27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 35a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2701PRUDInsurance — Appeals — Supplemental authority — Response — Rule 9.225 does not permit filing of response to notice of supplemental authority
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, INC., D/B/A EMERGENCY RESOURCES GROUP, a/a/o Mercedes Prudencio-Alvarez, Respondent. Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Orange County. Case No. 2018-CA-9259-O. February 18, 2019. Keith A. Carsten, Judge. Counsel: Rebecca O’Dell Townsend and Scott W. Dutton, Dutton Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner. David M. Caldevilla, de la Parte & Gilbert, P.A., Tampa; and David Alexander, Bradford Cederberg, P.A., Orlando, for Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTIONFOR LEAVE TO RESPOND TO RESPONDENT’SSECOND NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
THIS MATTER came before the Court for consideration of Respondent’s Second Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Second Notice”), filed February 7, 2019; Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Respond to Respondent’s Second Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Motion for Leave to Respond”), filed February 8, 2019; and Respondent’s Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Respond to Respondent’s Second Notice of Supplemental Authority (“Response”), filed February 11, 2019. The Court finds as follows:
In the Second Notice, Respondent provides to the Court as supplemental authority copies of various documents in four cases, including three county court orders and one per curiam affirmed opinion issued by the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court, in and for Orange County, Florida.1
In the Motion for Leave to Respond, Petitioner asserts that it wants to address the supplemental authority and then argues, among other things, that even if Khan has precedential value, it is factually distinct and thus has no persuasive value. Petitioner also argues that Woodside and Mitchell are of no persuasive value unless it is to “demonstrate the harm being inflicted upon GEICO and its insureds by assignees of PIP benefits who have succeeded in convincing the trial court to unilaterally reform the insured’s contracts based upon a misinterpretation of the PIP statute.”
In the Response, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s “motion” is, for all intents and purposes, an unauthorized supplemental brief. Respondent further asserts that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.225, which governs notices of supplemental authority, does not authorize a party to submit any substantive arguments in response to supplemental authority, and asks this Court to deny Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Respond.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.225 states, in its entirety:
A party may file notice of supplemental authority with the court before a decision has been rendered to call attention to decisions, rules, statutes, or other authorities that are significant to the issues raised and that have been discovered after service of the party’s last brief in the cause. The notice shall not contain argument, but may identify briefly the issues argued on appeal to which the supplemental authorities are pertinent if the notice is substantially in the form prescribed by rule 9.900(j). Copies of the supplemental authorities shall be attached to the notice.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the plain language of Rule 9.225 does not permit the filing of a response to a party’s notice of supplemental authority.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Respond to Respondent’s Second Notice of Supplemental Authority is DENIED.
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1The cases are: Florida Hosp. Med. Ctr. a/a/o Wassim Khan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 2015-SC-7091-O; USAA Gen. Indem. Co. v. Florida Hosp. Med. Ctr., (Fla. 9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2019), 2017-CV-119-A-O; Emergency Medicine Professionals a/a/o Dillon Woodside v. Geico Indem. Co., 2017-SC-16356-O [26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 657a]; and Tarpon Springs Hosp. Foundation a/a/o Austin Mitchell v. Geico Indem. Co., 2017-SC-27001-O.
