6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 535a
Attorney’s fees — Insurance — Personal injury protection — Complaint which referenced attorney’s fees and the statute under which recovery was sought gave defendant sufficient notice that fees were being sought
FORTUNE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, vs. CANDIDO CORDERO, Appellee. 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Appellate Case No. 98-335 AP, Lower Tribunal Case No. 98-325 SP 26. Opinion filed June 4, 1999. An appeal from the County Court of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Michael Samuels, Judge. Counsel: Diane H. Tutt and Valerie R. Manno, for Appellant. Martin Levine, for Appellee.
(Before CAROL R. GERSTEN, SANDY KARLAN and HENRY H. HARNAGE, JJ.)
(PER CURIAM.) The Appellee, Candido Cordero (hereinafter “Cordero”), sought unpaid PIP benefits from Appellant, Fortune Insurance Company (hereinafter “Fortune”). The Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and he moved for attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court entered an agreed order based upon the parties’ agreement as to the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Fortune appeals the attorney’s fee award.
Cordero has filed a motion for appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to §627.736, Fla. Stat. (1998).
We find that Cordero’s complaint, while imperfectly pled, gave sufficient notice to Fortune of a cause of action for attorney’s fees under the “Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law” §§ 627.730-627.7405, Fla. Stat. (1998). U.S. Security Insurance Company v. Londono, 5 F.L.W. Supp. 514 (11th Jud. Cir., April 10, 1998) is controlling. In U.S. Security, the Plaintiff cited the statute under which she was traveling in her complaint, followed by an allegation requesting attorney’s fees. In the instant complaint, paragraph 1 of the complaint states that this is an action for damages under the Florida No Fault Law. In paragraph 7 the Appellee states that due to nonpayment of benefits as required by § 627.736(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998) an attorney had to be retained. Further, attorney’s fees are demanded in the wherefore clause. In Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1991), the court noted that a claim for attorney’s fees must be pled. The complaint in U.S. Security, as in this case, referenced the attorney’s fees and the statute under which recovery was sought. Therefore, the instant complaint meets the Stockman pleading requirement. The fundamental concern is one of notice. Stockman, at 837. We find as did the U.S. Security court that the pleading gives notice and direction to the defendant that attorneys fees are being sought. Both the U.S. Security complaint and the instant one put the defendants on notice that fees were being sought. Therefore, we affirm Cordero’s attorney’s fees award.
Cordero has moved for an award of appellate attorney’s fees. We grant Cordero’s motion and remand assessment of the amount to the lower court.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
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