26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 681a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2608EDWAInsurance — Automobile — Windshield replacement — Limitation of liability — Where insurer did not present any evidence of prices that are prevailing and competitive or of method for calculating what windshield replacement service would cost in competitive market at time of loss, insurer failed to prove that its liability is limited under policy clause limiting liability to prevailing competitive price to repair or replace property at time of loss — Standing — Assignment — No merit to argument that assignment of benefits to repair shop was insufficient — Equitable estoppel — Argument that repair shop was equitably estopped from recovering more than prevailing competitive price where it performed work despite being aware from course of dealings with insurer that insurer would not pay more than prevailing competitive price fails where insurer did not present evidence that repair shop represented that it accepted insurer’s pricing limits, that insurer relied on any such representation or that insurer changed its position in detrimental reliance on any such representation — Waiver — No merit to argument that repair shop waived right to seek additional benefits by performing work after receiving document that stated insurer’s pricing limits and that performance of services constituted acceptance of price where insurer offered no evidence that repair shop intended to relinquish right to charge what it deemed necessary to replace windshield — Instead, evidence showed that shop immediately notified insurer through its invoice that it did not accept insurer’s pricing limits and has constantly reminded insurer of its intention not to accept those limits through series of lawsuits — Repair shop’s motion for directed verdict is granted
AUTO GLASS AMERICA, LLC (a/a/o Clinton Edwards), Plaintiff, v. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. COCE-15-001784 (51). September 24, 2018. Kathleen McCarthy, Judge. Counsel: Emilio R. Stillo and Andrew B. Davis-Henrichs, Emilio Stillo, P.A.; Mac S. Phillips, Phillips Tadros, P.A.; Lawrence M. Kopelman, Lawrence M. Kopelman, P.A.; and Joseph R. Dawson and Rowena Racca, Law Offices of Joseph R. Dawson, P.A., for Plaintiff. Vanessa S. Septien and Dario Perez, Shutts & Bowen, LLP, for Defendant.
FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on August 15, 2018 and August 17, 2018 for a non-jury trial, and the Court, having considered and weighed the evidence presented, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses; having considered and reviewed the pertinent legal authorities; having heard and considered the legal arguments presented and otherwise being fully advised in the premises,
ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:
NATURE OF THE DISPUTEAND SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff Auto Glass America, LLC (“AGA”) replaced the windshield on a vehicle insured by Geico Indemnity Company (“Geico”) and, pursuant to an assignment of benefits, billed Geico directly for the replacement. Geico paid AGA less than the amount invoiced. AGA, claiming entitlement to full payment under the insurance policy, sued Geico for breach of contract and seeks by this lawsuit the difference between the amount invoiced and the amount paid. Geico, in turn, asserted four affirmative defenses: (1) its liability is limited to the amount it paid under the policy; (2) AGA lacks standing; (3) AGA is estopped from seeking additional payment; and (4) AGA waived its right to seek additional payment.
Each party called one witness at trial. AGA called Charles Isaly, its owner and operator; Geico called Susana Eberling, its corporate representative who is assigned to glass litigation claims. The following exhibits were admitted into evidence:
· Plaintiff’ Exhibit 1: The insurance policy Geico issued to Clinton Edwards (the “Policy”);
· Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2: The work order prepared by AGA and executed by Clinton Edwards on October 28, 2014, which includes an assignment of benefits, that was sent to Geico on October 29, 2014 (the “AGA Work Order”);
· Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3: The invoice submitted by AGA to Geico on October 29, 2014 (the “AGA Invoice”);
· Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4: Composite of invoices from AGA to various insurers in September through December of 2014 that were adjusted to reflect payment at AGA’s invoiced price by the insurers referenced therein; and
· Defendant’s Exhibit 1: Document dated October 27, 2014 on Safelite Solutions, LLC’s letterhead containing what Geico describes as its “pricing parameters.”1
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Clinton Edwards was insured by Geico under an automobile insurance policy that was in effect from October 3, 2014 through April 3, 2015 bearing policy number 4217-65-33-38 (the “Policy”). The parties stipulated that the Policy was in full force and effect on the date of the loss (the date on which the windshield was damaged).
2. Under Section III — Physical Damage Coverages, the Policy provides comprehensive coverage for losses2, including broken windshields, that are not caused by a collision:
LOSSES WE WILL PAY
Comprehensive (Excluding Collision)
1. We will pay for each loss, less the applicable deductible, caused other than by collision to the owned or non-owned auto. This includes glass breakage.
No deductible will apply to loss to windshield glass.
3. The Policy also contains a clause stating that Geico’s liability for a loss:
2. Will not exceed the prevailing competitive price to repair or replace the property at the time of loss, or any of its parts, including parts from non-original equipment manufacturers, with other of like kind and quality and will not include compensation for any diminution of value that is claimed to result from the loss. Although you have the right to choose any repair facility or location, the limit of liability for repair or replacement of such property is the prevailing competitive price which is the price we can secure from a competent and conveniently located repair facility. At your request, we will identify a repair facility that will perform the repairs or replacement at the prevailing competitive price.
4. On October 21, 2014, Clinton Edwards sustained damage to the windshield of his 2000 Ford Ranger pickup truck.
5. There is no dispute that the windshield was damaged, and that the damage to the windshield constitutes a covered “loss” under the Policy.
6. On October 27, 2014, Mr. Edwards called AGA to schedule an appointment to replace his broken windshield. On that same day, AGA called Geico with Mr. Edwards on the line to notify Geico of the loss and that Mr. Edwards selected AGA to replace his windshield.
7. On October 27, 2014, Safelite Solutions, LLC, Geico’s third-party administrator who processes payments for Geico, emailed a document to AGA at an email address that AGA does not monitor (the Safelite Document). The Safelite Document set forth certain “pricing parameters” that are not referenced or mentioned anywhere in the Policy and states that “[p]erformance of services constitutes acceptance of the communicated price and billing instructions.”
8. The “pricing parameters” on the Safelite Document are (a) a 50% discount from the NAGS3 list price for the glass itself; (b) $40.00 per hour for labor; and (c) $15.00 per “kit.”4
9. On October 28, 2014, AGA’s technician met with Mr. Edwards and presented him with a work order prepared by AGA on October 27, 2014 (the “AGA Work Order”)5.
10. On October 28, 2014, Mr. Edwards signed the AGA Work Order, which includes language assigning “any and all insurance rights, benefits and proceeds under the above referenced policy to my repair facility Auto Glass America, LLC.”
11. On October 28, 2014, AGA replaced the windshield.
12. On October 29, 2014, AGA prepared an invoice that it transmitted to Geico that same day in the amount of $548.34 (the “AGA Invoice”)6. The invoiced price consists of (a) $245.47 for the windshield itself, which is ten percent over the NAGS recommended price7; (b) $90.00 per hour for labor; (c) 2.3 labor hours; (d) $60.00 for two kits ($30.00 each); and (e) $35.87 for sales tax.
13. In response to the AGA Invoice, Safelite Solutions, LLC paid AGA the total sum of $249.93 on Geico’s behalf. The amount paid consists of (a) $111.58 for the windshield itself, which is 50 percent less than the NAGS recommended price; (b) $40.00 per hour for labor; (c) 2.3 labor hours; (d) $30.00 for two kits ($15.00 each); and (e) $16.35 for sales tax.
14. The difference between the amount invoiced and the amount paid is $298.41, exclusive of interest. This is the principal amount of damages AGA seeks by this lawsuit.
15. Mr. Isaly testified that AGA never communicated to Geico that it accepted the “pricing parameters” listed on the Safelite Document. Mr. Isaly also testified that that AGA never relinquished any right to seek the amount it charges for its windshield replacement services.
16. To the contrary, Mr. Isaly testified that the very next day after AGA replaced the windshield, it invoiced Geico at AGA’s full price8 and thereby communicated to Geico that it did not accept the “pricing parameters.” Mr. Isaly also testified that Geico is the lowest paying insurance company in the state and that AGA began to actively pursue collection action against Geico as far back as late 2012 for the difference between the amounts AGA invoiced and the amounts Geico paid on prior claims.
17. Ms. Eberling testified there are three types of shops offering windshield repair and replacement services to Geico insureds: Safelite shops, affiliate shops and non-affiliate shops. Affiliate shops are those that are within the Safelite Glass Company (“SGC”) network and have agreed to accept Geico’s pricing parameters. Non-affiliate shops, like AGA, have not agreed to accept Geico’s pricing. Geico’s pricing parameters are the same for affiliate and non-affiliate shops, and both categories of shops are paid the same amount unless a particular shop charges less than Geico’s pricing parameters.
18. Ms. Eberling testified that the Safelite Document was actually created by Geico, who then sent it to Safelite Solutions, LLC, who then sent it to AGA on October 27, 2014 at 12:09 p.m. Ms. Eberling further testified that the Safelite Document communicated Geico’s pricing parameters to AGA and stated that “[p]erformance of the services constitutes acceptance of the communicated price and billing instructions.” Ms. Eberling also testified that the next communication that Geico had with AGA on this claim was its receipt of AGA’s invoice. After receiving AGA’s invoice, Safelite Solutions, LLC sent payment to AGA in accordance with Geico’s fixed pricing parameters.
19. When asked on direct examination why the amount invoiced was not “a prevailing competitive price” Ms. Eberling’s response was that “[t]tle prevailing competitive price is a price that Geico can secure for a competent, conveniently located shop. That amount — the amount billed by Auto Glass America exceeded that amount.”
20. When asked on direct examination how she knows when Geico can secure the work for its pricing parameters, Ms. Eberling’s response was, “[b]ased on reviewing Geico’s claims history” which is “based on the invoices that are received.” But no such invoices were admitted into evidence, and Ms. Eberling did not mention any shops (affiliates or otherwise) from whom Geico allegedly could have secured the windshield replacement at its pricing parameters at the time of loss.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By pretrial order dated August 13, 2018, the Court determined the respective burdens of proof for this bench trial. Specifically, AGA has the burden of proving the essential elements of its breach of contract claim by a preponderance of the evidence and Geico has the burden of proving the essential elements of each of its affirmative defenses under the same evidentiary standard.
AGA’s Breach of Contract Claim
An adequately pled breach of contract action requires three elements: (1) a valid contract; (2) a material breach; and (3) damages. Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 985 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1615a]. Here, to establish its prima facie case, AGA was obligated to prove (1) the existence of a valid insurance contract to which it was a party; (2) Geico breached the insurance contract by failing to pay the amount of the loss (i.e., the amount necessary to replace the windshield); and (3) the amount of damages sustained because of the breach.
As to the first element, AGA established that it was a party to the Policy based on the assignment of benefits (the “AOB”) under which it stands in the shoes of Clinton Edwards. The AOB is contained within the AGA Work Order, which was admitted into evidence as was the Policy. The parties stipulated the Policy was in full force and effect on the date of the loss and provided coverage for windshield replacements. Mr. Isaly testified as to all elements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule codified at Fla. Stat. 90.803(6) as to the AGA Work Order and the AOB contained therein and established that the AOB is what it purports to be.
As to the second and third elements, there is no dispute that Mr. Edwards’s windshield was damaged while the Policy was in full force and effect, and that Geico was obligated under the Policy to “pay for each loss . . . caused other than by collision to the owned or non-owned auto” including “glass breakage.” Mr. Isaly’s unrebutted testimony was that AGA invoiced Geico for the amount AGA deemed necessary to replace the windshield, and that AGA’s principal damages are $298.41 (the difference between the amount invoiced and the amount Geico paid).
Based on the documentary evidence and testimony, the Court concludes that AGA established its prima facie case thereby shifting the burden to Geico to prove each of its affirmative defenses.
Geico’s Affirmative Defenses
“An affirmative defense is a defense which admits the cause of action, but avoids liability, in whole or in part, by alleging an excuse, justification, or other matter negating or limiting liability.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Curran, 135 So.3d 1071, 1079 (Fla. 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly S122a], quoting, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Coucher, 837 So.2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D131b]; Mancinelli v. Davis, 217 So.3d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) [42 Fla. L. Weekly D784a]. “[T]he plaintiff is not bound to prove that the affirmative defense does not exist.” Custer Med. Ctr, a/a/o Maximo Masis v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1096 (Fla. 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly S640a]; Jenkins v. Gillen, 450 So.2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In a dispute concerning an insurance claim, “the insurer is the defensive pleader, [and] it has the burden of pleading and persuasion of each element of the defense.” Curran, 135 So.3d at 1079; Custer, 62 So.3d at 1096; Herrera v. C.A. Seguros Catatumbo, 844 So. 2d 664, 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D853a].
Limit of Liability
As its first affirmative defense, Geico asserted that its liability is limited under the policy’s LIMIT OF LIABILITY provision which states that Geico’s liability:
Will not exceed the prevailing competitive price to repair or replace the property at the time of loss, or any of its parts, including parts from non-original equipment manufacturers, with other of like kind and quality and will not include compensation for any diminution of value that is claimed to result from the loss. Although you have the right to choose any repair facility or location, the limit of liability for repair or replacement of such property is the prevailing competitive price which is the price we can secure from a competent and conveniently located repair facility. At your request, we will identify a repair facility that will perform the repairs or replacement at the prevailing competitive price.
Geico further asserted as part of its first affirmative defense that “[p]ursuant to the terms of its insurance policy, it paid an amount equal to the prevailing competitive price for the [replacement] at issue.”
Geico’s burden is to prove that it paid an amount equal to the “prevailing competitive price.” In other words, in order to prevail on its first affirmative defense, Geico must prove that it is more likely than not that AGA’s invoiced price exceeds charges that are both prevailing and competitive9. To do so, Geico must first introduce evidence to establish what amount constitutes the “prevailing competitive price” for the windshield replacement at the time of the loss. Geico did not offer any evidence in that regard.
When asked on direct examination why the amount invoiced was not “a prevailing competitive price” Ms. Eberling’s circular and conclusory response was that “[t]he prevailing competitive price is a price that Geico can secure for a competent, conveniently located shop. That amount — the amount billed by Auto Glass America exceeded that amount.” Ms. Eberling also testified that “[b]ased on reviewing Geico’s claims history” — which is “based on the invoices that are received” — Geico knows that it can secure the “prevailing competitive price.” But no such invoices were admitted into evidence, and Ms. Eberling did not mention even the names of any shops (affiliates or otherwise) from whom Geico could have allegedly secured the windshield replacement at its pricing parameters at the time of loss. Geico did not even establish what the “prevailing competitive price” is, let alone that AGA’s invoiced price exceeded it.
To be clear, the Court is mindful that most — if not all — insurance companies regularly include language in their policies attempting to limit their liability so they are not exposed to simply paying any amount submitted by a claimant. In this case, however, Geico did not prove that the limit of liability provision was triggered because it did not present any evidence as to any prices that are prevailing and competitive or any methodology for calculating what the service would cost in a competitive market at the time of the loss. Geico thus failed to present any competent evidence to support its affirmative defense that it paid the “prevailing competitive price” or that AGA’s charge was more than that.Standing
As its second affirmative defense, Geico asserted that the AOB was insufficient and AGA lacked standing as a result. Geico was therefore obligated to prove that the AOB was somehow deficient. Mr. Isaly’s unrebutted testimony was that the AGA Work Order, which contained the AOB language, satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay rule. As to authenticity, AGA established that the AOB was genuine and what it purported to be. See, Pennsylvania Blue Shield v. Wolfe, 575 So.2d 1361, 1362-3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Geico did not offer any evidence suggesting otherwise. Peak Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Center (a/a/o Enerio Beato), 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 258a (Miami-Dade Cir. Ct. (Appellate) 2011)(Although the defendant-insurer asserted there was never a valid AOB executed in favor of the plaintiff-provider, there was no evidence to prove that the AOB submitted was false or never executed or otherwise deficient). To the contrary, at the pretrial deposition of Susana Eberling, Geico stipulated that it does not “have anything that says these insureds [including Mr. Edwards] didn’t sign — sign these assignments.” Upon AGA’s request at trial, the Court enforced this stipulation.
Equitable Estoppel
As its third affirmative defense, Geico asserted equitable estoppel. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) representation of a material fact by the party estopped to the party claiming the estoppel that is contrary to a fact later asserted by the estopped party; (2) reliance on that representation by the party claiming the estoppel; and (3) the party claiming the estoppel detrimentally changed its position due to such reliance. Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So.2d 65, 68-9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D1275a].
The thrust of this defense is that AGA was aware from its course of dealings with Geico that Geico would not pay the amount invoiced for this claim, yet AGA voluntarily chose to do the work anyway. In other words, Geico alleges that AGA implicitly demonstrated its intention to accept the “prevailing competitive price” by performing the replacement and should now be estopped from recovering anything more than what Geico unilaterally decided to pay.
But Geico did not present any evidence of any representation — express or implied — that AGA accepted Geico’s pricing parameters. Likewise, Geico did not present any evidence that any purported representation by AGA was contrary to a fact later asserted by AGA. Geico failed to present any evidence that it relied on AGA’s purported representation or that Geico changed its position in detrimental reliance on AGA’s alleged acceptance of Geico’s fixed pricing parameters. To the contrary, Mr. Isaly testified that AGA never communicated to Geico, in any form or fashion, that it accepted the fixed “pricing parameters” listed on the Safelite Document. Most compelling on this point was Mr. Isaly’s unrebutted testimony that the very next day after AGA replaced the windshield, it invoiced Geico at AGA’s full price and thereby communicated to Geico that it did not accept the “pricing parameters.” Mr. Isaly also presented unrebutted testimony that AGA had been pursuing collection action against Geico as far back as late 2012 for the difference between the amounts AGA invoiced and the amounts Geico paid on prior claims.
Waiver
As its fourth affirmative defense, Geico asserted waiver. Geico alleged that AGA waived its right to seek additional benefits under the Policy because prior to replacing the windshield, AGA received the Safelite Document that stated Geico’s pricing parameters and included language that “[p]erformance of services constitutes acceptance of the communicated price and billing instructions.” In other words, Geico alleged that AGA’s intentional act of performing the work after receipt of the Safelite Document was a voluntary relinquishment of a known right or privilege.
“The elements of waiver are: (1) the existence at the time of the waiver of a right, privilege, advantage, or benefit which may be waived; (2) the actual or constructive knowledge of the right; and (3) the intention to relinquish the right.” Zurstrassen, 786 So.2d at 71, quoting, Leonardo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 675 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D1165a]. Waiver may be implied by conduct, but that conduct must be clear. Id. Thus, while forbearance for a reasonable time alone cannot constitute waiver, conduct leading one to believe that a right has been waived may imply such a waiver. Id.
Here, there is no dispute that AGA had a right to charge the amount it deemed necessary to replace the windshield. There is similarly no dispute that AGA knew it had that right. The dispute lies in the third element — whether AGA displayed an intention to relinquish that right. On this point, Geico offered no evidence at all. The only evidence on this issue was the testimony of Mr. Isaly that AGA never relinquished any right to seek the amount it charges for its windshield replacement services. On this claim, AGA communicated its invoiced price — in excess of Geico’s fixed pricing parameters — the very next day after the job was completed. And the history between AGA and Geico is such that AGA had been suing Geico for just under two years on other claims for the difference between AGA’s invoiced amount and the amount Geico paid per its fixed pricing parameters. AGA did not forbear for an unreasonable amount of time such that a relinquishment of any rights could be reasonably inferred or implied; rather, it immediately notified Geico through its invoice that it did not accept Geico’s pricing parameters. And AGA constantly reminded Geico of its intention not to accept the pricing parameters each and every time AGA filed a lawsuit against Geico on or before October 28, 2014 (the date on which AGA replaced Mr. Edwards’s windshield.A
GA’S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
After Geico rested, AGA moved for a directed verdict and argued that it established its prima facie case for breach of contract and that Geico failed to prove any facts in support of any of its affirmative defenses.
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that motions for directed verdict should be granted with extreme caution. Verdicts should be directed only when trial courts determine that no reasonable fact-finder could render a verdict for the non-moving party after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and assuming that the non-movant’s evidence and all inferences taken therefrom are true. Perry v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 597 So.2d 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Great S. Peterbilt, Inc. v. Geiger, 616 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Cowen v. Thornton, 621 So.2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 629 (Fla.1994); Regency Lake Apts. Assocs., Ltd. v. French, 590 So.2d 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
In this case, the Court agrees that AGA established its prima facie case for breach of contract and Geico failed to prove any facts in support of any of its affirmative defenses. By failing to offer any evidence at all in support of any of its affirmative defenses, no reasonable fact-finder could render a verdict in Geico’s favor.
It is therefore,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that AGA’s motion for directed verdict is GRANTED.
It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT final judgment be and the same is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Auto Glass America, LLC and against the Defendant, Geico Indemnity Company, whose address is 5260 Western Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland, in the amount of $298.41 as principal damages, plus $66.03 as prejudgment interest for a total amount of $364.44, which shall bear interest at the statutory rate, for which sum let execution issue forthwith.
It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that AGA is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs and the Court retains jurisdiction to determine amounts thereof.*****The Court notes this case has been in litigation for 1,337 days*****
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1Throughout the trial, Geico referred to this document as “the work order.” To avoid confusion between this document and Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (the work order prepared by AGA), the Court will refer to this exhibit as the “Safelite Document.”
2Unless otherwise noted, all bold-faced, italicized words appearing in quoted policy text are defined in the definitions portion of the Policy. “Loss” is defined to mean “direct and accidental loss of or damage to:
(a) An owned or non-owned auto, including its equipment; or
(b) Other property insured under this section.”
3NAGS stands for National Auto Glass Specifications. Susana Eberling, Geico’s corporate representative at trial, testified that NAGS is considered the benchmark for the pricing of glass parts. Charles Isaly, AGA’s owner and operator, testified that NAGS establishes general guidelines for auto glass pricing since the 1930s and maintains a database of pricing information based on national surveys identifying common prices for materials that are required for windshield installations. NAGS also determines the number of labor hours (but not hourly labor rates) required for all windshield replacements.
4“Kits” refer to adhesive kits that contain gloves, razor blades and the adhesive that binds the windshield to the vehicle.
5The AGA Work Order constitutes AGA’s business record that was properly authenticated by Mr. Isaly.
6The AGA Invoice constitutes AGA’s business record that was properly authenticated by Mr. Isaly.
7AGA and Geico agree that the NAGS list price for the glass is $223.15.
8Mr. Isaly testified that for windshield replacement services AGA performed in 2014. various insurers, including 21st Century, Liberty Mutual, The Hartford, Metlife, Safeco, Windhaven, Foremost and AAA, have paid AGA’s invoiced price. Mr. Isaly testified that even Geico has paid up to 150% of NAGS for the windshield component on replacement jobs performed in 2014. This information, while noteworthy, is not critical to the Court’s holding.
9Neither “prevailing” nor “competitive” nor “prevailing competitive price” are mentioned in the definitions portion of the Policy. Geico, however, argues that “prevailing competitive price” is defined in the limit of liability section as “the price [Geico] can secure from a competent and conveniently located repair facility” at the time of the loss. AGA disagrees that this language defines “prevailing competitive price.” Rather, this language simply means that Geico will not attempt to secure a “prevailing competitive price” from an incompetent shop that is too far away from the insured. The Court agrees with AGA.
