6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 592a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Action against insurer which refused to pay medical bills on ground that they were not necessary or reasonable — Discovery — Insured seeking to take deposition of corporate representative with the most knowledge concerning her claim and insurer’s affirmative defenses to first amended complaint — Trial court did not depart from essential requirements of law or abuse its discretion when it granted defendant’s motion for protective order where plaintiff had already deposed two other corporate representatives, including a claims superintendent and the claims representative assigned to her claim
KRISTINA DEMOND, Petitioner, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County. Case No. CI98-6672. Writ No. 98-40. June 10, 1999. Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Counsel: Seifert, Miller & Slusher, P.A., Terry A. Slusher, for Petitioner. Drage, deBeaubien, Knight, Simmons, Romano & Neal, P.A., Patrick C. Howell, for Respondent.
ORDER ON PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING AND/OR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
[Original Opinion at 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 450a]
(PER CURIAM.) THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner, Kristina Demond’s, Request for Rehearing and/or Clarification on Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on May 3, 1999. The Court, having considered the same and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds that clarification of the Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari is warranted.
In her request, Petitioner argues that this Court misapprehended the focus of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Petitioner points out that she is only appealing the initial order rendered by the trial court on July 19, 1998. While this may be true, a review of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari reflects that Petitioner has included information that was raised before the trial court on Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing below. In addition, a significant part of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is devoted to argument regarding matters that occurred after the trial court initially granted Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s, Motion for Protective Order. However, for Petitioner’s benefit and in order to clarify its Ruling, this Court will directly address the July 19, 1998 order rendered by the trial court.
On May 13, 1998, Petitioner served a Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum on Respondent. Petitioner sought to take the deposition of the corporate representative with the most knowledge concerning: 1) Petitioner’s claim; and 2) Respondent’s Affirmative Defenses to First Amended Complaint. Petitioner had previously taken the deposition of Debra Meharg, a State Farm claims superintendent, on April 26, 1996, and Denise Freeman, the State Farm claims representative assigned to Petitioner’s claim, on June 25, 1996.
On July 2, 1998, Respondent filed a Motion for Protective Order seeking to prevent the deposition on the ground that Petitioner had already taken the deposition of two corporate representatives. A hearing was held on July 13, 1998. At the hearing, Respondent also argued that Petitioner had previously attempted to depose another corporate representative in this matter subsequent to the first two depositions. Respondent advised that the trial court, Carter, J., granted its Motion for Protective Order related to that deposition on May 13, 1997. Petitioner did not appeal from that Order. Respondent further argued that Petitioner was attempting to get a second bite at the apple, having had the opportunity to question two corporate representatives about Respondent’s affirmative defenses and failing to do so. The trial court, Halker, J., granted Respondent’s Motion for Protective Order. In doing so, the trial court found that Petitioner had the opportunity to question the claims representative regarding State Farm’s affirmative defenses at her deposition and did not do so. It is well established that the essential prerequisite to granting a petition for writ of certiorari is action by the lower court which constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law that will cause material injury to the petitioner throughout the proceedings below, and for which there is no adequate remedy on appeal. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Ordinarily, orders denying discovery are not reviewable by certiorari because the harm from such orders can be rectified upon plenary appeal. See Ruiz v. Steiner, 599 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). However, certiorari review of discovery orders has been granted where it was found that the injury caused by the order was irreparable. Id. (citations omitted); see also Medero v. Florida Power & Light Co., 658 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c), a court in which an action is pending may restrict or deny discovery upon motion by a party and “for good cause shown.” In deciding whether good cause has been shown, it is necessary to balance the opposing interests that would be served by granting or denying the discovery. See Syken v. Elkins, 644 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citations omitted), decision approved by Elkins v. Syken, 672 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1996). The decision to restrict or deny discovery is in the broad discretion of the trial court. See American Southern Co. v. Tinter, Inc., 565 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Unless an abuse of that broad discretion is shown, the court’s ruling granting or denying a discovery motion will not be disturbed. Id.
With respect to the trial court’s order granting the motion for protective order entered on July 19, 1998, this Court finds that the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law or abuse its broad discretion in granting Respondent’s motion.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and/or Clarification on Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED IN PART.
The request for clarification is granted as reflected in the above opinion. (RUSSELL, WATTLES, and KOMANSKI, JJ., concur.)
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