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ROBERT WATTS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO., Appellee.

8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 230c

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Error to enter summary judgment on grounds that insured had assigned his PIP benefits to providers and no longer had standing when insurer admitted that no document existed that conclusively showed assignment, but asked the court to infer assignment from circumstances, and insured and providers filed affidavits denying assignment

ROBERT WATTS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO., Appellee. Circuit Court, 20th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Lee County. Appellate Case No. 00-1307 AP. Lower Case No. 98-1730 CC. Opinion issued November 8, 2000. Appeal from the County Court for Lee County, James R. Adams, Judge. Counsel: Mark C. Menser, Viles Law Firm, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant. Lynne E. Denneler, George, Hartz, Lundeen & Fulmer, Fort Myers, for Appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) Robert Watts appeals a final order whereby the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). We reverse and remand for trial to resolve disputed issues of material fact which make the granting of summary judgment improper and contrary to law.

On January 9, 1997, Mr. Watts was injured in an automobile accident whereby his vehicle was struck by a negligently operated school bus. Thereafter, Mr. Watts required and obtained medical treatment for his injuries. Mr. Watts was insured by State Farm. Under the provisions of the insurance policy, State Farm agreed to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits which amounted to “80% of reasonable medical expenses.”

Mr. Watts received medical treatment from two health care providers, Neuroscience Spine Associates, Inc. and Associates Chiropractic Clinic. Both providers refused to accept an assignment of the PIP benefits, and considered Mr. Watts personally liable for payment of the entire bill for services rendered. Thereafter, the providers did submit their claims on the standard industry form HCFA-1500, however, no other forms were ever provided to State Farm by the providers.

Mr. Watts filed suit when State Farm chose to disallow various expenses, and then pay 80% of the remaining expenses, while failing to move to compel the providers to submit to arbitration. State Farm answered the suit, moved for discovery, and filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: 1) Mr. Watts had assigned his PIP benefits to the providers and no longer had standing to litigate or arbitrate the matter; and 2) payment of only the reasonable portion of charges is not a breach of contract, and therefore, Mr. Watts had not sustained any damages.

State Farm conceded, in their motion for summary judgment, that no documents existed that could conclusively show that an assignment had occurred. However, they argued that the trial court should infer from the circumstances, which included the use of the standard HCFA-1500 form, and the fact that payment was made directly to the providers, that an assignment had occurred.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Watts filed with the trial court his sworn affidavit, and affidavits from the providers, which categorically denied the existence of any assignment and specifically established Mr. Watts’ personal liability for payment of all provider bills.

In the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court found that an assignment of PIP benefits had occurred, based upon the argument made by the moving party (State Farm) which asked the trial court to infer that an assignment had occurred. While the trial court’s decision may have been proper upon completion of a trial, the decision was improper for purposes of summary judgment, which requires that all evidence and inferences be considered in favor of the nonmoving party.

Summary Judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. The burden is on the moving party to “conclusively” prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999); Christian v. Overstreet Paving Company, 679 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

“If the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, or the possibility of an issue, or if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper.” Christian, at 840. “An opposing affidavit need only raise a material issue of fact to survive the motion . . . All inferences, doubts, and conclusions must be construed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Smith v. Harr, 571 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1990).

In light of the foregoing law, and the facts of this case, we REVERSE and REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (REESE, CORBIN, and MONACO, JJ. concur.)

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