7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 181b
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Collateral estoppel — Trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from claiming PIP benefits by jury verdict in previous suit in which plaintiffs sought uninsured motorist benefits and in which jury found that accident was not legal cause of loss, injury, or damage sustained by plaintiffs — Issues and claims in UM suit were too disparate from issues and claims in PIP suit for collateral estoppel to apply — Jury in UM suit was concerned with future medical expenses, permanent injury, and any accompanying damages for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, and loss of consortium and was not asked to render any opinion as to whether past medical expenses were incurred as result of the accident
GEORGE EMELIANCHIK and ANITA EMELIANCHIK, his wife, Appellant(s), v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 19th Judicial Circuit in and for St. Lucie County, Appellate Division. Case No. 99-325-CA-24. L.T. No. 96-1826-CC. Decision filed November 12, 1999. On Appeal From County Court, St. Lucie County, Thomas Walsh, Judge. Counsel: Eric J. Bruning, Port St. Lucie, for Appellant. Shari D. Castagnos, Tampa, for Appellee.
(PER CURIAM.) Appellants appeal from a final summary judgment for Appellee in a suit for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. The court below found that a jury verdict in a previous suit between these parties, in which Appellants sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits, was collateral estoppel as to Appellants’ entitlement to PIP benefits in the subsequent suit. Specifically, the jury in the UM suit found that the accident was not a legal cause of loss, injury, or damage sustained by Appellants.
We hold that the issues and claims in the UM suit were too disparate from the issues and claims in the PIP suit for collateral estoppel to apply. Collateral estoppel requires that the issue previously litigated be identical, not merely similar. A UM suit alleges negligence against an insurance company which is substituting for the uninsured tortfeasor. A PIP suit is a no-fault claim seeking reimbursement for loss sustained as a result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Section 627.736(1), Fla. Stat. PIP coverage is broadly construed without reference to traditional tort principles of causation. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Race, 508 So.2d 1276 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1987).
In the UM suit, the jury had been specifically informed by counsel for Appellee that Appellants had coverage available to them to cover their past medical expenses. As such, the jury was told by Appellee that they were to be concerned with the future consequences of the accident. The verdict form demonstrates that the purpose of the UM suit was to determine Appellants’ entitlement to and amount, if any, of future medical expenses, as well as whether there was a permanent injury and any accompanying damages for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, and loss of consortium. The jury was not asked to render any opinion as to whether past medical expenses were incurred as a result of the accident, which is the issue in the PIP suit. In short, while the UM suit dealt with Appellants’ future medical expenses and permanent injuries, the PIP suit is concerned with Appellants’ past medical expenses arising out of the use, ownership or maintenance of their automobile.
REVERSED and REMANDED. (BRYAN, COX, JJ, and MORGAN, Acting Circuit Judge, concur.)
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