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JOANNA MCNALLY, Plaintiff, vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 632a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Interest — Insurer, who did not make payment within 30 days from receipt of bill for treatment and offered no evidence of properly addressed post-paid envelope reflecting payment within 30 days, failed to properly pay interest on overdue benefits — Interest on overdue payments must be calculated from date insurer received notice of bill through date doctor received payment — Statute does not allow thirty day grace period such that interest would not commence until 31st day after receipt of bill

Additional ruling in this case at 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 102b

JOANNA MCNALLY, Plaintiff, vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Civil Division. Case No. 97-0464-SP-12. May 14, 1998. Cynthia A. Ellis, Judge.

JUDGMENT ON INTEREST PAYMENTS

THIS ACTION was tried before the Court. On evidence presented, the Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law.

RELEVANT FACTS

Plaintiff is insured by Allstate under a policy that provides No-Fault benefits. After Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident, Allstate began paying for medical treatment. Allstate concedes that it made certain payments after thirty days from receipt of the bills for treatment. One payment received by Dr. Jon Miller on October 7th, 1996, Allstate contends was not overdue. The question for Court to decide is whether Allstate properly made the interest payments pursuant to statute.

Through discovery, Allstate provided its method of calculation of interest on overdue payments, to wit: “10% + by 52 weeks x amount of bill x number of weeks late”.

Allstate further maintains that the “number of weeks late” includes only those days after thirty days from receipt of the bill until it issues the check for the payment. The Plaintiff’s position is that the statute does not allow a thirty day grace period for interest on overdue payments in general, and that the date to which the interest runs on the disputed bill is the doctor’s receipt of payment.

The Court heard testimony of Dr. Jon Miller and Robin Schneider. Dr. Miller testified that his bills are submitted on insurance claims forms that are prepared and maintained in the ordinary course of business, and that the information appearing on the forms are placed on them contemporaneous with the events described in the forms. He further testified that his office practice is for his secretary to write the date that the payment was received on the copy of the insurance form. The date appearing on the disputed bill is October 7th, 1996. It is undisputed that Allstate received the bill on September 3rd, 1996.

Mr. Schneider has been qualified on numerous occasions before various judges in the 20th Judicial Circuit as an expert on interest calculations. Mr. Schneider testified that general accounting principles require that when payment is considered overdue if not paid within 30 days, interest on overdue payments are calculated from the date of the invoice/notice. In simple terms by way of illustration, if a party makes payment within 30 days they pay no interest; if they pay on the 31st day, they pay interest for 31 days.

Allstate offered no evidence of a properly addressed post-paid envelope reflecting payment within 30 days. Finally, the Plaintiff attempted to solicit testimony that Allstate had an improper motive to withhold payment. The Court sustained Defendant’s objection to this line of questioning, finding that any such evidence was irrelevant in this particular case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The pertinent portion of 627.736 reads as follows:

“(4) Benefits when due.

(b) Personal injury protection benefits paid pursuant to this section shall be overdue if not paid within thirty days after the insurer is furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and the amount of same . . . for the purpose of calculating the extent to which any benefits are overdue, payment shall be treated as being made on the date a draft or other valid instrument which is equivalent to payment was placed in the United States mail in a properly addressed post paid envelope or, if not so posted, on the date of delivery.

(c) All overdue payments shall bear simple interest at the rate of 10% per year.

PIP coverage afforded by Florida Statutes is to be given very broad and liberal interpretation since it is intended to afford the minimum protection expected of Florida families who purchase it. To do otherwise would turn the “No-Fault” statute into a “No-Pay” plan. Dunmore v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In fact, the very purpose of the No-Fault law is to insure prompt payment of benefits. Dunmore, page 301.

Applying Allstate’s “30 day grace period” theory would require construing the statute most liberally in favor of the insurance company. The Court finds no reason to interpret the statute outside of generally accepted accounting practices. The statutory language is clear and unambiguous that an insurance company does not have to pay interest if it makes payment within 30 days, but the bill is overdue after 30 days and overdue amounts must include 10% simple interest. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “overdue” as “Due and more than due; delayed or unpaid.” The statute does not state, as Allstate urges, that 10% interest commences the 31st day after receipt of the bill. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court is not free to add words to steer it to a meaning and a limitation which its plain wording does not supply. James Talcott, Inc. v. Bank of Miami Beach, 143 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1962), Armstrong v. Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1963).

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resort to the rules of statutory construction. See Conquest v. Auto-Owners, 637 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1994), at page 42, affirmed Auto-Owners v. Conquest, 658 So.2d 958 (Fla. 1995). Even if the statutory language was considered ambiguous, which the Court does not accept, Allstate could not prevail on its “30 grace period” theory. Where words are ambiguous, the cardinal rule of construction is to interpret the statute in such a way that effect is given to the intention of the legislature. State Farm v. O’Kelly, 459 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The legislative intention of prompt payment and liberal construction in favor of the insured’s benefits cannot be harmonized with Allstate’s theory. Regardless of the effects that an insurer complains will result by giving the No-Fault law its proper interpretation, the Court is bound to interpret the No-Fault law in exactly that manner. State Farm v. Butler, 340 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In other words, if there are two possible interpretations that the courts may give the statute, the courts must give the one that sustains claims for benefits. Traveler’s v. Smith, 328 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). The uncontroverted testimony in this case establishes that Allstate’s theory would be considered most unusual from the standard of general accepted accounting principles. Again, allowing such an interpretation would require construing the statute liberally in favor of an insurance company, contrary to decisional law dating back more than 30 years.

Allstate provided no evidence of a properly addressed post-paid envelope, and the evidence established that the doctor received Allstate’s payment on October 7th, 1996. Accordingly, interest in this case accrues to the date of the doctor’s receipt. The Court does not make a specific finding that insurance companies are expected to keep copies of envelopes or certified return receipts on all no-fault payments. As pointed out by Mr. Schneider, when payment is running close to the 30 day deadline, it might be in the insurer’s best interest to keep such records. However, the court does not suggest that such a practice is required in the normal course of business.

Once a determination has been made of dates certain, computation of interest is merely a mathematical computation. There is no “finding of fact” needed. Thus, it is a purely ministerial duty of the trial judge or clerk of the court to add the appropriate amount of interest to the principle amount due. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985), at page 215.

Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is thereupon CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

a. Allstate has failed to properly pay interest on overdue No-Fault benefits to Joanna McNally;

b. The interest due to Joanna McNally on the overdue payment(s) shall be calculated from the date Allstate received notice of the subject bill(s) through the date the doctor received payment of the subject bill(s);

c. The amount of the overdue interest payable to Joanna McNally shall be included in the final judgement of this matter;

d. The Court retains jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to this action to enter such other and further orders as are necessary, including costs and attorney fees.

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