27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 127b
Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2702ETIENOT FINAL VERSION OF OPINION
Subsequent Changes at 27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 345aInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Owner of vehicle for which security was required by law — Trial court erred in ruling that vehicle owned by injured claimant did not have to be registered and insured at time of accident because vehicle was parked awaiting resale and was no longer being driven at that time — Law required that security be maintained on vehicle that had been driven on roads of state continuously throughout registration or licensing period that extended through date of accident
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. SILVERLAND MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, a/a/o Merland Etienne, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 2016-463-AP-01. L.T. Case No. 2012-4319-SP-25. April 15, 2019. An appeal from the County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Patricia Marino Pedraza, County Court Judge. Counsel: Douglas H. Stein, Association Law Group, P.L., Miami, for Appellant. Mark Gatica, Majid Vossoughi, and Brad R. Blackwelder, Majid Vossoughi, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
(Before DEL PINO, DE LA O, and FRANCIS, JJ.)
(FRANCIS, J.*) We review the trial court’s final order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Silverland Medical Center, LLC (“Silverland”). We have jurisdiction. See Article V, (5)(b), Fla. Const.; § 26.012, Fla. Stat. (2019). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand with instructions that final judgment be entered in favor of Appellant, Progressive American Insurance Company (“Progressive”).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Silverland sued Progressive for personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits under a policy of insurance issued by Progressive to its insured. In its complaint, Silverland alleged it was the assignee of Merland Etienne who was injured while operating the insured’s covered vehicle. Merland was neither a named insured nor driver on Progressive’s policy, and did not reside with the insured at the time of the accident.
Progressive’s amended answer denied all relevant allegations, raising the affirmative defense that Merland was not entitled to benefits under its policy because she owned three vehicles of her own that were required to be covered by PIP, the only one of which is relevant to this appeal is the 2007 Volvo. Silverland never filed a reply.
After a denial of its first motion for summary judgment that addressed only one of Merland’s vehicles, Progressive filed a second motion for summary judgment where it continued to argue as it did in its affirmative defense, but now with respect to the Volvo. Specifically, Progressive filed supporting documents showing that on the date of the accident, Merland’s Volvo had a temporary tag in her name, valid from May 10, 2011 — June 8, 2011; that she received a traffic ticket on May 29, 2011, while driving this vehicle for running a red light; and Progressive also filed Merland’s deposition testimony in which she acknowledged still owning the Volvo. Citing section 320.02(1), Florida Statutes, Progressive argued that all vehicles driven on Florida’s roads had to be registered, which in Merland’s case, ran from February 1, 2011 — January 31, 2012. Progressive argued that because her traffic ticket indisputably established that the vehicle was being driven during the registration period, Merland’s Volvo had to be registered, and by extension, had to also be covered by PIP pursuant to section 627.733(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Progressive concluded that because Merland was the owner of a vehicle required to be covered by PIP, her claim for PIP coverage under Progressive’s policy was not covered.
Silverland opposed Progressive’s second motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Volvo wasn’t required to have PIP coverage because it was only driven during the temporary tag period, and specifically not at the time Merland was involved in the accident. At that time, it was parked at Merland’s brother’s house. As support for her position that the Volvo needn’t be insured, Silverland attached an affidavit from Merland in which she acknowledged acquiring the vehicle in her name from a dealership, but only for the purpose of commercial resale by her boyfriend. Importantly, she went further — averring that she did not own any motor vehicle that required PIP insurance because she did not operate any vehicle that she owned on the roads of Florida. Progressive replied, and the case proceeded to a hearing.
As it did with the first, the trial court denied Progressive’s second motion for summary judgment, this time, ruling simply that the Volvo did not have to be registered or insured at the time of the accident.
Progressive filed a motion for reconsideration† arguing, inter alia, that Silverland was not entitled to summary judgment because it relied on factual matters that were never raised in a reply to Progressive’s affirmative defense. Essentially, Progressive contended, Silverland did more than a simple denial; it sought to avoid Progressive’s affirmative defense. The trial court denied Progressive’s motion for reconsideration, and Progressive stipulated to reasonableness, relatedness, and necessity — eliminating any remaining factual issues. The trial court entered final judgment, from which Progressive timely appeals, challenging only the trial court’s ruling with respect to the Volvo.
ANALYSIS
The standard of review on an order granting final summary judgment is so well known, it need only briefly be repeated here: we review such orders de novo. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Bch, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly S390a]. Because of Progressive’s stipulation, this is one of those rare cases where no factual disputes exist, and the question at issue is one of law only, truly determinable by entry of summary judgment. See id.
The issue before us is simply whether the trial court correctly determined that Silverland was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. We conclude it did not. And so we reverse and remand.
Because this is a purely legal issue involving the meaning of the statutes, we look, as we must, to the text of the statutes themselves. If clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to statutory interpretation canons; rather, the statute is given its plain and obvious meaning. See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly S34a]; Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla 2004) [29 Fla. L. Weekly S788a]. As courts, we lack the authority to construe unambiguous statutes in ways that would extend, modify, or limit the express terms, or the statutes’ reasonable and obvious implications. See Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty Police Dep’t, 934 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly S641a]. Finally, we read individual statutes within a statutory scheme in harmony so that we give full effect to the entire provision. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Bch. Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1234 (Fla. 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly S251a].
These principles in mind, resolution of the issue presented in this case turns on a harmonious reading of several statutory provisions: sections 320.055(1)(a); 320.02(1), (1)(a); 627.736(4)(e)(4); and 627.733(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012).
Every motor vehicle that is “operated or driven on the roads in this state” must be registered with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. § 320.02(1), Fla. Stat. Motor vehicles that are required to be registered “shall maintain security . . . continuously throughout the registration or licensing period.” § 627.733(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added). In this case, the registration period ran from February 1, 2011-January 31, 2012: the first day of Merland’s birth month, through the last day of the month preceding her birth month in the succeeding year. § 320.055(1)(a), Fla. Stat. A “motor vehicle” is defined as an “automobile . . . or any other vehicle operated on the roads of this state . . . .” § 320.02(1)(a), Fla. Stat. While the law generally mandates that persons injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident are entitled to PIP benefits, there are limitations. Specifically, section 627.736(4)(e)(4)(c) qualifies that such benefits are available only “if the injured person is not . . . [t]he owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required under ss. 627.730-627.7405.” § 627.736(4)(e)(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added).
Taken all together, the legislative mandate is clear and unambiguous: motor vehicles driven on the roads of this state must be registered, and have security (PIP coverage), and such security must be continuously maintained throughout the registration period; failure to maintain such security is an absolute bar to entitlement to PIP benefits to a person injured in a motor vehicle accident — including benefits that may have otherwise been available under another person’s policy.
The learned trial judge agreed that the statutory mandates were clear, opining that “there was no room for interpretation.” The application of the harmonious reading of the statutes to the undisputed facts of this case, then, requires reversal because this is exactly the situation the legislative mandates sought to address.
Silverland urges this Court to affirm, however, on the basis that the motor vehicle at issue, after being driven as evidenced by the ticket, was subsequently parked at a home awaiting resale, and was not then being operated on the roads “for a period of at least four months prior to the accident.” (Appellee Br. 17.) Thus, the argument goes, the Volvo was not a “motor vehicle” for which security was required, and so the limitation in section 627.736(4)(e)(4)(c) is inapplicable, entitling Merland to coverage under Progressive’s policy. As support, Silverland cites to the well-known case of Quanstrom v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Company, 504 So. 2d 1295 (Fla 5th DC 1987), as well as Fortune Insurance Company v. Ochme, 453 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Putting aside whether this argument could even have been properly raised in its reply to Progressive’s summary judgment motion below, we reject Silverland’s arguments on the merits.
First, the cited cases are inapposite. Both involved situations where the vehicle was inoperable because of some mechanical defect, rendering them unable to be driven during the registration period prior to the accident. See Quanstrom, 504 So. 2d at 1296 (registration first expired on an inoperable vehicle; claimant then got into an accident; and therefore the inoperable vehicle was repaired, re-registered, and re-insured at a later date); Fortune, 453 So. 2d at 921 (same). Here, Merland’s vehicle was not only operable, it was also actually driven on the roads during the February 1, 2011-January 31, 2012 registration period, before being parked. To the extent there were questions as to whether the parking-while-awaiting-resale rendered the vehicle inoperable, that would have been a fact question for a jury, which would still require reversal of summary judgment.
Second, adopting the reading of the statutes urged by Silverland, would, we believe, both negate portions of the statutory scheme, and lead to absurd results. The law requires that security on qualified vehicles, such as the one at issue, be maintained “continuously throughout the registration or licensing period.” § 627.733(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added). The statutes’ reasonable and obvious implication include situations such as the one presented here, where an otherwise operable vehicle is voluntarily parked awaiting resale after it had already been driven on the roads during the registered period. Nothing in the texts of the applicable statutes condition the registration and security requirements on the number of times a vehicle is driven on the roads. To the contrary, the law makes clear that the only trigger to the requirement that the vehicle be registered and continuously secured during that registration period, is the fact that the vehicle is driven at all during the registration period.
Had the legislature wanted the sort of outcome Silverland advances, it could have said so. Absent such an explicit admonition, however, we as “[i]nterpreters should not be required to divine arcane nuances or to discover hidden meanings [from the texts].” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Thompson/West (2012 Ed.). Such an outcome would simply negate clear legislative mandates. And so we decline to do so.
Further, Silverland’s approach would lead to absurd and illogical results. One can readily imagine a scenario where a car is driven on the roads, thereby being required to be registered and carry security, but then turns into a privately owned parking lot to park, and is suddenly no longer required to have either just because it is no longer being driven. This is the natural conclusion of Silverland’s argument. Not only is this not what the legislature intended, since we have unambiguous statutes mandating a different outcome, but such as result would also be absurd and illogical. “We are not required to abandon either our common sense or principles of logic in statutory interpretation.” Sch. Bd. of Palm Bch. Cnty v. Survivors Charter Sch., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1235 (Fla. 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly S251a]. And the reading of the statutes Silverland advances would require us to do exactly that. So we won’t.
Silverland’s remaining arguments are rejected for the reasons outlined above. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order, and remand with instructions to enter final judgment for Progressive. (DEL PINO and DE LA O, JJ., concur.)
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*This author volunteered to write this opinion after the primary judge was elevated to another court. The panel was then reconstituted to include Judge De La O, who didn’t sit for the OA.
†As an aside, Progressive characterizes its motion directed to the trial court’s order denying its second motion for summary judgment as a motion for rehearing. (Initial Br. 6.) But as a practical matter, it was not since the rules only authorize motions for rehearing to be directed to final judgments. Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Assocs., Inc., 263 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972) (A motion for rehearing may be directed only to final judgments rendered by the court). More appropriately, Progressive’s motion was actually a motion for reconsideration. See Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly S625a] (“[T]he trial court retains inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to the entry of final judgment or order terminating an action[.]”). This distinction is not merely academic either because only the appropriate motion can toll the time for timely filing a notice of appeal. See, e.g., James H. Wyman, Reconsideration Or Rehearing: Is There A Difference?, 83 Fla. B. J. Vol No. 6, at 79 (June 2009).
