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MEDICAL REHAB AND THERAPY CENTER d/b/a PAIN CORRECTIVE CENTER OF BRANDON, INC., as assignee of Shannon Patterson, Appellant, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 605a

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Assignment — Standing — Where medical provider in action for PIP benefits never presented proof of the existence of an assignment, and provider’s staff member testified that provider does not take assignments, competent substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding that assignment did not exist — Without an assignment, medical provider lacked standing, and court lacked subject matter jurisdiction — Civil procedure — Jurisdiction — Fact that insurer failed to object or raise issue is irrelevant since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by stipulation or failure to object — Argument that insurer is precluded from raising issue by entry of judgment lacks merit since subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time — Judges — Rendering of decision by successor judge was properly done where successor reviewed a point overlooked by predecessor which rendered judgment erroneous and did not review case on merits

MEDICAL REHAB AND THERAPY CENTER d/b/a PAIN CORRECTIVE CENTER OF BRANDON, INC., as assignee of Shannon Patterson, Appellant, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 00-9157, Division X. County Case No. 98-6419-SC-II. Opinion filed July 16, 2001. Counsel: Timothy A. Patrick, Tampa, for Appellant. Karen Barnett and Deborah L. Appel, Barnett and Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

Lower court order at 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 686a
Correction to some of court’s reasoning at 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 129a (Progressive Consumers Ins. Co. v. Newman, D.C. (a/a/o Reem Riley)

(PER CURIAM.) Appellant Medical Rehab appeals the dismissal of its case, which was dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of evidence of an assignment, and because Appellant lacked standing to sue. Appellant alleged in the complaint that it had an assignment of benefits but did not attach any documents to demonstrate such assignment. Appellee did not attack Appellant’s lack of standing in its motions to dismiss prior to the final judgement; the lack of standing was not raised until after the summary final judgment was entered. Throughout the litigation, Appellant never presented any evidence which demonstrated that insured assigned her benefits to Appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Appellant never presented proof of the existence of an assignment. The trial court found that an assignment did not exist, based upon the lack of a writing, coupled with the statement of Appellant’s staff member in her deposition that Appellant does not take assignments. It is not this court’s function to reweigh the evidence. Clegg v. Chipola Aviation, Inc., 458 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Competent substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision.

Without an assignment Appellant lacked standing, and the court, subject matter jurisdiction. In this context, the two are linked. See Kumar Corporation v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So.2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), fn 3. The fact that Appellee failed to object or otherwise raise the issue of the absence of an assignment is irrelevant. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by stipulation or failure to object. 84 Lumber Company v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297, 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), citing Florida Export Tobacco Co. v. Department of Revenue, 510 So.2d 936, 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Appellant’s argument that Appellee is precluded from raising the issue because a judgment had been entered is without merit. Florida courts have consistently held that subject matter jurisdiction is so vital to a court’s power to adjudicate the rights of individuals that its absence can be questioned at any time, even after the entry of final judgment or for the first time on appeal. 84 Lumber Company v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

As for the decision’s having been rendered by a successor judge, our review indicates that this was properly done. As the court stated in Groover v. Walker, 88 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956), a successor may review a point overlooked by the predecessor which renders an order or judgment erroneous. This is clearly what happened in this instance. The successor judge did not review the case on the merits, which would have been impermissible, and therefore did not act inappropriately.

It is therefore ORDERED that the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. (Judges Isom and Greco concur.)

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