25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 370a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2504DIAZInsurance — Standing — Assignment — Summary judgment in favor of insurer based on plaintiff’s lack of standing is precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether previous assignment of benefits made by insured to third party served to divest insured of ability to make assignment to plaintiff
THE KIDWELL GROUP, LLC, d/b/a AIR QUALITY ASSESSORS OF FLORIDA, a/a/o Jose Diaz, Plaintiff, v. OLYMPUS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County. Case No. 2015-SC-1963. May 2, 2017. Hal C. Epperson, Judge. Counsel: Erick Trivedi, The Morgan Law Group, P.A., Coral Gables, for Plaintiff. Andrew Labbe, Tampa, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on April 19, 2017 upon the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the instant action. The Plaintiff’s action is ostensibly predicated upon a valid assignment of benefits made by the Insured, Jose Diaz, to the Plaintiff, Air Quality Assessors of Florida. This assignment of benefits from the Insured to the Plaintiff, dated June 29, 2014, is attached to the Complaint. The Defendant does not attack the validity of this assignment based upon any substantive infirmities contained within the assignment itself. Rather, the Defendant asserts that the assignment is invalid based upon a previous assignment made by the Insured to a third party. On June 27, 2014, the Insured executed an assignment of benefits to United Reconstruction Group, Inc. as a constituent part of a Contract for Services contemplating that United Reconstruction was to perform services and supply materials. According to the Defendant, the breadth of this earlier assignment of benefits made by its Insured to United Reconstruction Group left the Insured with nothing to assign, thereby rendering the assignment between the Insured and the Plaintiff in this case, invalid. In response, the Plaintiff asserts that the earlier assignment of benefits to United Reconstruction was intended as a limited assignment, limited to the scope of services that were to be rendered under the contract for services which actually contained the assignment.
This assignment between the Insured and United Reconstruction has been made a part of the court file by virtue of Defendant’s Notice of Filing. A review of this assignment between the Insured and United Reconstruction offers credible arguments to both the Plaintiff and the Defendant as to the extent to which it did or did not divest the Insured of any benefits to assign. In support of the Defendant’s argument, the assignment itself does not contain explicit qualifying language to justify the limited scope argued by the Plaintiff. Therefore, a credible argument can be made that the language of the assignment is clear and unambiguous and that the words should be given their precise, literal meaning. Applying this well settled canon of construction, the Defendant reasonably argues that the assignment was without reservation and left the Insured with nothing to assign. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, may reasonably argue that the Court’s first obligation in construing a contract is to discern the intent of the parties. Based upon the fact that this assignment was part and parcel of a Contract for Services with a particular Contractor for specific services, Plaintiff argues the assignment should be fairly construed as an assignment pertaining solely to the performance of such services. Plaintiff argues that to construe the assignment provision as evidencing the Insured’s intent to divest himself wholly of any ability to assign covered benefits to other contractors who were not party to that particular Contract for Services would not make sense. Moreover, it is apparent from reviewing the letterhead on the Contract for Services between the Insured and United Reconstruction that the contract was drafted and supplied by United Reconstruction and that the assignment contained therein was to protect United Reconstruction’s interests in being paid for the work it performed.
Summary Judgment is appropriately granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute thereby justifying relief as a matter of law. In this matter, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a previous Assignment of Benefits made by the Insured served to divest the Insured of his ability to make the assignment to the Plaintiff in this case. The denial of this motion does not preclude the Defendant from asserting the same claim in defense of the Complaint.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
