6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 791a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Interest — When an insurer pays PIP benefits for medical services more than thirty (30) days after receipt of demand for payment, interest commences on first day after receipt of demand
NOTE: Order and judgments in this case voided upon finding of lack of standing. 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 686a
Additional ruling in this case at 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 214a
MEDICAL REHAB AND THERAPY CENTER d/b/a PAIN CORRECTIVE CENTER OF BRANDON, INC., (as Assignee of Shannon Patterson), Plaintiff, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 98-6419 SC, Division H. September 14, 1999. James M. Barton, II, Judge. Counsel: Meena Lopez, Law Office of Patrick and Lopez, for Plaintiff. Karen Barnett, for Defendant.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE coming to be heard August 23, 1999, on the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Court having considered the record as well as the written and oral argument of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
FACTS
1. The insured, Shannon Patterson, after being injured in an automobile accident on October 3, 1997, sought treatment with Plaintiff, a health care provider. Prior to treatment, the insured assigned to Plaintiff the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits contained in her insurance policy with Defendant.
2. Plaintiff submitted to Defendant bills for medical services rendered to the insured. Defendant paid some of the bills beyond the thirty (30) day period provided in F.S. §627.736(4)(b).
ISSUE
When an insurer pays PIP benefits for medical services more than thirty (30) days after submission, does interest commence on the first day after submission or the thirty-first day after submission?
ANALYSIS
This case involves a question of law for the Court, not a question of fact for the jury. See, Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency, Inc., 645 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While both parties have submitted affidavits of expert witnesses (accountants) to assist the Court in interpreting the statute, the Court is not permitted to rely on expert testimony to determine the meaning of terms in a legislative enactment. Lindsay v. Allstate Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990).
If legislative intent is clear from the plain and unambiguous language contained in a statute, the Court need not resort to rules of statutory construction. Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1996). At least one county court which has considered this issue, in ruling in favor of Plaintiff’s position, has so held. McNally v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 632 (Dade County Court, 1998).
Here, however, the language employed by the Legislature in F.S. §627.736(4)(b) leaves room for doubt. While an insurer which pays a PIP claim within thirty (30) days from receipt of a demand for payment owes no interest, the statute does not indicate when interest commences to run when payment is made after thirty (30) days. Thus, the Court is faced with two choices regarding when interest commences on overdue payments: 1. on the thirty-first day after receipt of the demand, or 2. on the first day after receipt. For the reasons expressed below the Court reaches the latter conclusion.
All rules of statutory construction are designed to illuminate legislative intent. The Court must construe a statute which furthers the legislative purpose.
In the instant case the personal injury protection statute has been designed to provide swift and virtually automatic payment so that the injured insured may get on with his life without undue financial interruption. “…an insurance company cannot be permitted simply to stonewall its insured by retaining — and drawing interest upon — payments to which it is admittedly not entitled.” GEICO v. Gonzalez, 512 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987).
Interpreting the statute in the manner suggested by Defendant would defeat the legislative purpose. If interest begins to accrue on the thirty-first day after receipt of a demand for payment, an insurer would derive financial gain by retaining funds and earning interest thereon for the thirty (30) day period after receipt. On the other hand, an insurer faced with interest on overdue PIP payments that commence from the date of receipt of the demand, has a financial incentive to pay within the thirty (30) day interest free period allowed by the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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