9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 169a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Standing — De facto or implied assignment of benefits — Document which directs insurer to pay by check to medical provider any outstanding balance at the time of settlement does not assign insured’s PIP benefits to provider where there is nothing in the plain language of the document that transfers any of the insured’s interest in his PIP benefits or gives provider any rights to enforce insured’s claim for benefits, and language is inconsistent with an intent to create an equitable assignment — Trial court correctly dismissed action with prejudice where amended complaint facially revealed that medical provider lacked standing to bring action against insurer
PHYSICIAN’S INJURY CENTER, as assignee of Richard Dietrich, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Appellee. Circuit Court, 13th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Hillsborough County. Case No. 01-4826. L.T. Case No. 00-7723 SC. Opinion filed January 17, 2002. Claudia R. Isom, Judge. Counsel: Timothy A. Patrick, Tampa, for Appellant. Valeria Hendricks, Tampa, for Appellee.
(PER CURIAM.) Appellant appeals a final order dismissing its complaint with prejudice for lack of standing to bring suit [10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 925b]. The appeal is timely, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A).
This case involves a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits allegedly owed to Appellant, as assignee of Richard Dietrich, by Appellee. A copy of a document purporting to be the assignment was attached to the original complaint. The body of the document states:
I hereby instruct and direct my attorney/insurance company to pay by check any outstanding balance at the time of settlement and mailed (sic) directly to (the provider).
A photocopy of this Assignment shall be considered as effective and valid as the original.
I also authorize [the provider] to release any information pertinent to my case to any insurance company, adjuster, and attorney involved in this case; and hereby release [the provider] and it’s [sic] staff of any consequences thereof.
The original complaint was dismissed on the ground that the attached document did not assign benefits to Appellant. An amended complaint stated that the assignment if not direct, was a de facto or equitable assignment; the foregoing document was not attached to the amended complaint.
Appellee filed another motion to dismiss, alleging that Appellant did not have a valid assignment of benefits from the insured, and therefore lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted this motion, dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss, as it looked beyond the four corners of the complaint. Further, Appellant argues that its complaint specifically pled that it contained a direct assignment or in the alternative, a de facto/equitable assignment. Appellee counters that the document attached to the original complaint and purportedly attached to the amended complaint did not legally assign the insured’s PIP benefits to the provider; therefore the provider lacked standing to bring a cause of action under section 627.736, Florida Statutes. We agree with Appellee and affirm the decision of the trial court.
The document that Appellant alleges is an assignment or is indicative of an intent to create an assignment does not create an equitable assignment where the plain language therein does not convey that intent. Moreover, Appellant’s argument that because the assignment was not attached to the amended complaint, the court went beyond the four corners of the complaint when it considered the document in relation to the amended claim of equitable assignment is without merit. Any documents attached to a complaint “become a part thereof for all purposes.” Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130(b). Moreover, if such attached document is inconsistent with or negates the allegations of the complaint, the facts revealed by the document controls and neutralizes those contrary allegations and further, renders the complaint objectionable. Kent Electric Co. v. Jacksonville Electric Authority, 395 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Padgett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Santa Rosa County, 378 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
To affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s action, this court need look no further than its prior precedent in Brazell v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 97-7655 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2000). Therein, in support of a motion to dismiss, the insurer in Brazell filed a document that included a section entitled, “Authorization to Pay Provider Directly.” The trial court granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss the claimant’s complaint. In reversing the dismissal, this court stated that the “Authorization to Pay Provider Directly” contains nothing stating that Appellant is giving up her rights to her PIP benefits, or that the health care provider is accepting an assignment. See also Artau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 679a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. May 19, 1999) (reversing summary judgement and stating that plaintiff’s authorization for direct payment and direct submission by provider to insurer for direct payment insufficient to create assignment). The use of the term “assignment” does not create an assignment in this context, anymore than it did in Wallace v. Omni Ins. Co., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 284b (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 2, 1998), wherein the appellate court reversed a dismissal in favor of the insurer, stating that even language referring to the document as an assignment does not create an assignment when all it does is allow for direct payment.
Consistent with the foregoing, the trial court correctly held that the subject document does not assign the insured’s PIP benefits to Appellant. It merely directs the insurer to pay by check to Appellant “any outstanding balance at the time of settlement.” There is nothing in the plain language of the document that transfers any of the insured’s interest in his personal injury protection benefits or gives Appellant any rights to enforce his claim for benefits. Additionally, the language is inconsistent with an intent to create an equitable assignment.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed this action with prejudice because the amended complaint facially revealed that the provider lacked standing to bring an action against the insurer. See Timmins v. Firestone, 283 So.2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (affirming dismissal where complaint and second amended complaint facially revealed that affirmative defense of statute of limitations had run).
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