2015

40 Fla. L. Weekly D1879a
171 So. 3d 814

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity did not violate clearly established principle of law resulting in miscarriage of justice that could be addressed on second-tier certiorari review by district court by affirming, in a per curiam opinion without discussion, a summary judgment in favor of medical provider entered by county court after it rejected affidavit of insurer’s actuary because it was not shown to be based on personal knowledge or sufficient data and reliable principles

40 Fla. L. Weekly D693b
188 So. 3d 1

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Policy language, which stated that reimbursements “shall” be subject to the limitations in section 627.736, including “all fee schedules,” was sufficient to give notice of insurer’s election to limit reimbursements by use of Medicare fee schedules

40 Fla. L. Weekly D2497b
178 So. 3d 927

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Emergency services — Deductible — Circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity departed from essential requirements of law by affirming county court’s ruling that timely-submitted emergency service provider’s bill was not subject to deductible

40 Fla. L. Weekly D1918a
177 So. 3d 19

Insurance — Personal injury protection — Medical expenses — Coverage — Statutory fee schedules — Clear and unambiguous election by insurer — Policy language providing that any amounts payable “shall be subject to any and all limitations authorized by section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, including, but not limited to, all fee schedules” did not make it clear whether insurer was actually and in fact electing to limit its reimbursements to providers under Medicare fee schedules or was simply announcing that it was reserving its right to elect to do so — Language is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of providers — Conflict certified

40 Fla. L. Weekly D2144a
174 So. 3d 622

Insurance — Automobile liability — Uninsured motorist — Excess coverage — Priority of coverage — Accident involving permissive driver of car owned by another, following which owner’s liability insurer tendered its $100,000 policy limits to injured party and injured party sought coverage from its UM carrier after injured party had unsuccessfully sought payment from owner’s excess liability carrier, which required that owner maintain underlying limits of $250,000 per person — Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of UM carrier on its third-party claim against excess carrier where UM carrier asserted throughout litigation that excess carrier’s umbrella policy came first after owner’s liability policy, and that UM policy was last in priority, but trial court actually held that UM carrier was responsible for $150,000 gap between limit of owner’s automobile liability policy and the $250,000 threshold at which excess coverage was triggered — UM carrier could not claim victory on ground that it requested a generic priority of coverage determination and received what it requested where the priority determination was, in fact, the opposite of what UM carrier sought

40 Fla. L. Weekly D1186a
167 So. 3d 470

Insurance — Policy insuring personal property from hurricane or other weather condition — Notice of claim — Timeliness — Trial court erred in entering summary judgment finding that insured’s notice of claim for damage to furniture in her condominium unit due to mold growth caused by flooding of neighboring unit during hurricane was not “prompt” as a matter of law where notice was given three years after hurricane — Because damage did not become apparent until years after hurricane, issue of whether insured gave “prompt” notice was a jury question, given policy language

40 Fla. L. Weekly D1951a
172 So. 3d 973

Attorney’s fees — Administrative proceedings — Equal Access to Justice Act — Prevailing small business party — Administrative law judge erred in denying attorney’s fees award pursuant to section 57.111 to sole proprietor of general insurance agency whose insurance license was suspended based on administrative complaint in which Department of Financial Services alleged he sold unregistered securities in form of viatical settlement agreements — DFS’s licensing enforcement action was not substantially justified at the time it was filed where viaticals were not regulated as securities in Florida at the time licensee made the sales at issue — Case law decided after licensee sold viaticals at issue cannot form reasonable basis in law for filing administrative complaint

40 Fla. L. Weekly D147c
155 So. 3d 429

Torts — Insurance — Nonjoinder of insurer in tort action against insured — Trial court did not err in denying motion to dismiss with prejudice plaintiff’s breach of policy claim against insurer, but court departed from essential requirements of law in denying motion to sever plaintiff’s breach of policy claim against insurer from negligence claim against insured

40 Fla. L. Weekly D26a
153 So. 3d 384

Insurance — Judges — Disqualification — Statements of trial judge indicating that he had prejudged coverage issue, injecting personal opinions into case, and indicating a bias in favor of insured required disqualification — Petition for writ of prohibition granted

40 Fla. L. Weekly D638d
159 So. 3d 945

Civil procedure — Discovery — Depositions — Head of state agency — Action by Department of Financial Services, acting as receiver for insolvent insurers, against accounting firm, alleging firm negligently prepared inaccurate financial statements for insurance companies that were filed with Office of Insurance Regulation in 2005, and that had accounting firm prepared accurate financial statements, OIR would have recommended that DFS take insurance companies into receivership in 2005, rather than 2006 — Trial court departed from essential requirements of law by requiring Florida Insurance Commissioner, who is agency head of the Office of Insurance Regulation, to appear for a deposition where information sought from Insurance Commissioner was neither necessary to cause of action nor unavailable from other sources — Further, compelling agency head to testify at deposition during which respondents intended to ask him hypothetical questions regarding how he would have carried out his statutory duties in a hypothetical situation violates the separation of powers doctrine