6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 535b
Insurance — Automobile — Subrogation — Insurer’s action for reimbursement of money paid for property damage as result of intersection collision occurring when defendant, whose view while sitting at stop sign was obscured, moved through intersection — Error to rule in favor of defendant on ground that insured saw defendant’s vehicle moving through intersection in sufficient time to stop and avoid the accident — Because insured had the right of way and defendant had duty to stop at stop sign, look for oncoming traffic, and yield the right of way, insured should not have been found 100% at fault for the accident
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Jorge L. Lopez, Appellant, vs. XIOMARA YOSEL SOSA, Appellee. 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Appellate Division. Case No. 98-291 AP. L.T. Case No. 98-4449. Opinion Filed June 4, 1999. An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Honorable Nancy J. Pollock. Counsel: Stephen C. Shenkman, for Appellant. Xiomara Yosel Sosa, Pro Se.
(Before ROBERT P. KAYE, CELESTE H. MUIR and SCOTT BERNSTEIN, JJ.)
(Per Curiam.) The Appellant, Plaintiff below, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, as subrogee of Jorge L. Lopez (“Lopez”), filed a lawsuit against the Appellee, Xiomara Yosel Sosa (“Sosa”), pursuant to its subrogation rights for reimbursement of moneys paid for property damage as a result of an automobile accident. Evidence at trial revealed that Lopez had the right of way and that Sosa faced a stop sign. Testimony also revealed that Sosa crept into the intersection and that she finally proceeded through it. Sosa testified that her view while sitting at the stop sign was obstructed by two cars. The court found that Lopez, since he saw Sosa and, therefore, had sufficient time to stop, could have avoided the accident. The court thereafter ruled in favor of the defendant. This appeal ensued.
A trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law come to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless totally unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Hull v. Miami Shores Village, 435 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). However, if the trial court’s decision is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, contrary to the legal effect of the evidence, or unsupported by competent substantial evidence, the appellate court has a duty to reverse. Id. We find that the lower court’s ruling was not supported by substantial competent evidence, so we must reverse.
Since Lopez had the right of way, he should not have been found 100% at fault for the accident. Sosa was at least partially negligent because she had a duty to stop at the stop sign, look for oncoming traffic, and yield the right of way. See Morera v. Castellon, 716 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (defendant was at least partially negligent as he had a duty to make a complete stop at the stop sign, look for oncoming traffic, and yield the right of way). There is no way this accident could have occurred but for the negligence of Sosa. See London v. Atlanta Mutual Insurance Company, 689 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). As such, this case should be remanded for consideration of the comparative negligence issue.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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