6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 47a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Action in which medical provider initially sought payment of PIP benefits that had already been paid and subsequently amended complaint to seek only statutory interest on late paid benefits, and attorney’s fees — Where insurer asserts that it paid medical provider more than was actually due, and that any overage paid should be used to offset any interest due, action should proceed as traditional action for damages in which single judgment is to be obtained, and any sums recovered by medical provider would be subject to setoff process — Whether setoff is affirmative defense or counterclaim does not determine whether single judgment, or separate judgments, should be entered — Independent judgments should not be entered on medical provider’s amended complaint and insurer’s counterclaim asserting setoff — Issues remaining for trial are whether medical provider is entitled to reimbursement for sums paid, and if so, how much
PINNACLE MEDICAL, INC., Plaintiff, vs. OCEAN HARBOR CASUALTY INS. CO., Defendant. County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County. Case No. 97-2719 COCE 56. September 9, 1998. Robert W. Lee, Judge.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on September 3, 1998 for hearing of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court’s having reviewed the Motion and Court file, heard argument of counsel, and reviewed the relevant case law, finds as follows:
Findings of Facts: On November 18, 1996, the Defendant, Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Company (“Ocean Harbor”), a PIP Insurer, received a $650.00 bill from Plaintiff, Pinnacle Medical, Inc. (“Pinnacle”), for medical services provided to one of Ocean Harbor’s insureds. On January 11, 1997, Ocean Harbor paid $520.00, or 80% of the bill. Pinnacle accepted the payment. Nevertheless, on February 12, 1997, Pinnacle filed this suit seeking payment of PIP benefits, along with interest and attorneys’ fees. At some point thereafter, Pinnacle realized that it had already been paid the PIP benefits. Accordingly, on December 4, 1997, Pinnacle filed its Amended Complaint seeking only statutory interest on the late paid benefits, and attorneys’ fees.
Undisputedly, Ocean Harbor did not include an amount specifically earmarked as “interest” when it tendered its $520.00 payment. At best, Pinnacle concedes that it is entitled to no more than $3.82 in interest.1 Ocean Harbor has filed two affirmative defenses: one asserting payment, and the other asserting setoff. In sum, Ocean Harbor contends that it paid more to Pinnacle than was actually due, and as a result, any overage paid should be used to offset any interest due.
Pinnacle asserts that Ocean Harbor’s claim is not an affirmative defense, but is rather a counterclaim. Pinnacle urges that a counterclaim does not prevent it from obtaining summary judgment on the Amended Complaint. Rather, Pinnacle believes that both parties could feasibly obtain separate independent judgments. This distinction could be critical because, if correct, Pinnacle might be able to obtain prevailing party attorneys’ fees even if Ocean Harbor prevails on its setoff claim.
Conclusions of Law. The Court does not believe that whether setoff is a defense or a counterclaim is dispositive of the issue before the Court. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if a party mistakenly denotes a defense as a counterclaim, or vice versa, the Court is to treat it as if it had been properly designated. Rule 1.110(d), Fla. R. Civ. P. Of course, if setoff is a defense, then a single judgment would be appropriate. Florida law has, however, also long established the general rule that only a single judgment may be entered by a court when a counterclaim is filed in a civil proceeding; a counterclaim generally does not result in two independent judgments. H. Trawick, Florida Practice and Procedure §§12-10, 25-10.2 Accordingly, whether setoff is a defense or a counterclaim does not generally determine whether a single judgment, or separate judgments, should be entered.
In situations involving similar defenses or counterclaims, a single judgment is calculated through the process of “setoff”: the smaller recovery amount is deducted from the larger recovery amount, and the party having the “excess” amount has a judgment entered in its favor. For instance, in one case, a Florida appellate court reviewed a real estate transaction in which the two parties had competing claims. Arko Enterprises, Inc. v. Wood, 185 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). In this case, the court considered the counterclaim, and stated the setoff process as follows:
When the total amount of all deductions and setoffs . . . has been determined, any difference between their total and the total agreed purchase price should be awarded Arko against those vendees whom the court shall determine are liable therefor under the contract of purchase and sale …. If, however, the total amount of such deductions and setoffs exceed the agreed purchase price, then judgment for such excess shall be awarded the vendees against Arko.
Id. at 741. Accordingly, only a single judgment was appropriate.
Some Florida case law appears to create a few exceptions to this general rule. One such situation is the right to obtain an independent “non-setoff” judgment when an action is successfully brought to enforce a party’s right to a security deposit in the context of a residential landlord/tenant relationship.3 This exception only applies, however, when a tenant strictly complies with the requirements set forth in the Florida Statutes to establish entitlement to the independent “non-setoff” judgment. The case law is clear that a tenant must strictly comply with the statutory notice requirements in order to claim the benefits and protections of the Landlord-Tenant Security Deposit Act. See Speigner v. Holland, 1 FLW Supp. 551 (Brevard Co. Ct. 1993); Fagaly v. Alderman Properties, Inc., 10 Fla. Supp. 2d 92 (Orange Co. Ct. 1985). If a tenant fails to do so, he loses the protections of the Act, but he is still entitled to recover his damages against a landlord under traditional legal theories, such as breach of contract, in a separate legal action. Speigner, 1 FLW Supp. at 551. Such a case, however, would proceed under general rules of civil actions, not under the greater protections afforded by the Landlord-Tenant Act. As a result, a single net judgment would be entered in the action using the setoff process, rather than two independent judgments.
The Court does not believe the landlord/tenant analogy is applicable to this case for at least two reasons. First, if Ocean Harbor is successful in its counterclaim to any extent in seeking reimbursement for overpayment of PIP benefits, it then follows that a portion of the payment submitted to Pinnacle represents at least a portion of the interest sought. Second, Pinnacle did not strictly comply with the requirements of the PIP statutes because it admittedly brought suit against Ocean Harbor for benefits that it later acknowledged had been paid. As a result, the Court believes that this action should proceed as a traditional action for damages in which a single judgment is to be obtained. Any sums recovered by Pinnacle would be subject to the setoff process.
Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 1.510(d), Fla. R. Civ. P., this Court enters partial summary judgment as to all findings of fact set forth in this judgment. Accordingly, the issues remaining for trial are whether Pinnacle is entitled to reimbursement for sums paid, and if so, how much.
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1On this point, counsel should refer to the recent decision in Century Medical Health Plan, Inc. v. Balbin, 5 FLW Supp. 735 (11th Jud.Cir. July 6, 1998).
2“A complaint, counterclaim or cross-claim, or any combination of them, do not require separate judgments. The final determination should be in one judgment.” Trawick, supra at §25-10, citing Davar Corporation v. Tropic Land Improvement Corporation, 330 So.2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Karden v. Hatfield, 143 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Tobin v. Garry, 127 So.2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
3 Fla. Stat. §83.49(3) (1995).
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