26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 536a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2607TORRInsurance — Personal injury protection — Counsel — Disqualification — Prior representation of opposing party — Abuse of discretion to deny insurer’s motion to disqualify law firm as medical provider’s counsel in 215 pending PIP cases based on fact that attorney who is now employed by provider’s law firm was previously employed by law firm that represents insurer where attorney possessed considerable confidential information regarding insurer’s defense of PIP claims in general, and defense of claims regarding whether insurer’s policy provides sufficient notice of election to use statutory fee schedules in particular, and fact that attorney’s representation of provider would require her to take opposite position regarding interpretation of insurer’s policy than position that she had represented to various courts as being legally correct when she was representing insurer demonstrates that current cases and cases in which attorney represented insurer are substantially related matters — Trial court departed from essential requirements of law by holding that insurer must prove that disclosure and use of confidential information resulted in unfair advantage to provider as predicate to disqualification and by placing reliance on statements that attorney’s new firm would screen attorney from cases in which insurer is defendant — Provider’s law firm remains disqualified despite fact that it no longer employs attorney

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NEXT MEDICAL FLORIDA LLC, a/a/o Ruben Torres, Respondent. Circuit Court, 7th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2017 11698 CIDL. Consolidated with on Cases Exhibit “1” hereto. Division 32. August 10, 2018. Michael S. Orfinger, Judge. Counsel: Kenneth P. Hazouri, DSK Law, Orlando, for Petitioner. Kimberly P. Simoes, Simoes Davila, PLLC, Longwood, for Respondent.

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI

Petitioners STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY (collectively “State Farm”) seek certiorari review of the trial court’s October 30, 2017 “Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Law Firm” (“the Order”). The Order denied State Farm’s motion to disqualify the law firm of Simoes & Davila, PLLC as Plaintiff’s counsel in some 215 pending PIP cases.¹ Concluding that the trial court’s Order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, causing harm that is not remediable on direct appeal at the conclusion of the instant cases, this Court grants the petitions and quashes the Order.

Background

The factual history giving rise to the instant petitions is reasonably straightforward. Simoes & Davila, PLLC (“S&D”) represents medical providers who hold assignments of personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from their patients. State Farm provides PIP coverage to those patients. The underlying cases challenge the amount of State Farm’s reimbursements to the medical providers and the basis for calculating those reimbursements, contending that the amount of the reimbursements is not reasonable. The validity of State Farm’s position turns (at least in part) on the validity and proper interpretation of certain language contained in its Form 9810A insurance policy. More specifically, one of the substantive questions in these various cases is whether State Farm’s policy adequately gives notice to its insureds of State Farm’s intent to utilize Medicare fee schedules to limit PIP reimbursements. See GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Services, Inc., 141 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly S517a]. This issue was described below, and will be identified herein, as the “9810A/Reasonableness Dispute.” ²

State Farm is often represented in PIP litigation by the law firm of Cole Scott & Kissane (“CSK”). In April 2008, attorney Brooke Boltz (“Boltz”) joined CSK in its Tampa office [PX. 4, ¶3].³ She transferred to CSK’s Orlando office in 2013 specifically to supervise, as a partner, CSK’s State Farm PIP litigation in Central Florida [PX. 4, ¶3]. Boltz represented State Farm in PIP litigation in Central Florida from 2013 until she departed the firm in July 2017 to join S&D [PX.4, ¶ 3]. Her tenure at S&D was short-lived to say the least; according to affidavits filed by Boltz, Simoes, and David Davila, Boltz’s employment at S&D ended on October 13, 2017 [RX. 7]. The Motions to Disqualify at issue here, however, were filed while Boltz still worked for S&D.

Reduced to bare essentials, State Farm’s Motions to Disqualify claimed that Boltz had for years represented State Farm and become privy to substantial confidential information material to the issues being litigated in these cases. Having used that confidential information to advocate State Farm’s position regarding, among other things, interpretation of the 9810A policy form, State Farm contended that it would violate R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9 for Boltz to represent Plaintiff’s in substantially related matters against State Farm. State Farm further argued that because Rule 4-1.9 disqualified Boltz from undertaking this representation, her disqualification was imputed to the remaining attorneys of S&D pursuant to Rule 4-1.10(b).

Although the cases were never consolidated below, the trial court held one combined hearing on all 217 cases on October 4 and 5, 2017. Each side submitted several affidavits for the trial court’s consideration, but no testimony was taken. The trial court issued its Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Law Firm on October 30, 2017 (hereafter “Order”) [PX. 1]. The trial court recognized that in order for imputed disqualification to apply, State Farm would have to establish that “a) the attorney now associated with the law firm formerly represented a person whose interests are materially adverse to the current client; b) in a same or substantially related matter; and c) in the prior representation the attorney obtained confidential information that is material to the current lawsuit or matter.” Order at ¶ 5 (citing Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Caro, 207 So. 3d 944, 950-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly D2722b]. Accord R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10(b). The trial court agreed that State Farm had satisfied the first element, in that Boltz represented State Farm while at CSK, and State Farm’s interests were materially adverse to S&D’s current clients.

The trial court found, however, that State Farm had failed to prove the second and third elements necessary for disqualification. The court found that the current cases were not “substantially related” to the cases Boltz handled at CSK because, although the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute (as described in Virtual Imaging) was common to the current cases and those Boltz handled at CSK, there were “numerous other provisions in the policy that may require enforcement. Each case would stand on its own merit based on the facts of that case.” Order at ¶ 8. Relying on the Comment to Rule 4-1.9, the trial court stated that PIP litigation was a “type of problem” in which S&D could represent “another client in a wholly distinct problem (other policy provisions) of that type. . .” Id., ¶ ¶ 7-8.

As to the third element, the trial court framed the issue as whether Boltz was privy to confidential information that she disclosed to S&D, thus giving S&D an unfair advantage in cases involving the notice provision of the 9810A policy form. Id., ¶ 9. The trial court held that in the Fifth District, a party seeking imputed disqualification must prove that an attorney in Boltz’s position actually disclosed confidential information about her former client to her new firm, and that the new firm used that information so as to gain an unfair advantage over Boltz’s former client. Id., ¶ 13. The trial court found that State Farm had not met that burden of proof.Legal Analysis

A party seeking certiorari relief from a non-final order must demonstrate “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be remedied on post judgment appeal.” Cohen v. D.R Horton, Inc., 121 So. 3d 1121, 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D1800a]. Orders granting or denying motions to disqualify counsel are reviewable by certiorari. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Caro, 207 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly D2722b]; City of Apopka v. All Corners, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) [22 Fla. L. Weekly D2588a]; Edwin J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).

Respondents submit that the standard by which this Court is to review the trial court’s Order is abuse of discretion. They rely on the Third District’s decision in Moriber v. Dreiling, 95 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D2030a], wherein the court stated, “On motions to disqualify, this standard is especially difficult to meet because the disqualification of counsel is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, as long as such discretion is exercised within the confines of the applicable law and the trial court’s express or implied findings are supported by competent substantial evidence.” Id. at 453 (emphasis added). The extent to which the trial court acted within the confines of applicable law is discussed in more detail below. Further, it bears repeating that the trial court in the instant cases heard no testimony; it based its factual findings exclusively on affidavits and other documents submitted into evidence. In that circumstance, this Court is not bound by the customary strictures of review regarding such things as credibility and weight of evidence. C.A. Hansen Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 455 So. 2d 1329, 1332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

Respondents correctly point out that disqualification of an opposing party’s counsel is an extraordinary remedy, and as such, should be resorted to sparingly. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Appel, 831 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D137c], pet. denied 857 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2003). Courts view motions to disqualify with some degree of skepticism, “because disqualification impinges on a party’s right to employ a lawyer of choice, and such motions are often brought for tactical reasons.” Coral Reef of Key Biscayne Developers, Inc. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters at London, 911 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D1698a]. However, where the lawyer of the client’s choice is precluded from undertaking or continuing the representation because of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, adherence to the rules must prevail.

Determining whether S&D is disqualified from representing its clients against State Farm requires the Court to examine portions of R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10, titled “Imputation of Conflicts of Interest; General Rule.” In particular, Rule 4-1.10 provides as follows:

(b) Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) and (c) that is material to the matter.

Thus, to impute disqualification to S&D, State Farm would have to establish that Boltz formerly represented State Farm, that State Farm’s interests were materially adverse to S&D’s clients, that the current representation is “in the same or a substantially related matter,” and that Boltz had acquired confidential information material to the current matter. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10(b); Caro, 207 So. 3d at 948-49.

Subject to a few exceptions not applicable here, Rule 4-1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to representation of a client without the client’s informed consent. Rule 4-1.9, titled “Conflict of Interest; Former Client,” states:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter must not afterwards:

(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent;

(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known; or

(c) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

The parties do not dispute that Boltz and State Farm had an attorney-client relationship. The existence of that relationship creates an irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). That presumed access to the client’s confidential information imputes knowledge of that information to all lawyers in the firm. See id.However, when a lawyer switches firms, the former client seeking to disqualify the lawyer and the new firm cannot rely upon the presumption of disclosed confidences. Instead, the party seeking imputed disqualification under Rule 4-1.10 must prove that the lawyer who has switched firms actually acquired confidential information during his or her prior representation. See Solomon v. Dickison, 916 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2712a]; Gaton v. Health Coalition, Inc., 745 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999) [24 Fla. L. Weekly D2645b]. Further, that confidential information must be material to the matter at hand. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10(b).

State Farm offered several affidavits in support of its contention that Boltz acquired confidential information that was material to the cases at bar. Attorney Gregory J. Willis, a CSK partner responsible for managing the firm’s statewide relationship with State Farm, stated in his affidavit that he was instrumental in recruiting Boltz to move from CSK’s Tampa office to its Orlando office so that she could supervise State Farm’s PIP litigation in Central Florida [PX. 4, ¶ 3]. Boltz was supervising some eleven associate attorneys who litigated PIP suits for State Farm (and other insurers) at the time she left CSK. Id., ¶ 5. Willis stated that Boltz billed 1,829 hours to State Farm in 2015, 1,849 hours in 2016, and 717 hours in 2017 prior to her leaving the firm in July. Virtually all of that billable time was devoted to PIP related matters. Id., ¶ 4.

Willis said that in many of those cases, Boltz “assisted with the initial case evaluation conference call with the assigned State Farm claim representative, and was copied on CSK’s initial case evaluation, which contained confidential information regarding State Farm and CSK’s strategy for defending these PIP cases.” Id., ¶ 7. Willis also explained that State Farm allowed only certain attorneys (including Boltz) to handle critical legal proceedings in PIP cases, such as depositions of State Farm employees, motions for summary judgment, and discovery disputes regarding what he called “institutional” discovery. As a result, Boltz was entrusted with more confidential information than the associates she supervised. Id., ¶ 5. In addition, Willis stated that Boltz had access to State Farm’s confidential discovery manuals, see id., ¶ 16(b), and attended training regarding the handling of PIP matters presented by State Farm’s corporate law department at its headquarters in Bloomington, Illinois. Id., 9(e).

Willis identified in his affidavit some 540 PIP cases that CSK was handling for State Farm at the time of Boltz’s departure. He stated that Boltz provided services in all of those cases in some form or fashion. Id., ¶ 8. In 80 of those cases, Boltz was State Farm’s counsel of record, while S&D represented the plaintiffs. Willis stated that those cases “almost exclusively involved, as one of the major issues, State Farm’s adoption of then [sic] schedule of maximum charges into its 9810A policy form.” Id., ¶ 6. Attorney Kimberly Simoes stated during the hearing on the Motion to Disqualify that S&D had withdrawn from those 80 cases, and although no evidence was presented on that point, State Farm does not appear to dispute that assertion. Willis testified in his affidavit that Boltz was “supervising, managing, or otherwise assisting” with the remaining 460 cases, and that many of them also involved the same issue of policy interpretation set forth above. See id., ¶ 7. He further stated that the cases all had fact patterns identical or substantially similar to those in the instant cases. By way of illustration, Willis offered several time entries from Boltz’s billing on one State Farm PIP case in order to show her involvement “in receiving and formulating confidential strategies regarding the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute.” Id., ¶ 20.

State Farm also offered the affidavit of a CSK associate named Katherine McGinnis. McGinnis worked on PIP litigation matters for State Farm, and Boltz was her direct supervisor [PX. 9, ¶ 2]. She worked on an almost daily basis with Boltz, and stated that based on that interaction, she could verify that Boltz defended all varieties of PIP matters for State Farm. These included examinations under oath, litigation defense, and confidential investigations. Id., ¶¶ 3-4. McGinnis participated with Boltz in confidential strategy telephone conferences with State Farm. See id., ¶ 6. McGinnis also stated that in cases arising under the 9810A policy form, Boltz received confidential information from State Farm regarding the best theories to argue, which ones to avoid, and how to counter plaintiffs’ anticipated arguments. Id., ¶ 12. In addition, McGinnis testified in her affidavit that Boltz trained the attorneys she supervised on State Farm’s preferred methods for handling cases involving the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute. Id., ¶ 13(b).

Next, State Farm offered an affidavit of Kevin Cox, one of its Team Managers [PX. 6]. Cox supervises State Farm claim representatives who handle Florida PIP matters. Id., ¶ 2. He worked with Boltz in a case in which the plaintiff was Advantacare of Florida, LLC a/a/o Linda Kitco. Cox testified in his affidavit that the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute was directly at issue in that case. See id., ¶¶ 4-5. He recounted an email to State Farm from Boltz and another CSK attorney dated April 15, 2016 discussing confidentially such matters as retention of expert witnesses, settlement of attorney fee claims, how best to present the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute, whether to challenge the reasonableness of the provider’s charges following an adverse summary judgment ruling on the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute, and whether to challenge the medical necessity of the treatment received. Id., ¶ 5. Cox received an analysis from Boltz of the summary judgment hearing (which State Farm lost), and the two later discussed whether State Farm should settle the case or challenge the reasonableness of the provider’s charges via expert testimony. See id., ¶ 7.

State Farm offered the affidavit of another Team Manager, one James Richardson [PX. 7]. He explained State Farm’s policy regarding confidentiality with its defense counsel. According to Richardson, State Farm sends claims information to defense counsel using password protected communications, and many of its confidential communications with defense counsel are sent via encrypted e-mail. Id., ¶ 4. Richardson contends that the strategies and confidences exchanged between State Farm and its counsel regarding how to conduct litigation over its policy forms are confidential. Examples of these discussions include whether to file a proposal for settlement, what experts to engage, evaluations of judges, opposing counsel and the venue, whether a given case should be settled and in what amount, evaluation of fee claims, evaluation of plaintiffs’ experts, and the pursuit and defense of discovery. Richardson stated that many of these confidential communications are largely the same from case to case. Id., ¶ 5. Richardson goes on in his affidavit to identify a handful of exemplar cases involving some combination of these issues in which Boltz was directly involved. See id., ¶¶ 6-14.

The record contains two affidavits from Boltz in opposition to State Farm’s Motion to Disqualify. In one affidavit, Boltz confirmed that she was employed with S&D from July 24, 2017 through October 13, 2017. She then stated, “During my employment with [S&D], I did not discuss or disclose any confidential information regarding my former representation of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and I have never disclosed any confidential information to [S&D] regarding my former representation of State Farm” [RX. 7]. Both Simoes and S&D’s managing partner, David Davila, submitted affidavits to the same effect. Id.

Boltz submitted a second, more detailed affidavit in which she described the PIP litigation process in general [PX. 3]. She offered the view that the arguments in the instant cases regarding whether the language in State Farm’s policy form 9810A satisfied the Supreme Court’s requirements in Virtual Imaging “are not uncommon”, and that the issue has been and continues to be litigated by several insurance companies. Id., ¶ 5. While Boltz agreed that she represented State Farm in cases involving challenging the 9810A policy language, see id. ¶ 6, she testified in her affidavit that she did not provide legal advice to State Farm regarding what language it should use in drafting its insurance policy, nor did she “participate or otherwise provide any legal advice to State Farm as to the language or arguments put forth in its standard Motion for Final Summary Judgment as to the 9810A policy form.” Id., ¶ 8. She went on to say that “[a]ny information regarding State Farm’s arguments, legal theories or legal positions regarding the interpretation of the 9810A policy is information that is widely disseminated through hearings, pleadings, orders, discovery responses and all such information could be obtained by any reasonably prudent lawyer.” Id., ¶ 10. Boltz said that she “counseled State Farm as to the specific strengths or weaknesses of individual factual issues” that pertained to a particular litigation file. Id., ¶ 11. She disclaimed any access to the claims files in the current cases, and testified that they were not substantially related to any matter she previously handled for State Farm. Id., ¶ 16. She further denied having any “specific knowledge or specific fact [sic] regarding any policy or procedure related to State Farm’s specific handling of discovery, settlement decisions, utilization of expert witnesses, evaluation of experts or other specific information that could be used in the current matter to the disadvantage of State Farm except for information that has become generally known.” Id., ¶ 14.

Rule 4-1.10(b) “makes the disqualification turn solely on possession of information concerning the former client.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (emphasis added). In Petrin, an associate in the firm representing the defendant in a personal injury suit left that firm and became a partner in the law firm representing the plaintiff. There was no dispute that the attorney was privy to confidential information regarding the defendant’s strategy. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s law firm because the plaintiff’s firm had established a “screening procedure” to prevent any disclosure of information by the attorney. Id. at 6-7. In granting certiorari relief, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a screening process was not a defense to disqualification when a private attorney moved to another private firm. Id. at 7. Looking at the plain language of Rule 4-1.10(b), the Petrin court found that disqualification turned on simply possessing information regarding the former client because “[t]he mere possession of confidential information is too great a threat to public confidence in the attorney-client privilege….” Id. Accordingly, the Fifth District quashed the order denying disqualification.

It is abundantly clear from all the affidavits presented, including Boltz’s own, that Boltz possessed considerable confidential information regarding not only State Farm’s defense of PIP claims in general, but its strategies for defending the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute in particular. Respondents attempted to minimize the effect of this knowledge by arguing that “Ms. Boltz did nothing more than present legal arguments crafted by State Farm.” T.2: 44:3-4. Respondents went further by arguing, “Brooke Boltz never had an independent thought in her head as it pertains to the arguments in 9810A.” Id., 101:25-102:1-2. Even if the Court accepted this argument, which would reduce Boltz to little more than an automaton, the argument would only bolster State Farm’s position because it establishes that State Farm gave Boltz information pertaining to the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute. See Petrin, 516 So. 2d at 7.

Notwithstanding the clear language of Rule 4-1.10(b) and the Fifth District’s decision in Petrin, the trial court made the following statement in paragraph 13 of its Order, which constitutes a significant departure from the essential requirements of law:

In the 5th DCA the movant is required to prove, not only that there was confidential information disseminated between the former client and the attorney, but also prove disclosure and use that resulted in an unfair advantage for the new firm before the court disqualifies a law firm [sic]. . . . The Defendant has not shown that confidential information has been disclosed. (Emphasis added).

In making this erroneous statement of law, the trial court misapplied the decision in City of Apopka v. All Corners, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) [22 Fla. L. Weekly D2588a]. In City of Apopka, decided ten years after Petrin, the Fifth District considered as “a case of first impression” the imputed disqualification of a law firm based upon the lateral move of a non-lawyer employee, specifically a secretary, from one firm to another. Id. at 643. The Fifth District rejected a prophylactic rule of disqualification that failed to take into account whether the secretary had actually imparted confidential information to the new employer. Aligning itself with the Second District, the City of Apopka court held “that disqualification is required only when there is evidence that the law firm obtained confidential information, thereby gaining an unfair advantage, from its new personnel.” Id.at 544 (citing Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1988)). Accord Stewart v. Bee-Dee Neon & Signs, Inc., 751 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D598b].

It appears to this Court, based upon its review of the Response to Petition for Certiorari, that Respondents do not attempt to defend the trial court’s reasoning on this point. Their decision in this regard is sound. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by overlooking the fact that Florida law imposes different requirements on laterally moving lawyers and laterally moving legal support staff. Unfortunately for Respondents, this issue appears to have been an integral part of the trial court’s reasoning, as reflected by the fact that it consumes about four pages of the 13-page Order. On its face, Rule 4-1.10(b) comes into play when the laterally-moving attorney acquired confidential information about his or her former client; there is no requirement that the attorney disclose the information to the new employer. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10(b); Petrin, 516 So. 2d at 7. Indeed, if Boltz actually disclosed confidential information about State Farm to S&D, the issue would not be whether Boltz’s disqualification was imputed to S&D; rather, S&D would almost certainly be disqualified for actually possessing confidential information and Boltz would be in direct violation of Rules 4-1.6(a), 4-1.9(b), and 4-1.9(c). By requiring State Farm to prove that Boltz actually shared confidential information about her representation of State Farm with S&D, so as to give S&D an unfair advantage, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law.

The trial court’s interpretation of Rule 4-1.10(b) departs from the essential requirements of law in other respects as well. First, the trial court seemed to give some evidentiary weight to attorney Simoes’ statement in open court that Boltz would not work on any cases in which State Farm was a defendant. See Order, ¶ 12. The unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence, and the trial court cannot rely on them as such. See Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Center, Inc. v. Seaman, 959 So. 2d 774, 778-79 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D1488a]. Even had Respondents offered sworn testimony to this effect, however, any effort by S&D to screen Boltz from the instant cases would not prevent the imputed disqualification of the firm. Petrin, 516 So. 2d at 7.⁴ To the credit of both Respondents and S&D, they expressly disclaim reliance on this statement by the trial court. See Response to Petition, pp. 27-28.

Ultimately, Respondents assert that the trial court correctly refused to disqualify S&D because the instant cases are not “substantially related” to the cases Boltz litigated or supervised while at CSK.

This is an issue Petrin does not address, because Petrin involved a lawyer moving between firms in the same case. In determining whether matters are “substantially related” to one another, the Comment to Rule 4-1.9 is instructive:

The scope of a “matter” for purposes of rule 4-1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer’s involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute, or if the current matter would involve the lawyer attacking work that the lawyer performed for the former client. For example, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent.

Lawyers owe confidentiality obligations to former clients, and thus information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client without the former clients consent.

However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. Information that has been widely disseminated by the media to the public, or that typically would be obtained by any reasonably prudent lawyer who had never represented the former client, should be considered generally known and ordinarily will not be disqualifying. The essential question is whether, but for having represented the former client, the lawyer would know or discover the information.

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9 Comment (emphasis added).

The trial court agreed with Respondents that the instant cases were not substantially related to the PIP cases that Boltz handled at CSK. The trial court reasoned that even though the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute was a common issue in both the instant cases and those Boltz handled at CSK, there were numerous other policy provisions that could come into play in the cases, and thus “[e]ach case would stand on its own merit based on the facts of that case.” Order, ¶ 8. Thus, the trial court characterized the instant cases as a “type of problem” Boltz handled for State Farm on a recurrent basis that precluded neither Boltz nor S&D from representing other clients in “wholly distinct” problems of that type. See id.; Rule 4-1.9 comment.

In support of their position that the instant cases and those Boltz previously handled for State Farm are not substantially similar to one another, Respondents rely on Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Solomon, 2009 WL 413519 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In Morgan Stanley, attorney Solomon had represented Morgan Stanley for several years while an associate at the Greenburg Traurig law firm. His scope of work included representing Morgan Stanley in class action securities litigation and in arbitration claims brought by its individual clients. His duties “included responding to discovery, ranking arbitrators, research and writing, attending meetings and preparing pre-hearing memoranda for in-house attorneys. As part of his responsibilities, he would confer with Morgan Stanley brokers, branch office managers, branch administrative managers and in-house attorneys. He tried two arbitrations and participated in one mediation and therefore needed to talk to branch members with respect to these matters.” Id. at *1. In arbitration matters, he handled standard discovery, but was also exposed to some Morgan Stanley documents that were not part of standard discovery. He also became familiar with Morgan Stanley’s settlement evaluation practices, and learned what factors its in-house attorneys considered important in evaluating settlements. Id. at *2. After Solomon left Greenberg Traurig, he began representing Morgan Stanley’s clients in securities arbitrations against it. Morgan Stanley filed suit to enjoin Solomon from representing clients against it on the basis that such representation violated Rule 4-1.9. Id. at *1.

Following an evidentiary hearing on Morgan Stanley’s motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court found that Solomon’s representation of his current clients did not violate Rule 4-1.9. Id. at *3. In so doing, the court relied heavily on the comment to Rule 4-1.9. “The comment distinguishes between a lawyer who has been ‘directly involved in a specific transaction’ and a lawyer who ‘recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client.’ In the latter circumstance, the lawyer would not be precluded from ‘later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of the type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client.’ ” Id. The Morgan Stanley court found that Solomon’s current representation fell within the latter category. Id. While the court agreed that both Solomon’s previous and current representation involved arbitration of securities claims involving Morgan Stanley, and that the same individuals from Morgan Stanley were involved in all the cases, those facts were themselves insufficient to make the cases “substantially related” to one another. Id.

The Morgan Stanley court also relied on the Fourth District’s decision in Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, Inc. v. Bradley, 961 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D1777a], rev. granted 980 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2008), rev. dismissed 997 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly S963b]. In this case, attorney Fisher had represented Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America (“Manor Care”) in approximately 60 cases while employed (by coincidence) at CSK. Many of those cases involved nursing home negligence, specifically concerning falls and pressure ulcers. Fisher left CSK and joined another firm, which represented Bradley in a negligence suit against Manor Care about eight months later. The trial court disqualified Fisher and his new firm from representing Bradley, and Bradley petitioned for certiorari. Id. at 1072.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted certiorari, finding that Bradley’s case was not “substantially related” to the cases Fisher handled for Manor Care. Id. Once again relying on the comment to Rule 4-1.9, the Bradley court stated that while at CSK, “Fisher handled a ‘type of problem’ for Manor Care — negligence cases involving patients who suffered from pressure ulcers or falls; the current case, filed after Fisher left [CSK], is a ‘wholly distinct problem of that type.’ ” Id. at 1073-74. Accordingly, the Bradley court declined to disqualify Fisher or his new firm, finding that the old and new cases were not “substantially related.” Id

On the issue of “substantial relationship,” State Farm relies on the First District’s decision in ASI Holding Co., Inc. v. Royal Beach & Golf Resorts, LLC, 163 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Here, ASI sought to disqualify its former counsel, the law firm of Matthews & Jones (“M & J”) from representing Royal Beach & Golf Resorts (“Resorts”) in a dispute over ASI’s non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”). In 2009, the parties had attempted negotiating a business transaction in which ASI shared information with Resorts that required the latter to enter into the NDA. Soon after the negotiations broke down, ASI learned that Resorts was using the information it had shared, and sued for breach of the NDA. Id. at 669. Some four years into the litigation, Resorts changed counsel, and hired M & J, which had represented ASI in NDA-related matters about ten years earlier. ASI moved to disqualify M & J from representing Resorts. The trial court denied the motion because, among other things, M & J’s representation of ASI had ended a decade earlier. Id

The First District granted certiorari, quashed the order under review, and ordered the law firm disqualified. Id. at 671. Preliminarily, the ASI court observed that nothing in Rule 4-1.9 or the caselaw “suggests that questions regarding conflicting representations turn on the passage of time.” Id. at 670. The court recognized that the key question was whether M & J’s representation of the parties “involved the same or ‘substantially related’ matters.” Id. Examining the comment to Rule 4-1.9, the ASI court noted that “matters are considered ‘substantially related’ under the rule if the current litigation ‘would involve the lawyer attacking work that the lawyer performed for the former client.’ ” Id. Against this backdrop, the court viewed the disqualification issue as follows:

Supporting its motion below, ASI provided the sworn testimony of its principal and attached documentary evidence revealing the nature of M & J’s prior legal work for ASI.

The firm provided “general counsel” type services to ASI from 2002-2004. It specifically supported ASI’s efforts to enforce the identical NDA, writing demand letters on ASI’s behalf to apparent violators. The letters expressed the firm’s opinion that the NDA was “valid and binding,” an opinion that stemmed from M & J’s own review, approval, and advice to ASI about validity and enforceability of the NDA. And it advised ASI to pursue those that violate the NDA.

By contrast, the Resort’s pleadings in this case indicate that it is defending itself on the basis that the NDA is not valid and enforceable and that its terms are vague and ambiguous. With this defense, M & J would be taking a position exactly contrary to the professional opinion and advice it gave earlier on ASI’s behalf. Again, it is undisputed that the terms of the NDA haven’t changed in all these years. As such, M & J would be placed in a position of attacking its prior legal opinion and advice regarding the NDA were it to represent the Resort in this case.

Id. at 670 (emphasis added).

The ASI court also recognized that the comment to Rule 4-1.9 allowed a lawyer who had recurrently represented a client in a particular type of matter to represent another client in a wholly distinct matter of the same type against the former client. However, the ASI court concluded that this exception did not apply, because opposing ASI in this case would require the law firm to attack “the validity of the very document that it had previously represented to be valid and legally binding.” Id. at 671.

Having considered all these cases closely, this Court finds that the situation presented in the instant case is more analogous to ASI than to Morgan Stanley or Bradley. In Bradley, attorney Fisher handled nursing home negligence cases for Manor Care before representing residents of Manor Care who were suing the facility for negligence. While the alleged injuries may have been similar, each case would contain questions of negligence and proximate causation that would by necessity be very fact-intensive, and thus a “wholly distinct problem” of the same type that Fisher handled when representing Manor Care. Bradley, 961 So. 2d at 1073-74. Morgan Stanley, a federal trial court decision not binding on this Court, is somewhat closer on the facts but nonetheless distinguishable. Procedurally, Morgan Stanley did not arise in the context of a motion to disqualify counsel, but rather in a lawsuit against attorney Solomon seeking to enjoin him from representing clients in FINRA arbitrations against Morgan Stanley. Substantively, the arbitrations in which Solomon either represented or opposed Morgan Stanley involved customers who lost money in investments. Once again, these would be very fact-intensive cases which would turn on the nature of particular investments and particular clients. See Morgan Stanley, 2009 WL 413519 at *4. Further, while the Morgan Stanley court observed that there was no evidence that Solomon had any recollection of Morgan Stanley’s arbitrator rankings because several years had passed since his representation of Morgan Stanley, see id. at *6, questions regarding conflicts of interest do not turn on the passage of time. See ASI, 163 So. 3d at 361.

The similarities between ASI and the instant cases are apparent. In ASI, ASI used the M & J law firm to enforce its NDA. There was no evidence that M & J actually drafted the NDA, but it nonetheless wrote to alleged violators asserting the NDA to be “valid and binding” after reviewing and advising ASI about the document. Similarly, Boltz advocated the validity of State Farm’s position regarding the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute, and the reasonableness of State Farm’s PIP payments, when employed at CSK. S&D’s clients now take the diametrically opposite position regarding the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute and the reasonableness of payments. That Boltz did not actually write the insurance policy is irrelevant. Likewise, even if Respondents are correct in their assertion that Boltz merely advanced arguments created by State Farm, she did so as an officer of the court. She could not advance those arguments without a basis in law or fact to do so. See R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-3.1.⁵ For Boltz to take the opposite position regarding the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute now would permit her to attack the interpretation of a document she represented to various courts as being legally correct. This is tantamount to Boltz attacking her own work, a classic example of “substantially related” matters under Rule 4-1.9. See ASI, 163 So. 3d at 670.

This Court is aware, as was the trial court, that the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute is not the only issue in the instant cases, and that there will be some issues in these cases that are distinct from the cases Boltz handled while at CSK. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Caro, 207 So. 3d 944, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly D2722b]. But that will inevitably be true of any two cases, regardless of the parties or causes of action involved. Clearly, whether the issue is the proper interpretation of the Form 9810A policy or preferences as to the retention of experts, Boltz’s long-standing prior representation of State Farm is substantially related to at least some of the issues in the instant cases. See id.

Boltz’s disqualification from representing clients against State Farm in cases involving the 9810A/Reasonableness Dispute leads to the conclusion that S&D is likewise disqualified under Rule 4-1.10(b). The cases in which Boltz represented State Farm are substantially related to the instant cases, the Respondents in the instant cases have interests materially adverse to State Farm, and Boltz acquired confidential and material information from State Farm protected by Rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) and (c). Respondents’ argument that any such information has become generally known or would be uncovered by any reasonably prudent lawyer suing State Farm is unpersuasive, because it ignores unrebutted evidence from State Farm, for example, that Boltz had access to State Farm’s confidential discovery manuals, and that she attended training at State Farm’s corporate headquarters conducted by its corporate law department regarding the handling of special PIP projects [PX. 4, ¶ 9(e), (g)]. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the discovery manuals or the contents of the training are either now commonly known or discoverable by any reasonably prudent lawyer. To the extent the trial court concluded otherwise, it departed from the essential requirements of law.

Given that Boltz and S&D state that Boltz left S&D’s employ on October 13, 2017, the Court asked the parties to address one issue not raised in the trial court; i.e. whether State Farm’s Motions to Disqualify were now moot [Doc. 20]. Not only do the parties take differing positions on the issue of mootness, they dispute whether Boltz actually achieved a complete separation from S&D [Docs. 23-24; 27]. However, the Court need not resolve whether Boltz and S&D completely severed their ties, because even if they did, S&D must still be disqualified.

Respondents contend that this issue is governed by Rule 4-1.10(c), which provides:

Representing Interests Adverse to Clients of Formerly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:

(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 41.9(b) and (c) that is material to the matter.

The Court finds that disposition of this issue is governed by Canta v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 245 So. 3d 813 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2017) [43 Fla. L. Weekly D55a]. In Canta, an attorney who worked for a firm representing Philip Morris in several Engle-progeny cases left his firm and was hired by a firm suing Philip Morris and other tobacco cases in substantially similar Engle-progeny cases. After the same law firm was disqualified in another case and the disqualification was upheld on appeal, Philip Morris moved to disqualify the plaintiff’s firm in Canta. The following day, the plaintiff’s law firm terminated the attorney in question, provided affidavits from every attorney in the firm disclaiming knowledge or discussions with the fired attorney about Philip Morris’s confidential information, and argued that the termination of the lawyer rendered the motion for disqualification moot. Id. at 816-17. The plaintiff’s firm relied on Rule 4-1.10(c), arguing that it could continue representing the plaintiff because no lawyer remaining in the firm had information about Philip Morris protected by Rule 4-1.6 or 4-1.9(b) or (c). The trial court disqualified the plaintiff’s law firm, and the plaintiff petitioned for certiorari. Id. at 817-18.

The Third District Court of Appeal denied certiorari relief, finding that the trial court correctly disqualified plaintiff’s law firm. Id. at 822. The Canta court concluded that an imputed disqualification could not be undone in the middle of a case by terminating the attorney creating the conflict. The court read Rule 4-1.10(c) as addressing “a scenario in which a lawyer formerly associated with a law firm leaves the firm and ‘thereafter’ the firm represents ‘a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer.’ ” Id. at 818. The court observed that the word “thereafter” would allow the firm to take on a new case after the conflicted lawyer left, but ultimately determined that the attorney’s departure would not cure an otherwise well-taken disqualification motion in pending litigation. Id. at 817. In concluding that Rule 4-1.10(c) applied only to future representations, the Canta court relied on Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 124 and Comment c thereto. Id. at 821. The Canta court summarized its reasoning as follows:

Neither Rule 4-1.10(c) nor the comments to the Rule directly address the firm’s ability to continue in a matter “representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer” after the formerly associated lawyer has been terminated precisely because his presence resulted in disqualification in other “substantially related” matters. “Unimputing” a conflict seems as implausible as unringing a bell, unscrambling an omelette, or pushing toothpaste back into the tube.

Id. at 821.

Finally, the Court deems it important to clarify that it is not suggesting any actual misconduct by Boltz or the S&D firm, such as the actual sharing of State Farm’s confidential information. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991). The trial court’s holding that State Farm had to prove such misconduct as a predicate to disqualification misstates Florida law, and therefore departs from its essential requirements. In disqualifying a law firm in K.A.W, the Florida Supreme Court found the following language from a New York court apropos:

While these facts neither indicate nor imply any departure from professional conduct or breach of any ethical canon, we cannot escape the conclusion that this is a situation rife with the possibility of discredit to the bar and the administration of justice. Obviously Mr. Turkewitz cannot erase from his mind the confidences he received from his former client or the plan of defense he envisaged. Though we do not dispute his good faith or the good faith of the firm representing plaintiff, both the possibility of conflict of interest and the appearance of it are too strong to ignore.

K.A.W., 575 So. 2d at 634 (quoting Rotante v. Lawrence Hospital, 46 A.D.2d 199, 20; 361 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1974)). See also Petrin, 516 So. 2d at 7 (“The mere possession of confidential information is too great a threat to public confidence in the attorney-client privilege. . . .”).

State Farm’s Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED. The trial court’s October 30, 2017 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Law Firm is hereby QUASHED, and these cases are remanded to the trial court for entry of an order disqualifying the law firm of Simoes & Davila., PLLC, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

__________________

¹The Court has been advised that of the cases consolidated for purposes of these certiorari proceedings, the following cases have been settled: Case Nos. 2017-31974-CICI; 2017-31978-CICI; 2017-31988- CICI; 2017-11802-CICI; 2017-32051-CICI; and 2017-32036-CICI. Those cases have been dismissed by separate order, and their case numbers appear in strikethrough on the attached matrix of consolidated cases.

²Although an open question when these cases were filed, the Court notes that the Second District Court of Appeal recently issued an opinion resolving this issue in State Farm’s favor. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. d/b/a Park Place MRI, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1149a (Fla. 2nd DCA May 18, 2018).

³Citations to the parties’ appendices shall be to those filed in Case No. 2017-11698-CIDL. Petitioner’s Appendix is designated “PX,” while Respondents’ Appendix is designated “RX.” References to the transcript of the October 4-5, 2017 hearing on the Motion to Disqualify, which is Exhibit 18 to Petitioner’s Appendix, are designated by “T. __:__:__, ” with the blanks containing the appropriate volume, page, and line numbers of the transcript.

⁴Unlike Rule 4-1.10, Rule 4-1.11, titled “Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees,” allows a firm to avoid imputed disqualification due to the hiring of a former government lawyer so long as the disqualified lawyer is screened from participating in the matter and receives no fee therefrom. This rule exists so as “to avoid an adverse impact on the government’s ability to recruit attorneys.” Petrin, 516 So. 2d at 7; R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.11 Comment.

⁵Nothing has been presented to the Court suggesting that in advancing State Farm’s position, Boltz was making a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law, which would also be permissible under Rule 4-3.1.

__________________EXHIBIT “1”

CASE NUMBER	CASE NUMBER	CASE NUMBER	CASE NUMBER	CASE NUMBER
2017 11698 CIDL	2017 11719 CIDL	2017 11743 CIDL	2017 11763 CIDL	2017 11789 CIDL
2017 11699 CIDL	2017 11720 CIDL	2017 11744 CIDL	2017 11764 CIDL	2017 11790 CIDL
2017 11700 CIDL	2017 11721 CIDL	2017 11745 CIDL	2017 11767 CIDL	2017 11791 CIDL
2017 11701 CIDL	2017 11722 CIDL	2017 11746 CIDL	2017 11768 CIDL	2017 11792 CIDL
2017 11702 CIDL	2017 11723 CIDL	2017 11747 CIDL	2017 11769 CIDL	2017 11793 CIDL
2017 11703 CIDL	2017 11724 CIDL	2017 11748 CIDL	2017 11772 CIDL	2017 11794 CIDL
2017 11704 CIDL	2017 11726 CIDL	2017 11749 CIDL	2017 11773 CIDL	2017 11795 CIDL
2017 11705 CIDL	2017 11727 CIDL	2017 11750 CIDL	2017 11774 CIDL	2017 11796 CIDL
2017 11706 CIDL	2017 11728 CIDL	2017 11751 CIDL	2017 11776 CIDL	2017 11797 CIDL
2017 11707 CIDL	2017 11729 CIDL	2017 11752 CIDL	2017 11778 CIDL	2017 11798 CIDL
2017 11708 CIDL	2017 11730 CIDL	2017 11753 CIDL	2017 11779 CIDL	2017 11799 CIDL
2017 11709 CIDL	2017 11731 CIDL	2017 11754 CIDL	2017 11780 CIDL	2017 11800 CIDL
2017 11710 CIDL	2017 11732 CIDL	2017 11755 CIDL	2017 11781 CIDL	2017 11802 CIDL
2017 11711 CIDL	2017 11733 CIDL	2017 11756 CIDL	2017 11782 CIDL	2017 11804 CIDL
2017 11712 CIDL	2017 11734 CIDL	2017 11757 CIDL	2017 11783 CIDL	2017 11807 CIDL
2017 11713 CIDL	2017 11737 CIDL	2017 11758 CIDL	2017 11784 CIDL	2017 11808 CIDL
2017 11714 CIDL	2017 11738 CIDL	2017 11759 CIDL	2017 11785 CIDL	2017 11809 CIDL
2017 11715 CIDL	2017 11739 CIDL	2017 11760 CIDL	2017 11786 CIDL	2017 11810 CIDL
2017 11716 CIDL	2017 11741 CIDL	2017 11761 CIDL	2017 11787 CIDL	2017 31930 CICI
2017 11718 CIDL	2017 11742 CIDL	2017 11762 CIDL	2017 11788 CIDL	2017 31932 CICI
2017 31933 CICI	2017 31952 CICI	2017 31974 CICI	2017 31994 CICI	2017 32019 CICI
2017 31934 CICI	2017 31953 CICI	2017 31975 CICI	2017 31995 C1CI	2017 32020 CICI
2017 31935 CICI	2017 31954 CICI	2017 31976 CICI	2017 31996 CICI	2017 32021 CICI
2017 31936 CICI	2017 31955 CICI	2017 31977 CICI	2017 31997 CICI	2017 32022 CICI
2017 31937 CICI	2017 31956 CICI	2017 31978 CICI	2017 31998 CICI	2017 32023 CICI
2017 31938 CICI	2017 31957 CICI	2017 31979 CICI	2017 31999 CICI	2017 32025 CICI
2017 31939 CICI	2017 31958 CICI	2017 31980 OCT	2017 32000 CICI	2017 32026 OCT
2017 31940 CICI	2017 31959 C1t1	2017 31981 CICI	2017 32001 CICI	2017 32027 CICI
2017 31941 CICI	2017 31960 CICI	2017 31982 CICI	2017 32002 CICI	2017 32028 CICI__,
2017 31942 CICI	2017 31961 CICI	2017 31983 CICI	2017 32003 CICI	2017 32029 CICI
2.017 31943 CICI	2017 31962 CICI	2017 31984 CICI	2017 32004 CICI	2017 32030 CICI
2017 31944 CICI	2017 31963 CICI	2017 31985 CICI	2017 32005 CICI	2017 32031 CICI
2017 31945 CICI	2017 31964 CICI	2017 31986 CICI	2017 32006 CICI	2017 32032 CICI
2017 31946 CICI	2017 31965 CICI	2017 31987 CICI	2017 32007 CICI	2017 32033 CICI
2017 31947 CICI	2017 31966 CICI	2017 31988 CICI	2017 32008 CICI	2017 32034 CICI
2017 31948 CICI	2017 31967 CICI	2017 31989 CICI	2017 32009 CICI	2017 32035 CICI
2017 31949 CICI	2017 31969 CICI	2017 31990 CICI	2017 32010 CICI	2017 32036 CIC1
2017 31950 CICI	2017 31970 CICI	2017 31991 CICI	2017 32011 CICI	2017 32037 CICI
2017 31951 CICI	2017 31971 CICI	2017 31992 CICI	2017 32012 CICI	2017 32038 CICI
	2017 31972 CICI	2017 31993 CICI	2(117 32018 CICI	2017 32039 CICI
2017 32040 CICI
2017 32041 CICI
2017 32042 CICI
2017 32043 CICI
2017 32044 CICI
2017 32045 CICI
2017 32046 CICI
2017 32047 CICI
2017 32048 CICI
2017 32049 CICI
2017 32050 CICI
2017 32051 CICI
2017 32056 CICI
2017 32057 CICI
2017 32060 CICI
2017 32052 CICI

*CASES WHOSE NUMBERS HAVE BEEN STRICKEN-THROUGH HAVE BEEN SETTLED AND DISMISSED BY SEPARATE ORDER.