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BRETT M. HERRINGTON, D.C., P.A., FIRST CHOICE CHIROPRACTIC, a/a/o Jennifer Bogart Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 155a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2802HERRInsurance — Venue — Forum non conveniens — Venue transferred from Miami-Dade County to Pinellas County where accident occurred, insured resides, insurer’s office is located, and policy was issued — Further, insurer’s adjusters and representatives are located in county adjoining Pinellas County, and witnesses would be significantly inconvenienced by having to travel to Miami-Dade County

BRETT M. HERRINGTON, D.C., P.A., FIRST CHOICE CHIROPRACTIC, a/a/o Jennifer Bogart Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 2019-023563-SP-25, Section CG02. April 9, 2020. Elijah A. Levitt, Judge. Counsel: T. Roger White, Jr., White & Twombly, P.A., Miami Shores, for Plaintiff. Stephen B. Farkas and Michael Fogarty, Dutton Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Defendant.

ORDER OF VENUE TRANSFERAND ORDER CLOSING CASE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on a motion to transfer venue and/or to dismiss case. The Court being advised in the premises, it is:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to transfer this cause to the County Court of Pinellas County. The filing fee shall be paid by DEFENDANT as soon as practicable or within 30 days of the lifting of the court’s emergency provisions caused by the COVID-19 virus. Accordingly, this action is closed in Miami-Dade County, Florida reserving jurisdiction to address any issues regarding the transfer and this Order.

In support of this Order, the Court provides the following:

As an initial matter, under the circumstances of this case, dismissal is inappropriate. See Foy v. State Rd. Dep’t, 166 So.2d 688, 689-690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (holding that courts should transfer cases for improper venue rather than enter orders of dismissal). Wherefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Defendant brings its Motion to Transfer under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.060 and section 47.122, Florida Statutes (2020). Section 47.122 provides, “For the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought.” The Court finds that a transfer of this matter is warranted under section 47.122, so the Court will not address the Rule 1.060 argument. To render its decision, the Court interprets the plain language of section 47.122.

The interests of justice require transfer of this matter to Pinellas County. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D1199a]; E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Fuzzell, 681 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D2303a]. According to the affidavit of Defendant’s adjuster Judy Bailey, (1) the accident occurred in Pinellas County, (2) claimant Jennifer Bogart, Defendant’s insured, resides in Pinellas County, (3) Defendant issued the policy to Ms. Bogart in Pinellas County, (4) Plaintiff’s office is located in Pinellas County, and (5) Defendant’s adjusters and corporate representatives are located in Polk County, a neighboring county of Pinellas County. Plaintiff argues that the case involves only legal issues, but these legal issues should be addressed by the correct jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the interests of justice, this matter should be governed by the legal precedent of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida and Florida Second District Court of Appeal, both authorities having jurisdiction over Pinellas County.

The Court also finds that the Miami-Dade County jury and court system would be unjustly burdened by determining a case that has no connection to Miami-Dade County other than having a defendant that has representatives in Miami-Dade County. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D1199a]. Indeed, Defendant very well likely has a representative in every county in the United States of America. The matter is more appropriately resolved in the county in which all parties reside and the action accrued.

The Court further finds that the witnesses would be significantly inconvenienced by having to travel to Miami-Dade County from Pinellas County for trial or other hearings. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mooney, 147 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D1386a].[1] Approximately 280 of roadways lie between the Dade County Courthouse and Pinellas County. See https://www.google.com/maps. The distance alone is a significant inconvenience. Defendant’s counsel indicated that he expected to depose Plaintiff’s corporate representative and Ms. Bogart. The attorneys would need to travel to Pinellas County for depositions anyway. See Fla. R. Civ. P 1.410(e)(2) (Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties and witnesses or allowed by order of the Court, a witness shall be deposed in the location where the witness resides, is employed or transacts business in person.) Plaintiff’s counsel prospectively also will be able to resolve the case’s legal issues via telephonic or video appearance from Miami-Dade County.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Transfer the Case is granted as provided herein.

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1The Court disagrees with the Third District Court of Appeal’s addition of the qualifier “significantly” before the word “inconvenient.” The Court is rewriting the statute, which is the province of Florida legislature. Either a course of action is convenient or it is not. The antonym of “convenient” is “inconvenient” and not “significantly inconvenient” as proposed by the Third District Court. https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/convenient. This Court, nevertheless, finds a significant inconvenience exists in this case.

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