6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 258a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Ownership, maintenance or use of vehicle — Insured who was denied coverage for injury allegedly sustained while she was arranging luggage in vehicle while in the process of preparing to drive vehicle and transport luggage stated cause of action for breach of contract — Arranging luggage once it is inside automobile is indispensable accessory use of automobile and one that is closely connected to routine transportation of travelers and their baggage — Error to dismiss insured’s complaint with prejudice
PATRICIA COMFORT, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 12th Judicial Circuit in and for Sarasota County, Civil Appeal. Appeal No. 97-5774 CA-01. County Court Case No. 97-1562 CC11. Opinion filed July 8, 1998. Appeal from the County Court for Sarasota County; Barbara B. Briggs, Judge. Counsel: Andrew B. Spark, for Appellant. George Vaka, Charles W. Hall, for Appellee.
This case is on appeal from an order of the county court dismissing with prejudice Patricia Comfort’s amended complaint. Appellant is seeking coverage under the Personal injury Protection (PIP) provisions of her Florida automobile insurance policy issued by Nationwide. Count I of the amended complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract for failing to pay no-fault benefits, and Court 11 assert a contract breach for failing to provide medical payment benefits.1
It is alleged that the parties entered into a contract for PIP coverage in exchange for premiums, that premiums were paid, that appellant suffered an injury for which PIP benefits are due and payable, but that such benefits have not been paid for which Comfort seeks damages.
The primary dispute between the parties in this appeal focuses on the following allegation in the amended complaint:
7. On or about August 23, 1994, PLAINTIFF suffered accidental bodily injury while occupying a motor vehicle as she was arranging luggage within the vehicle in imminent preparation for driving the vehicle and thereby transporting the luggage.
On a motion to dismiss, Nationwide argued to the trial judge that this allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to require the payment of PIP benefits. The lower court agreed and, on the invitation of appellant who elected to stand by the pleading, entered an order of dismissal with prejudice.
Appellant’s policy contains the following language:
“COVERAGE AGREEMENT
This coverage provides Personal injury Protection in accordance with the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. We will pay benefits for accidental bodily injury of an insured arising out of the:
1. ownership;
2. maintenance; or
3. use
of a motor vehicle as a vehicle. We will pay regardless of fault in the accident. Benefits include:
þ Medical Expenses
þ Work Loss
þ Death Benefits…”
This contractual language is consistent with the implementing statute, Florida Statute. § 627.736(1).
Essentially, the dispute between the parties is this: Assuming the allegations are true, do her injuries arise from the “use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle?” Stated differently, is an insured entitled to PIP benefits where she claims she was injured arranging luggage within the vehicle while in the process of preparing to drive the vehicle and transport the luggage?
Different rules of interpretation apply when a claim is made by z Florida insured for no-fault PIP benefits, as opposed to a claim for automobile liability or uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The identical phrase in the policy may be interpreted differently, broadly or narrowly, depending on the type of coverage being referred to. Thus, in analyzing coverage questions, care must be taken to distinguish UM and liability cases from PIP cases.
In Race v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 542 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1989), the supreme court clarified that the more liberal interpretation of the phrase “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured or underinsured vehicle” being applied in PIP cases would not be used to provide coverage in UM situations. Race involved a claim for UM benefits made when the insured suffered an assault by the driver of an uninsured motor vehicle following a minor traffic accident. The court said:
[W]e are unwilling to apply the liberal PIP interpretation of nexus to claims for UM benefits. To do so would substantially expand the legislative intent of providing UM coverage to those “who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.” § 627.727(1), Fla.Stat (1987). As this Court said in Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229, 237-38 (Fla.1971), UM coverage “is statutorily intended to provide the reciprocal or mutual equivalent of automobile liability coverage prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Law….” Thus, we believe that the term “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use” of a motor vehicle as contained in a UM policy should be given the same interpretation as that language is construed in automobile liability policies. 542 So. 2d at 349.
When PIP coverage is the dispute, the clause “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle,” is given an interpretation intended to effect broad coverage. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Novak, 453 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 1984). As noted recently in Stilson v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 692 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), a PIP coverage case citing Novak, the Second District Court of Appeal reiterated that the phrase “ `Arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use’ is not a test requiring proximate causation as employed in a negligence action instead, this clause must be construed liberally to extend coverage broadly whenever there is `some nexus’ between the car and the injury.” Stilson, 692 So. 2d at 981.
Disparate treatment of the same or similar contract language occurs because of the different legislative purposes behind each type of coverage as well as certain public policy concerns deemed significant by the supreme court. Race, 542 So. 2d at 349. For example, PIP insurance is intended to cover injuries which arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle; whereas automobile liability UM coverage contemplates injuries which arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the tortfeasor’s motor vehicle. Id at p 351, fn. 1. Setting aside PIP cases involving assaults in and around motor vehicles, which have posed special problems for the appellate courts and which are of limited value in the instant case, when the issue is other types of injury occurring inside or near the motor vehicle, the liberal construction of “arising from the use” has led to PIP coverage being provided under a number of diverse circumstances: Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 645 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), insured bumped head on door of vehicle while walking on sidewalk outside vehicle; Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Batchelder, 421 So 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), child injured eye when a beer bottle exploded inside the cab of a pickup truck; held: where heat generated in interior of truck because of movement of truck doubtless directly contributed to explosion of beer bottle in truck, there was sufficient causal connection or relation between use of vehicle and accident, and accident was within “use” coverage of vehicle policy; Padron v. Long Island Insurance Company, 356 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), claimant injured stepping out of driver’s side door when his foot slid and leg broke after hitting door; Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Pridgen, 339 So 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), hand crushed while attempting to disengage wire between jeep and boat trailer when trailer tilted; National Indemnity Co. v. Corbo. 248 So 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), passenger bitten by dog being transported inside vehicle.
As noted in Pridgen, in no-fault personal injury protection cases the motor vehicle itself need not always be the source from which emanates the forces leading to the accident; it is enough that there be some nexus between an insured’s “ownership, maintenance, or use” of the insured’s motor vehicle and a source of injury which arises out of such ownership, maintenance or use. 339 So.2d 1164, at 1165.
Transporting luggage together with people is an integral aspect of car ownership. Arranging luggage once it is inside the vehicle is an indispensable accessory use of the automobile and one that is closely connected to its intended purpose, the routine transportation of travelers and their baggage. In spite of the insured’s marginal allegations, the requisite nexus is present and the vehicle is not a mere situs for the injury. The allegations meet the “some nexus” standard applicable to PIP coverage issues. Specifically, the court holds that the facts as alleged together with the other allegations, though sparse, are sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of contract for failure to pay PIP benefits.
The order which dismissed both counts of the amended complaint with prejudice is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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1Appellee confesses partial error, agreeing that the claim for medical payment benefits should not have been dismissed with prejudice, and that remand is proper as to Count II.
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