26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 320b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2604CORIInsurance — Discovery — Failure to comply — Sanctions — Insurer’s filing of notice of dismissal without prejudice did not divest trial court of jurisdiction to enforce order compelling response to discovery that was entered prior to dismissal or to rule on motion for sanctions that was filed prior to dismissal — No merit to argument that no further sanction could be imposed because dismissal itself was ultimate sanction where dismissal was without prejudice — Monetary sanction imposed
CONFORTI CHIROPRACTIC AND WELLNESS CENTER, INC. a/a/o Michele Corigliano, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 13th Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County. Case No: 17-CC-016568, Division H. June 7, 2018. Daryl M. Manning, Judge.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONSFOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURETO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on May 22, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. upon the Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply with Court Order, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The undisputed facts regarding Defendant’s motion are as follows:
a. On June 19, 2017, Defendant served upon Plaintiff a Request for Production and Interrogatories. Plaintiff failed to respond to this discovery, failed to object to the discovery, and failed to seek an enlargement of time in which to respond to the discovery.
b. On October 8, 2017, this Court entered an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s discovery within ten (10) days. Plaintiff failed to comply with the order, failed to respond to the discovery, failed to object to the discovery, and failed to seek an enlargement of time in which to respond to the discovery.
c. On October 24, 2017, Defendant filed its Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply with Court Order. That motion was then coordinated for hearing to occur on May 22, 2018 and a Notice of Hearing was served on Plaintiff on February 6, 2018.
d. As of May 22, 2018, Plaintiff had not served responses or objections and had not sought an enlargement of time to respond to Defendant’s discovery or to comply with the Court’s order of October 8, 2017.
e. On May 22, 2018, at 8:56 a.m., slightly more than one hour before the hearing that had been coordinated since February, Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice.
2. The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery and has failed to comply with this Court’s order of October 8, 2017. The Plaintiff offered no explanation for its above noted failures to comply.
3. The Plaintiff asserts that this Court was divested of jurisdiction to enforce its order or to hear Defendant’s motion for sanctions, both of which were entered prior to the dismissal. Plaintiff argued case law that stands for the proposition that a court loses jurisdiction to entertain motions filed after the filing of a dismissal. Such case law is not applicable to the present facts and does not warrant further discussion.
4. Plaintiff offered no case law suggesting that a Court loses jurisdiction to enforce orders entered prior to a dismissal or to rule on motions for sanctions filed prior to a dismissal. Plaintiff’s unsupported argument in that regard completely contradicts well-established law that a Court has inherent authority to enforce its orders. “Clearly, a trial judge has the inherent power to do those things necessary to enforce its orders, to conduct its business in a proper manner, and to protect the court from acts obstructing the administration of justice. In particular, a trial court would have the ability to use its contempt powers to vindicate its authority and protect its integrity by imposing a compensatory fine as punishment for contempt.” Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608-609 (Fla. 1994). “[E]ven after resolution of a lawsuit by way of final judgment or stipulation of dismissal, the trial court retains jurisdiction to resolve ‘collateral matters such as taxation of costs and prevailing attorney’s fees. A motion for sanctions seeking attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses as a result of discovery abuses and alleged violations of court orders properly falls within the exception to the rule as an independent and collateral claim.’ ” Giuffre v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) [42 Fla. L. Weekly D1912a] citing to Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D295a]. “In addition to retaining jurisdiction over independent and collateral claims, it is axiomatic and inherent that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its own orders. . . .” Giuffre at 1038. See also Erickson v. Erickson, 998 So.2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D46d] (holding that “it is axiomatic that a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders.”); Cooter v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (“A court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated.”); Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 121 So.3d 23, 41 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S168a] (holding a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to resolve a pending motion for sanctions under section 57.105 regardless of a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of case); Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 961 So.2d 349, 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D276a] (finding that, after entry of final judgment, trial court retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce contempt order that was entered prior to judgment).
5. Plaintiff also argued that its own voluntary dismissal constituted the “ultimate sanction” and that no further sanctions could be imposed as a result. It is true that the Florida Supreme Court has labeled a dismissal with prejudice as an “ultimate sanction.” Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1993). However, the facts of Kozel are not applicable because the Plaintiff’s dismissal in this case was without prejudice. The Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not constitute a sanction under the present facts.
6. The Plaintiff is hereby sanctioned in the initial amount of $450.00 to be paid to the Dutton Law Group PA trust account within ten (10) days of execution of this order. The Defendant may move for additional sanctions if it presents evidence that the above described fact pattern is a normal pattern of behavior for Plaintiff’s counsel, Landau & Associates PA.
