2002

27 Fla. L. Weekly D2188a

Insurance — Automobile liability — Contracts — Settlement agreement — Meeting of the minds — Where insurer agreed to plaintiffs’ demand for settlement of claim for policy limits and submitted settlement check along with release which provided for plaintiffs to indemnify insurer for any future claims or litigation arising out of accident, but plaintiffs’ attorney returned settlement checks to insurer with letter rejecting the indemnification language in the release, there was no binding settlement agreement — Disagreement between parties as to the indemnification language was an essential element of the settlement — Trial court should have denied insurer’s motion for summary judgment on its settlement enforcement claim, and should have granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the defense that there was no meeting of the minds — Plaintiffs’ failure to respond after objectionable language was removed from the release did not indicate an acceptance because insurer’s removal of the indemnification language evinced a new settlement offer which plaintiffs were not obliged to accept

Circuit court order granting motion for summary judgment at 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 827a

27 Fla. L. Weekly D331c

Insurance — Automobile liability — Other insurance — In consolidated civil actions relating to an accident involving a tractor-trailer, trial court incorrectly determined two insurance policies, one carried by the driver and owner of the tractor and the other by the owner of the trailer, both provided primary coverage — In light of the respective ownerships of the tractor and trailer, the “other insurance” clauses, found in each of the policies, specifying primary and excess coverage for cases involving trailers connected to motor vehicles with different owners, provide for primary coverage under the driver’s policy and excess coverage under the policy of the owner of the trailer — Although multiple primary coverages are appropriate in some circumstances, the plain wording and meaning of the policies at hand control the resolution of this case

27 Fla. L. Weekly D1723a

Insurance — Automobile liability — Commercial general liability — Multi-flex policy — Stacking — Antistacking clause in automobile part of multi-flex policy is unambiguous, and limits coverage provided by affiliate insurance carriers for the same accident to $1 million — Parties do not dispute that entity providing automobile liability coverage and entity providing CGL coverage are affiliated insurance carriers — Evidence established that automobile liability and CGL were coverage parts within a single multi-flex policy with a single policy number, not separate policies, and that neither the auto part nor the CGL part included an integration clause which would preclude application of antistacking provision in auto part to CGL portion of multi-flex policy — Fact that antistacking clause in auto part applies to both auto and CGL part is buttressed by policy’s inclusion of a provision limiting liability coverage in the auto part — Assertion of antistacking clause does not constitute a coverage defense requiring insurer to comply with Florida’s Claims Administration Statute — Claims administration statute does not apply where insurer is not denying coverage under CGL part of policy, but is arguing that liability is limited to $1 million under policy’s antistacking clause — Antistacking clause applies to additional insured as well as named insured — Trial court reversibly erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, finding that plaintiffs were entitled to stack coverages from the two policy parts

27 Fla. L. Weekly D652a

Insurance — Automobile liability — Bad faith — Discovery — Privilege — Work product — Memoranda prepared by insurer’s employees during litigation over insurance coverage for claims arising from automobile accident involving multiple deaths and injuries fell within work product privilege where the documents were prepared during ongoing bad faith litigation — Intervenors who sought the memoranda failed to establish that they had substantial need for the documents, an exception to the work product rule — Inconsistencies in testimony and discrepancies are not basis to compel production of work product material — The memoranda concerned when one of the employees first learned that one of the persons injured in accident had been rendered quadriplegic, and it appears that, with respect to bad faith issues, intervenors received the “substantial equivalent” of the requested memoranda when the two employees testified at depositions that they did not know or bother to inquire about this person’s condition prior to paying out policy limits to other claimants — Order requiring production of memoranda quashed

27 Fla. L. Weekly D1615a

Insurance — Automobile liability — Settlement agreement — Letter from insurer’s counsel which stated that it was insurer’s “intention to consummate a settlement” for the full extent of the policy limits did not result in a binding settlement agreement — Statement was a conditional statement of intention to take action in the future, and did not give rise to an enforceable contract — Trial court erred in entering order enforcing settlement

27 Fla. L. Weekly D2389a
833 So. 2d 804

Insurance — Class actions — Action against automobile insurer to recover unearned premiums — Where insured was involved in accident after her policy had been canceled, insured demanded that insurer afford coverage for the accident or return unearned premiums, and insurer agreed to reinstate policy and provide coverage for the accident, insured did not have standing to maintain class action against insurer to recover unearned premiums, because insured had no claim for unearned premiums — Because insured had sustained no damages, she had no standing to maintain action on behalf of class — Trial court properly denied class certification

27 Fla. L. Weekly D351a

Contracts — Insurance — Automobile — Class action seeking damages for breach of contract based on insurer’s policy of authorizing non-original equipment manufacturer parts to be used in repair of automobiles — Trial court erred in going beyond four corners of complaint and dismissing complaint for failure to state cause of action based on lack of proof — Appellate court cannot say, based on allegations of complaint, that insured could not produce prima facie evidence supporting his allegations that insurer authorized automobile to be repaired with non-OEM parts without insured’s knowledge, that the non-OEM parts were not of “like kind and quality” and were not only uniformly inferior in quality, but did not restore vehicle to its pre-loss condition, and that insurer’s obligations under policy “could be met only by requiring the exclusive use of factory-authorized or OEM parts”

27 Fla. L. Weekly S492a

Insurance — Automobile — Collision — Coverage — Diminution in value — Automobile collision policy which provides that the insurer must repair or replace the damaged vehicle “with other of like kind and quality” does not obligate the insurer to compensate the insured in money for any diminution in market value after the insurer completes a first-rate repair which returns the vehicle to its pre-accident level of performance, appearance, and function — Insurer’s use of terms “repair,” “replace,” and “like kind and quality” does not create an ambiguity in policy

27 Fla. L. Weekly D881aI

nsurance — Automobile — Collision — Coverage — Competent substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding that insured had eliminated collision coverage in policy prior to accident, after receiving notice of increased premium, in order to reduce her insurance premium — Statute setting forth procedure an insurance company must follow when an additional premium is sought does not preclude insured from changing coverage in order to reduce premium — No merit to insured’s contention that, because reduction of coverage is not one of three options specified in statute, amendment to policy had no effect and original policy remained in effect until cancellation date specified in notice of premium increase — Although letter from insurer stated that policy was reinstated “as originally written,” witnesses testified that language referred to policy with any amendments, including the reduction in coverage

27 Fla. L. Weekly D1841a

Insurance — Automobile — Coverage — Estoppel — Cancellation of policy by insurer upon receipt of copy of cancellation notice from premium finance company — Where insured never received notice of cancellation from premium finance company because premium finance company did not have insured’s correct address, court erred in finding that insurance company should be equitably estopped from denying coverage under policy which had been canceled, because insurance company did have insured’s correct address but failed to provide the correct address to premium finance company — Doctrine of estoppel may not be used to create or extend coverage