6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 450a
NOT FINAL VERSION OF OPINION
Subsequent Changes at 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 592a
Insurance — Action against insurer which refused to pay medical bills on ground that they were not necessary or reasonable — Discovery — Because adequate record was not provided, court unable to determine whether trial court departed from essential requirements of law by denying a motion for rehearing of court’s decision to grant protective order preventing deposition of a corporate representative with the most knowledge concerning plaintiff’s claim and defendant’s affirmative defenses, where plaintiff had already deposed two other corporate representatives, including claims superintendent and claims representative
KRISTINA DEMOND, Petitioner, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County. Case No. CI98-6672. Writ No. 98-40. April 22, 1999. Counsel: Seifert, Miller & Slusher, P.A., Terry A. Slusher, for Petitioner. Drage, deBeaubien, Knight, Simmons, Romano & Neal, P.A., Patrick C. Howell, for Respondent.
(BEFORE RUSSELL, WATTLES and KOMANSKI, JJ.)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, Kristina Demond, seeks certiorari review of an order of the trial court granting Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s, Renewed Motion for Protective Order. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c). This Court, having reviewed the briefs and record in this matter, dispenses with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320.
Petitioner was injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 21, 1995. As a result, Petitioner received medical treatment and the bills were submitted to Respondent. Respondent refused to pay some of the medical bills on the grounds that they were not necessary or reasonable. Petitioner filed suit against Respondent.
During pre-trial discovery, Petitioner took the deposition of Debra Meharg, a claims superintendent, on April 26, 1996, and Denise Freeman, the claims representative assigned to Petitioner’s claim, on June 25, 1996. On May 13, 1998, Petitioner sought to depose a “corporate representative” with the most knowledge concerning the claim of Petitioner and Respondent’s affirmative defenses.
On July 2, 1998, Respondent filed a Motion for Protective Order stating that Petitioner had already taken the deposition of two corporate representatives. A hearing was held on July 13,1998. At that hearing, counsel for Respondent represented that the individuals deposed would be the persons who would “answer questions regarding what the affirmative defenses are.” Respondent’s Motion for Protective Order was granted.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing on the Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Protective Order. Petitioner’s basis for a rehearing was Respondent’s responses to a subsequent Request for Admissions regarding Meharg and Freeman’s status as corporate representatives. A hearing was held on Petitioner’s motion on August 13, 1998. The trial court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing. Petitioner filed the instant petition on August 17, 1998.
There is no transcript of the hearing held on Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing. Petitioner also failed to prepare a Statement of Proceedings as provided for by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Without an adequate record, there is no way to determine whether the trial court’s decision departed from the essential requirements of law. See McCray v. County of Volusia, 400 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).1
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner, Kristina Demond’s, Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED.
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1Procedural problems notwithstanding, it appears that this is nothing more than an attempt by Petitioner to get a second bite at the apple with respect to discovery. The Court notes that a prior Motion for Protective Order was granted on a similar Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum. That order was not appealed.
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