26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 914a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2611COLLInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Medical expenses — Declaratory action brought by claimant injured while passenger in vehicle owned by her boyfriend seeking declaration as to whether she is owed coverage under boyfriend’s PIP policy or under policy covering vehicle that claimant co-owns with her father with whom she does not reside and on which she is not named insured — Fact that claimant is co-owner of insured vehicle for which she is not included as named insured does not exclude her from coverage as passenger in boyfriend’s vehicle — Insurer of vehicle co-owned by claimant and father is not required to extend coverage to claimant
HOLLYWOOD INJURY REHABILITATION CENTER, INC., (a/a/o Chelsey Colliflower), Petitioner, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY and GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, Respondents. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 15-02620CONO (71). February 15, 2018. Louis H. Schiff, Judge. Counsel: Thomas J. Wenzel, Cindy A. Goldstein, PA, Coral Springs, for Plaintiff. David L. Taylor, Law Offices of Robert J Smith, Ft. Lauderdale, for Respondent Allstate Indemnity Company. The Law Office of George L Cimballa, III, Plantation, for Respondent GEICO Indemnity Company.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON THE PARTIES’COMPETING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE having been reviewed by the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, having heard arguments on January 23, 2018, having reviewed the Court file, and the Court otherwise being advised in the premise, the Court finds as follows:The Facts and Procedural History
On March 23, 2012, Chelsey Colliflower was injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, she was a passanger in a 2004 Ford F150 that was owned by Corey Hayes and insured by GEICO Indemnity Company (“GEICO”). Mr. Hayes was Ms. Colliflower’s boyfriend and co-resident.
Also at the time of the accident, Ms. Colliflower was a co-owner of a 2010 Dodge Journey. Ms. Colliflower co-owned the vhehicle with her father. Ms. Colliflower did not reside with her father at the time of the accident. While the Dodge Journey was insured by Allstate Indemnity Company (“Allstate”), Ms. Colliflower was not a named insured on the policy. Instead, she was only listed as an additional driver.
Ms. Colliflower treated at Hollywood Injury Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (“Petitioner”). The Petitioner submitted bills to both insurers. Both GEICO and Allstate denied coverage for the accident under the facts recited above. GEICO denied coverage claiming that it was not required to extend personal injury protection coverage as a host vehicle because Ms. Colliflower owned a motor vehicle and that, therefore, she should look to Allstate for coverage. Allstate contended that it did not have a coverage duty because she was the guest passenger in the GEICO insured vehicle and she was neither a named insured on the Allstate policy nor a co-resident with a named insured.
As a result, Petitioner filed the instant lawsuit requesting Declaratory Relief. Petitioner proceeded under three alternative theories and requested the Court enter a declaration that: GEICO owed coverage, Allstate owed coverage, or both insurers owed coverage (in which case the Court would be called on to apportion liability pursuant to Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(f)).Findings and Analysis as to GEICO
In its motion, GEICO claimed that it was not responsible for coverage because Ms. Colliflower co-owned a motor vehicle. GEICO claimed that Ms. Colliflower’s status as co-owner of the Dodge Journey meant that either Allstate was responsible for affording coverage or Ms. Colliflower was self-insured. In support of its position, GEICO relied on Fla. Stat. §627.733 that requires every owner to maintain security on the owner’s motor vehicle. GEICO argued that the penalty for failing to maintain the required security is for the owner to become personally liable. See Fla. Stat. §627.733(4). Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the statutes merely require the owner to maintain appropriate security on the vehicle, but that the statutes do not mandate that the owner be covered as a named insured or by the personal injury protection insurance under the policy. Petitioner further argued that neither the pleadings nor the subject policy contained any specific policy provision that would exclude Ms. Colliflower from coverage. The Court finds that GEICO’s position regarding the statutory requirements is erroneous.
“The goal behind the enactment of the no-fault law was to provide a comprehensive system of coverage for all people operating or riding in motor vehicles.” Pearson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Fla. Stat. §627.736(1) requires a motor vehicle insurance policy complying with the security requirements of Fla. Stat. §627.733 to provide personal injury protection coverage to passengers riding in a motor vehicle. That Ms. Colliflower co-owned a motor vehicle, but was not included as a named insured is not a factual scenario that excludes her from the coverage duty owed by GEICO to Ms. Colliflower as a passenger in a GEICO insured motor vehicle. The Second District Court of Appeal previously decided this issue under facts that are identical in all material aspects to the case sub judice. See Pearson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). This is the only District Court of Appeal opinion directly on point. “[I]n the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts”. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992). As such, the Court finds that GEICO must extend coverage to Ms. Colliflower.Findings and Analysis as to Allstate
Allstate argued primarily that Pearson was binding and the Court was required to find that GEICO owed a coverage duty under the facts presented in this case. Petitioner agreed that Pearson was binding and that there was no question that GEICO owed a coverage duty, but made several arguments primarily for purposes of preservation of its rights in the event of an appeal is taken. Petitioner argued that the PIP statute contemplates overlapping coverages and that one reasonable reading of Fla. Stat. §627.736(e)(1) would subject Allstate to a potential coverage duty, even if that duty was ultimately deemed secondary to GEICO’s duty. Petitioner urged the Court to find that Allstate owed an initial duty to process the claim upon receipt of the notice of a potentially covered loss and that Allstate should thereafter have sought to recover benefits and claims processing expenses from the primary insurer, GEICO, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(f). Petitioner furthermore noted that Pearson was silent as to Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(f).
Ultimately, the Court finds this argument academically interesting, but at this stage, moot. Ms. Colliflower and her assignees will get made whole by virtue of the Court’s declaration requiring GEICO to extend coverage in this case. Allstate is not required to extend coverage at this point by virtue of the Court ruling against GEICO.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1. GEICO owed a duty to extend coverage to Chelsey Colliflower for the injuries she sustained in her March 23, 2012 motor vehicle accident. GEICO is ordered to extend coverage for the loss. GEICO’s denial of coverage was incorrect.
2. Allstate does not owe a duty to extend coverage to Chelsey Colliflower for the injuries she sustained in her March 23, 2012 motor vehicle accident.
3. In the event it is required to equitably apportion liability pursuant to Fla. Stat. §627.736(4)(f), the Court finds GEICO to be 100% liable and Allstate to be 0% liable.
4. The Court retains jurisdiction to address any claims for Supplemental Relief pursuant to Fla. Stat. §86.061.
5. The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine Petitioner’s entitlement to and award of attorneys’ fees and costs and to enter further orders to enforce this declaratory judgment.
