27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 132a
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2702HINCInsurance — Personal injury protection — Appeals — Timeliness — Appeal filed more than thirty days after entry of final judgment is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
INTERVENTIONAL SPINE CENTER, LLC. a/a/o Luz Hincapie, Appellant, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 2017-000049-AP-01. L.T. Case No. 2014-13047-SP-23. March 26, 2019. An appeal from the County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Jason Emilios Dimitris, County Court Judge. Counsel: Virginia M. Best, and Johanna Mendez, Lopez & Best, Miami, for Appellant. Monica C. Segura, Nicole Sieb Smith, and K. Abigail Roberts, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
(Before MIRANDA, FINE, and FRANCIS, JJ.)
ON CONFESSION OF ERROR AND NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
(FRANCIS, J.) We grant the motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, writing briefly to explain how we got here.
This case began when Appellant, Interventional Spine Center, LLC, (“Interventional”), sued Appellee, GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”) for personal injury protection benefits stemming from Interventional’s medical treatment of GEICO’s insured.
The case proceeded to summary judgment, the trial court ruling in favor of GEICO, and against Interventional.
The latter then filed a motion for “Reconsideration, Clarification and Rehearing.” Of course, because the motion was directed to the trial court’s nonfinal order, notwithstanding its “Rehearing” title, it was properly a motion for reconsideration that the court, in its inherent and discretionary authority, was free to consider at that time. See Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly S625a] (“[T]he trial court retains inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to the entry of final judgment or order terminating an action[.]”); Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Assocs., Inc., 263 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972) (A motion for rehearing may be directed only to final judgments rendered by the court). As a motion for reconsideration, it could not have tolled the time for filing an interlocutory appeal. Wagner, 263 So. 2d at 3. And it could not have tolled the time to file an appeal from an appealable nonfinal order. Agere Sys., Inc. v. All Am. Crating Inc., 931 So. 2d 244, 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D1658c].
Before it could hear Interventional’s motion, however, the trial court entered final summary judgment for GEICO, effectively denying the motion for reconsideration.
Following entry of the final order, Interventional filed neither a timely motion for rehearing in the trial court, nor a notice of appeal to the appellate court. See generally Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b) (“A motion for . . . rehearing shall be served not later than 15 days after the . . . date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) (stating that the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed).
Instead, remarkably, almost three months after entry of the final judgment, the parties proceeded to a hearing on Interventional’s motion for reconsideration, where the trial court denied it. Then within thirty days of the denial of this motion — but now more than thirty days after the entry of the final order — Interventional filed its notice of appeal.
Under different facts, perhaps the motion for reconsideration could have been determined to be a premature motion for rehearing that tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal. But we don’t pass upon that issue since those facts are not before the Court, and Appellant raised no argument regarding this.
Rather, when this author questioned Appellant as to whether this Court had jurisdiction to hear the case given the timing of the filing of the notice of appeal, Appellant conceded error, and filed this “notice” to dismiss the appeal. Because we agree with Appellant’s concession, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Bryant v. Wells Fargo Bank, 182 So. 3d 927, 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly D239a] (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction where notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after judgment); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). (MIRANDA and FINE JJ., concur.)
