9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 324a
Insurance — Personal injury protection — Contracts — Because each of insurer’s denials or reductions of claimed PIP benefits constitutes breach of contract which gives rise to separate cause of action, which insured can choose to bring at any time within applicable statute of limitations, insured’s failure in contract action to bring any claims or causes of action or potential causes of action arising after date of filing of lawsuit does not constitute improper splitting of a cause of action — Any claims, causes of action or potential causes of action arising after filing of suit are irrelevant to any issues in suit, particularly issue of whether treatment sought by insured prior to filing suit was medically necessary — Evidence limited accordingly
TIFFANY RIMAR, Plaintiff, vs. METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. County Court, 9th Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County. Case No. CCO 00-7577. March 8, 2002. C. Jeffery Arnold, Judge. Counsel: Norm Monroe. Thomas Andrew Player, Weis Legal Group, P.A., Maitland.
ORDER
This action was heard on February 26, 2002, on paragraph 18 of Plaintiff’s Amended Motion in Limine (served on July 20, 2001) regarding admissibility of information or testimony concerning any chiropractic or medical treatment received by the insured beyond the date of the filing of this lawsuit. The court finds that
1. It is a well established principle of contract law that each separate breach of a contract gives rise to a separate cause of action for the given breach;
2. as applied to claims for personal injury protection benefits, each time a claim for PIP benefits is submitted to an insurer and payment is denied or reduced, a separate cause of action arises for breach of contract;
3. in the instant case, Plaintiff’s claim for damages in this breach of contract action encompasses all claims and causes of action arising from breaches of the insurance contract occurring prior to the date this action was filed, July 10, 2000;
4. any claims or causes of action, or potential claims or causes of action arising after July 10, 2000 are not at issue in this lawsuit;
5. because this action is brought in contract and not in tort, Plaintiff’s failure to bring any claims or causes of action, or potential claims or causes of action arising after July 10, 2000 does not constitute a improper splitting of a cause of action, as Defendant contends, as each breach gives rise to a separate cause of action, which Plaintiff can choose to bring at any time within the statute of limitations for such action.
6. Any of Plaintiff’s claims or causes of action, or potential claims or causes of action arising after July 10, 2000 are irrelevant to any issue in this lawsuit, particularly the primary issue of whether treatment sought by Plaintiff prior to July 10, 2000 was medically necessary. Accordingly,
IT IS ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant and its witnesses are prohibited at trial from any mention, comment, reference, suggestion or question regarding the existence of any other claims, lawsuits, or potential claims or lawsuits of the Plaintiff, Tiffany Rimar, accruing after July 10, 2000.
2. Defendant and its witnesses are prohibited at trial from any mention, comment, reference, suggestion or question regarding any chiropractic treatment or other health care services rendered to or sought by Plaintiff, Tiffany Rimar, subsequent to July 10, 2000.
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