8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 245a
Small claims — Insurance — Personal injury protection — Offer of settlement — Motion to strike proposal for settlement granted — Offer of judgment statute does not apply in PIP case filed under Small Claims Rules — In a PIP governed by Small Claims Rules, which specifically exclude Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, U.S. Security Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui, a case filed in county civil court under Rules of Civil Procedure which held that offer of judgment statute applies to PIP cases, does not apply where there is no court order or stipulation of parties adopting Rules of Civil Procedure
WILLIAM C. CHESSHER, Plaintiff, vs. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 1st Judicial Circuit in and for Escambia County. Case No. 99-3236-SP-11, Division 5. January 25, 2001. Patricia Kinsey, Judge. Counsel: Robert Heath, Robert N. Heath, P.A., Pensacola, for Plaintiff. Charles Beall, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT
At a hearing on January 22, 2001, the court heard argument of counsel, accepted case law and memoranda of law and reviewed the file. The issue before the court is whether Section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and U.S. Security Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui, 760 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) apply to PIP cases filed under Small Claims Rules.
On November 6, 2000, defendant served a Proposal for Settlement pursuant to Section 768.79, Florida Statutes and Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure on plaintiff and filed the applicable notice with the clerk. The following day, plaintiff moved to strike the Proposal. Defendant argues the plain language of Section 768.79, which begins “In any civil action for damages.. .” applies to this case. Defendant further argues that the issue of whether or not this statute applies to PIP cases has already been addressed by the Third DCA in Cahuasqui. This court agrees with defendant that “in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.” Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).
Therefore, the court looked at Cahuasqui to determine if its principles applied or should be distinguished under the facts of this case. Significantly, Cahuasqui involved a case filed in the County Civil Court under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, unlike the case before the court today, which was filed under the Small Claims Rules, Rule 1.442 applied in Cahuasqui.
Although this is a difficult issue which requires the court to attempt to harmonize at least three statutes which appear to be, at least in some respects, in conflict, in the final analysis, it is impossible to ignore the simple fact that Small Claims cases are different. Rule 7.010(a) states “[t]hese rules shall be construed to implement the simple, speedy and inexpensive trial of actions at law in county courts.” The Small Claims Rules were developed to permit cases and controversies to be heard without application of all the technicalities required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, only a few of the Rules of Civil Procedure actually apply to Small Claims cases. More specifically, Rule l.442 does not apply in Small Claims cases unless authorized by court order or stipulation of the parties and there has been no such Order or Stipulation in this case. (See Rule 7.020, Florida Small Claims Rules.) Common sense dictates that the reason Rule 1.442 does not apply is because its technical nature is incompatible with the design and intent of Small Claims Rules. If Section 768.79 were intended to apply to Small Claims cases, then Rule 1.442 would have been included in Rule 7.020 as an applicable Rule of Civil Procedure.
This court agrees that in any PIP case filed in County Civil Court, or any PIP case filed in Small Claims Court where there is a stipulation and/or court order filed adopting the Rules of Civil Procedure, Cahuasqui would control. However, this case is governed by the Small Claims Rules which specifically exclude Rule 1.442 and therefore Cahuasqui (and its principles which apply Section 768.79 to PIP cases) does not apply.
Although this court is not entirely comfortable with the fact that this case is ripe for review as there has been no decision by the finder of fact which would bring the Proposal for Settlement before the court, the court reluctantly bends to plaintiff’s argument that failure to address this issue now deprives him of ability to weigh the consequences of rejecting the Proposal and places him in the position of being unable to make an informed decision.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that because this case has been fjled under Small Claims Rules, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Proposal for Settlement is granted.
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