7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 343a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Assignment — Standing — Plaintiff, by having assigned her benefits to healthcare providers, did not have standing to file action for payment of bills from healthcare providers — Insurer’s motion for directed verdict granted, and cause dismissed without prejudice
MACALINE DADAILLE, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO., Defendant. County Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 98-2085 SP 05. February 25, 2000. Roger A. Silver, Judge. Counsel: Mark A. Kaire and Daniel Kaufman, for Plaintiff. Jacqueline G. Emmanuel, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motions for a New Trial, for a Directed Verdict and/or in the alternative for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The Court, having considered the Memoranda of Law submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, decides as follows:
BACKGROUND
On 2/6/98, the Plaintiff, Macaline Dadaille (hereinafter referred to as “Dadaille”), filed her Complaint against the Defendant, Allstate Indemnity Company (hereinafter referred to as “Allstate”), alleging that on 2/15/97, she had been involved in a car accident that resulted in her being injured. The injuries required medical treatment resulting in bills, lost wages, and transportation expenses. According to the Complaint, she provided Allstate with a no-fault application, medical authorizations, notice of covered loss and thus made a demand for benefits (including lost wages and transportation expenses). Allegedly, Allstate did not make all of the required payments within the statutory 30 days. Therefore, Plaintiff prayed for an award of benefits and declaratory relief asking this Court to clarify whether the Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) had to be performed by an impartial physician and not one predisposed to find that Plaintiff no longer required medical attention.
On 3/16/98, Allstate filed its Motion to Dismiss and for a more Definite Statement arguing that Count I of the complaint was vague and ambiguous and therefore Allstate could not prepare a responsive pleading. Allstate simultaneously asked for a more definite statement regarding the names and addresses of the medical providers whose bills were at issue and the amount of those bills. Allstate also complained that the declaratory relief count, while “verbose,” failed to state a cause of action in that “impartiality” is a matter for impeachment rather than declaratory relief. Hence, Allstate contended that Count II should be dismissed.
On 4/21/98, this Court granted Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint as to both Count I and II. Plaintiff was given 10 days to file an amended complaint. Also on 4/21/98, and despite the dismissal, Allstate filed its Request for Admission asking Plaintiff to admit that her deductible was $2000 and that her bill with General Medical Associates was for $2015. Allstate also asked Plaintiff to admit that she had executed assignments of benefits and therefore nothing was owed to her.
On 5/1/98, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint itemizing the medical bills and dates of treatment. Count I, as before, sought payment of benefits and Count II alleged “Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Civil Remedy Under Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1).” In this Count, Plaintiff alleged that the IME doctor misrepresented her medical condition to her and that Allstate had in place a program to motivate adjusters to save Defendant money by minimizing the amount paid on claims.
On 5/18/98, Plaintiff filed her Reply to Allstate’s Affirmative Defenses in which she denied them all. Also on this date, Allstate filed its Answer to Count I of the Amended Complaint alleging that it had already paid Plaintiff’s claim in full. Allstate also filed its Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint arguing that it failed to state a cause of action. Furthermore, Allstate argued that Plaintiff could not recover for any alleged bad faith on its part nor for compensatory or punitive damages based on alleged mental pain and anguish.
On 9/3/98, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Count II of the Amended Complaint. After several continuances and pre-trial motions, on 7/6/99, Allstate filed its Notice of Filing the Proposal for Settlement (the actual offer was made on 7/2/99 for $100) pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
In response, on 7/8/99, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike Allstate’s Proposal for Settlement arguing that Allstate’s offer of $100 for settlement contravened Fla. Stat. § 627.428 (award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff after rendition of judgment adverse to insurer). The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Allstate’s Proposal for Settlement. This matter came on for trial from August 31, 1999, to September 2, 1999. The jury rendered a verdict for the Plaintiff on September 2, 1999. Defendant filed a Motion to Prevent the entry of judgment which this Court granted pending disposition of the post-trial matters.
THE ISSUE OF STANDING
Directly related to the precise issue at bar is Defendant’s 7/29/99 Motion for Summary Judgment. In this Motion, Defendant argued that Plaintiff had no standing to bring this action as to the bills from Central Magnetic Imaging and General Medical Associates/Metropolitan Health Networks because Plaintiff had executed assignments of benefits to both healthcare providers. Plaintiff first executed her assignment of benefits to General Medical Associates on 4/7/97. She then executed her assignment of benefits to Central Magnetic Imaging on 4/20/98.
After hearing argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court reserved ruling and informed the parties that Defendant could renew this Motion via a Motion for a Directed Verdict at the close of the Plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Ultimately, this Court deferred hearing and ruling on Defendant’s Motion for a Directed Verdict on the issue of standing until after the verdict in this matter was rendered. Thus, having received all of the evidence, this matter is now properly before the Court.
At the various hearings on the issue of standing, Plaintiff has argued that there was no proof of the acceptance of the assignments of benefits. Alternatively, Plaintiff has argued that she had revoked her assignments and therefore she had regained standing in this matter. It is undisputed that the purported revocation of the assignment of benefits to Central Magnetic Imaging is dated 6/99 (more than one and a half years into this litigation) while the purported revocation of assignment of benefits to General Medical Associates is dated 8/30/99, the day before trial began in this cause.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction is a power that arises solely by virtue of law. Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1st DCA). rev. denied, 519 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1987). It is conferred upon a court by a constitution or a statute, State ex rel. Caraker v. Amidon, 68 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1953), and it cannot be created by waiver, acquiescence, agreement of the parties, by error or inadvertence of the parties or their counsel, or by the exercise of power by the court. Id. Also, it is the matters set forth in the complaint together with the nature of the relief sought which determine subject matter jurisdiction. City of Clearwater v. Janet Land Corp., 343 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
It is equally well settled that standing is equated with subject matter jurisdiction. Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead Save Our Bays, Inc., 269 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Silver Star Citizens’ Committee v. City Council of Orlando, 194 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). Thus, standing must exist at the time a lawsuit is filed. And because the issue of standing goes to the very jurisdiction of the court, the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Marion Correctional Inst. v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1988).
With these precedents as guidance and given the above posture of this case, it is clear that Plaintiff, by having assigned her benefits to the healthcare providers, did not have standing to file this suit. See Fortune Ins. Co. v. Lugo, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 753 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct., August 25, 1999) (finding that once made, an assignment of the insured’s interest in personal injury protection benefits to a medical provider is irrevocable); Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (assignment of the insured’s interest in personal injury protection benefits to a medical provider is irrevocable); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gonnella, 677 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (revocation of assignment of personal injury protection benefits after claims dispute had arisen and insurer had demanded arbitration was invalid); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ray, 557 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (unqualified assignment transfers to assignee all interest of assignor under assigned contract so assignor has no right to make any claim on contract once assignment is complete unless authorized to do so by assignee); Mochnick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 98 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., Nov. 1, 1999) (finding that once an assignment is made and a claim dispute arises, the assignment is irrevocable); Schackelford v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 335 (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct., Jan. 20, 1999) (if assignments were properly executed and in effect at time suit was filed, insured lacked standing because a statutory procedure for binding arbitration controlled the dispute); Dennis Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 624 (17th Jud. Cir., March 25, 1999) (insured who had assigned rights under policy to healthcare provider lacked standing to sue insurer for interest on payments made by insurer).
Plaintiff’s citations to the contrary are unavailing. In Ari Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hogen, 734 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), ARI appealed from a non-final order granting Hogen’s motion to compel arbitration. ARI contended that the trial court erred by compelling arbitration and by leaving the issue of waiver to be determined by the appraisers. Given this scenario, the Third District reaffirmed its long standing position that the question of whether arbitration has been waived is one for the trial court to determine. Additionally, the court found that in determining whether Hogen had waived her right to arbitration, the trial court should have considered whether she actively participated in the lawsuit or took action inconsistent with her right to appraisal, and whether such action resulted in prejudice to the non-moving party. As is readily apparent, neither the issue of standing nor assignment of benefits were before the court.
Similarly, the Plaintiff’s reliance on Amador v. United Automobile Ins. Co., 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) is misplaced. In that case, appellants, Amador and Borges (“the insureds”), appealed from a final summary judgment in favor of United Automobile Insurance Company (“United Auto”). It appears that the insureds sought PIP benefits for injuries sustained in separate automobile accidents. Over thirty days after notice of the claim, United Auto scheduled an examination under oath for each of the insureds. In response, the insureds filed their Complaint for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and breach of contract seeking (1) a determination of whether United Auto could require the insureds to submit to an examination under oath as a condition precedent to receipt of PIP benefits; (2) to prohibit United Auto from requiring the insureds to submit to an examination under oath, or in the alternative, from scheduling the examination under oath outside their “municipality of residence;” and (3) a judgment that United Auto breached the parties’ agreement by failing to pay the PIP claim within a reasonable time.
United Auto filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that the insureds failed to comply with conditions precedent to coverage by refusing to attend the scheduled examinations under oath. The insureds filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment contending that United Auto’s policy provision, requiring an insured to submit to an examination under oath, contravened Florida’s PIP statute. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of United Auto and denied the insureds’ motion. Given this, the court found that if the insurer did not pay by the statutory 30-day period, on the 31st day, the insurer was in violation of the PIP statute and the insured is free to initiate a lawsuit to have the case determined on the merits. The court also stressed that the “burden is clearly upon the insurer to authenticate the claim within the statutory time period” and that the insurer could not use its investigative rights to extend the 30-day period without reasonable proof that it is not responsible for the claim. Again, it is readily apparent that neither the issue of standing or assignment of benefits was before the court.
More interestingly, but equally unavailing is Glover v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 193 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct., August 12, 1997). In that case, the court found that if an insured executes an assignment of benefits so that the medical provider is to be paid directly, and the insurer disputes the amount charged, arbitration is required because that would constitute a claims dispute. However, if the insurer refuses to pay anything at all based upon a belief that the treatment is not covered, the insured must be allowed to assert any contractual rights pursuant to the policy in court. But, in the case at bar, Allstate avers that it has already paid the reasonable and necessary expenses claimed by the Plaintiff and thus there were no unpaid covered medical bills pending or benefits owed when the complaint was filed. See also, Van Dusen v Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 356 (Fla. 10th Cir. Cty. Ct., March 9, 1999) (same).
Because this Court is bound by the appellate decisions of the 11th Circuit Appellate Division and the District Courts of Appeal cited above which address the issue of standing and because Plaintiff has failed to cite a single binding case to the contrary in support of her proffer of standing, the Court finds that Plaintiff in the instant matter did not have standing to file this suit.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for a Directed Verdict is GRANTED. The cause is accordingly dismissed without prejudice.
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