7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 167a
Insurance — Automobile — Subrogation — Damages — Towing, storage, and rental expenses are recoverable where a pleasure vehicle has been totally destroyed by a tortfeasor — Trial court erred in denying recovery of those expenses on ground that damages were limited to fair market value of vehicle at time of accident — Remand for determination as to the reasonableness of the amount of damages claimed by insurer
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o Janet San Juan and Leopoldo San Juan and JANET SAN JUAN and LEOPOLDO SAN JUAN, individually, Appellants, vs. CARMELO LUIS PRADO, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Appellate Division. Case No. 99-099 AP. Lower Court Case No. 98-4010 CC 25. Opinion filed December 7, 1999. An Appeal from County Court, Miami-Dade County, Ellen Sue Venzer, Judge. Counsel: Lee L. Hinnant, for Appellant. Sharon C. Degnan, Diane H. Tutt, for Appellee.
(Before MARIA M. KORVICK, CELESTE H. MUIR, SANDY KARLAN, JJ.)
(Karlan, J.) This appeal arose from a final judgment entered in favor of the Appellant, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o Janet San Juan and Leopoldo San Juan (“STATE FARM”). STATE FARM argues that it was error to deny recovery for towing, storage, and rental expenses.
STATE FARM’s insured, Janet San Juan, (“San Juan”) and appellee (Defendant below, “Prado”) were involved in an automobile accident on December 9, 1996. After the accident, San Juan’s vehicle was initially towed to a relative’s house and then to a body shop. As a result of the accident, San Juan rented a vehicle. On December 17, 1996, STATE FARM, attempted to contact San Juan to advise her that the vehicle was a total loss and to relay an offer. On December 19, 1996, STATE FARM actually notified San Juan that the car was not repairable. Consequently, on December 23, 1996, San Juan accepted STATE FARM’s offer, and on December 24, 1998, purchased a replacement vehicle, at which time she turned in her rental car.
STATE FARM filed a negligence action as a subrogated Plaintiff against Prado seeking damages which included the value of the vehicle, less the salvage sale price, plus towing, storage fees and rental car expenses. At a non-jury trial, the court heard arguments from counsel regarding the proper measure of damages. STATE FARM argued that, in addition to the fair market value of the vehicle, it was also entitled to the towing fees, storage charges and rental expenses. Prado argued that in the case of a total loss, damages should not exceed the fair market value of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The trial court entered a Final Judgment in favor of STATE FARM which excluded recovery on the claims for towing fees, storage charges and rental expenses. STATE FARM appeals the Final Judgment.
Neither party has presented a Florida case directly on point as to whether towing, storage, and rental expenses are recoverable where a pleasure vehicle has been totally destroyed by a tortfeasor. However, in Wayjay Bakeries, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 177 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), the Third District allowed recovery for loss of use damages where commercial property has been totally destroyed. The Court relied upon the following reasoning expressed in the California Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n, 345 P. 2d 926, 927 (Cal. 1959):
…There appears to be no logical or practical reason why a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the property is totally destroyed and those in which it has been injured but is repairable, and we have concluded that when the owner of a negligently destroyed commercial vehicle has suffered injury by being deprived of the use of the vehicle during the period required for replacement, he is entitled, upon proper pleading and proof, to recover for loss of use in order to `compensate for all the detriment proximately caused’ by the wrongful destruction.
Wayjay at 546; see also Ocean Elec. Co. v. Hughs Laboratories, Inc., 636 So. 2d 112, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“The owner of a stock of goods held for sale, which has been damaged or destroyed, is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of replacing such goods . . . plus any other reasonable expenses incurred in the replacement.”)
In Meakin v. Dreier, 209 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), the Second District allowed loss of use damages for a personal vehicle which was repairable. The court cited Cook v. Packard Motor Car Company, 92 A. 413, 418 (1914) as guidance for the following principle:
`Since compensation for injury to personal property is the cardinal rule for the measure of the damage, there would seem to be no room for affording a recovery for a deprivation of the use of an automobile devoted to business, and denying it to one devoted to pleasure uses…. The value of an article to its owner, as Sedgwick points out, lies in the right to use, enjoy, and dispose of it…. His right of user, whether for business or pleasure, is absolute, and whoever injures him in the exercise of that right renders himself liable for consequent damage.’
Id. at 254. Although Meakin was not a total destruction case, its holding provides recovery for loss of use damages to pleasure vehicles. See also Aurnou v. Craig, 584 N.Y.S. 2d 249, 252 (Sup. Ct. App. Div., 4th Dep’t 1992) (Plaintiff whose vehicle was totally destroyed was entitled to recover costs of towing, storage, insurance, and loss of use of vehicle for reasonable time while obtaining replacement vehicle).
In Maserati Automobiles Inc. v. Caplan, 522 So. 2d 993, 995-996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), the Third District cited approvingly both Wayjay and Meakin, supra. The court affirmed an award of loss of use damages to a Plaintiff whose personal vehicle was considered to be a total loss. It held that the Plaintiff was entitled to compensation for loss of use damages under negligence and breach of warranty claims, even though the Plaintiff was awarded the purchase price and collateral charges under the “Lemon Law.” The court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that such an award constituted double recovery, since the Plaintiff was required to return the vehicle to the Defendant upon satisfaction of the judgment. The court stated, “[b]ecause the remedies serve different functions in recompensing [Plaintiff] for his damages, no double recovery exists.” Id. at 996.
In support of their position, STATE FARM also relies on a circuit court decision which allowed recovery for loss of use damages in a case involving facts similar to the case herein. In Daldorf v. State Farm, a/s/o Metcalf, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 627b (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1997), cert. den. 696 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the appellate court affirmed the trial court which had awarded loss of use damages to a Plaintiff whose personal vehicle had been totally destroyed in an accident. In reaching its conclusion, the court espoused the modern view adopted in Wayjay, in conjunction with Meakin, and held that there is “no logical basis for applying one rule to the negligent demolition of a commercial vehicle and a different one to a pleasure vehicle…” Id. The court also relied, in part, on Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, Section 5.11 (West, 1st Ed. 1973) at 385, in which the author states:
The more recent cases that have given serious consideration to the rule limiting recovery in cases of destruction to the value of the chattel have rejected the rule, and have instead allowed loss of use claims in destruction cases just as in repair cases. But of course, the relevant period of time in destruction cases is only the time reasonably required to obtain a replacement.
Although we acknowledge that sister circuit court opinions are not controlling (see e.g. State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)), we find the above reasoning persuasive with respect to the facts of the instant case, as the result is consistent with the combined holdings of Wayjay, Meakin, and Maserati, supra. We further note that Dobbs, in a later edition of his treatise on remedies states:
[C]ourts today appear to have very generally allowed rental value claims even in cases of complete destruction of the chattel…. [T]he idea that the market value of the property is a ceiling on the recovery for loss of use has been firmly rejected in strong opinions of recent years.
Dobbs, Law of Remedies, Section 5.15(2) (West, 2d ed. 1993) at 571.
We are aware that in Badillo v. Hill, 570 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), the court stated that generally a plaintiff may not recover a sum greater than the chattel’s pre-injury value. Id. at 1069. However, we find Badillo to be distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar. In that case, the automobile had not been totally destroyed, and the holding expressly focuses on the limitation upon rental expenses in the case of an automobile that is repairable.
Therefore, we believe that recovery for loss of use, towing and storage expenses in the instant case, is consistent with the modern trend and well established tort principles. A tortfeasor should be held responsible for damages that are foreseeable and proximately caused by his or her negligence. See e.g., Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The central policy of all tort law is to place the person in a position nearly equivalent to what would have existed had the defendant’s conduct not breached a duty owed to the plaintiff thereby causing injury. See e.g. Carye v. Boca Raton Hotel and Club Ltd. Partnership, 676 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Ocean Elec. Co. v. Hughes Laboratories, Inc., 636 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (Measure of damages in tort actions seeks to restore the victim to the position he would be in had the wrong not been committed). In order to achieve this result in the case at bar, we find that the appellant is entitled to recover the reasonable expenses incurred for towing, storage, and car rental. Therefore, we remand this cause to the lower court for a determination as to the reasonableness of the amount of these damages.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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