of damage to her vehicle caused by a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, the insured’s vehicle was covered by an automobile insurance policy (“the policy”) issued to the insured by The Standard Fire Insurance Company (“the insurer.”) On September 26, 2014, Earl Stewart Toyota submitted an estimate to the insurer for $5,890.48. On September 30, 2014, Earl Stewart Toyota submitted a supplemental estimate for repairs for $6,228.59. After Earl Stewart Toyota submitted both estimates, the insurer’s appraiser prepared a written estimate, estimating that repairs would cost $4,180.56. The insurer’s estimate contained a provision, which was not contained in the policy, that “all supplements must be pre-approved” and that “supplement repair charges may be subject to rejection unless approved by Travelers prior to repairs.” On October 2, 2014, the insurer issued a check to Earl Stewart Toyota for $3,680.56. After receiving the insurer’s check, Earl Stewart Toyota continued to perform repairs on the insured’s vehicle, without notifying the insurer, and then billed the insurer for $5,884.26.
On October 15, 2015, Earl Stewart Toyota filed an Amended Complaint against the insurer for a breach of contract arising out of the insurer’s failure to pay the full amount of Earl Stewart Toyota’s estimate for repair work of the vehicle. On February 22, 2016, the insurer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), alleging that it was entitled to summary judgment because Earl Stewart continued to perform repairs on the insured’s vehicle based on its supplemental estimate and in contravention of language contained in the insurer’s estimate that “all supplements must be pre-approved” and “supplemental charges may be subject to rejection” and in violation of policy language requiring Earl Stewart Toyota’s cooperation “in the investigation, settlement, or defense of any claim or suit.”
This Court rejects the insurer’s argument that the language contained in the supplemental estimate requiring pre-approval for repairs bound Earl Stewart Toyota because this language was contained only in the supplemental estimate, and not in the policy itself. Therefore, this language does not constitute a contractual duty on the part of Earl Stewart Toyota. Additionally, issues of material fact remain with respect to whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company’s proposed estimate would have fully paid for the loss covered by the policy. Such issues of material fact include whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company’s estimate properly called for the installation an aftermarket energy absorber, a used left quarter panel salvaged from a junkyard, and an aftermarket rear bumper cover. Moreover, Florida courts have held that whether an insurer breaches an obligation to cooperate is a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. Bontempo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company because issues of material fact remain. Earl Stewart Toyota’s Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED conditioned upon its prevailing in the lower court. Additionally, The Standard Fire Insurance Company’s Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED conditioned upon its prevailing in the lower court, and the lower court’s determination that the proposal for settlement entitled The Standard Fire Insurance Company to fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. (SASSER, HAFELE, and OFTEDAL, JJ., concur.)
